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Introduction
This article was inspired by the challenge laid down by Leslie
Bender in her 1988 article, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory
and Tort,1 to consider the many ways in which the power histori-
cally wielded by men has shaped our legal system, specifically in its
treatment of tortiously-inflicted harm.2 Benders work applied fem-
inist theory to the law of torts and found that the beliefs or atti-
tudes on which the law is based, and which appear to be value-free
and gender neutral, are in fact deeply biased and represent only
one point of view. In particular, the law contains implicit male
norms, which place the male and the masculine at the centre of
law's world view and marginalize the female and the feminine.
Thus the law generally expects and rewards "reasonableness"-a
trait culturally associated with men-and fails to require us to be
consciously caring and responsible towards each other-traits cul-
turally associated with women.3 Bender's most impressive point, in
1. Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 3, 37 (1988).
2. For a compendious summary of work in the area of feminist theory and tort,
see Leslie Bender, An Overview of Feminist Torts Scholarship, 78 CoRNLL L. REv.
575 (1993). One writer's work in particular is very closely related to mine, and her
article could almost be considered a companion piece to this. See Deborah K Hepler,
Providing Creative Remedies to Bystander Emotional Distress Victims: A Feminist
Perspective, 14 N. ILL. U. L. Rrv. 71 (1994).
3. See infra parts IV.A-B.
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my view, relates to the general rule that one cannot sue a "stran-
ger" for failure to come to one's rescue.4 Applying an ethic of care
and responsibility, rather than reasonableness, Bender argues that
the interest of the "stranger" in autonomy is less important than
the interest of the would-be plaintiff in life and health. Bender
makes the further telling point that the would-be plaintiff is bound
to have relationships with other people, who indirectly will be
harmed by that person's injury or death. Thus we might expect
that a system of tort law which had been developed by women and
with traditionally feminine concerns in mind would impose a duty
to rescue, not just for the benefit of the would-be plaintiff, but for
the benefit of the whole community.
This article develops some of these ideas in relation to another
area of tort law,5 namely that which deals with mental injury-
otherwise commonly known as "nervous shock" or "emotional dis-
tress."6 The particular focus of this article is psychic, emotional, or
psychiatric disability (sometimes with physical consequences) suf-
fered as a result of the death of, or of a physical injury to, another
person. In the vast majority of cases, some sort of strong emotional
tie, either of blood or marriage, binds the plaintiff and the physi-
cally injured person. 7 An especially common scenario is mental in-
jury arising out of the death of, or serious injury to, a son or
daughter. It is for this reason that it will be argued that these inju-
ries should be treated as the consequence of the disruption of rela-
tionships-something which the law has, by and large, failed to do.
Rather, the law appears to have assumed that people's connections
with others are unimportant, and it has developed and applied re-
4. See Bender, supra note 1, at 33-36 (discussing "no duty" cases).
5. A very useful complement to my analysis is provided in Hepler, supra note 2,
at 78-87.
6. The former expression is current in Britain and Australia, the latter in the
United States. It is interesting to note the different connotations raised by the two
terms: "nervous shock" sounds more serious and permanent than "emotional dis-
tress." This is perhaps a very good lesson in the importance of naming and terminol-
ogy, considering that recovery is generally much more limited in the jurisdiction that
employs the less serious-sounding term. At the same time, "nervous shock" raises
connotations of neurosis, thus presenting plaintiffs in an unsympathetic light from
the very start. It is also a medical misnomer, and the terminology "has led to break-
down in communication between Medicine and the Law on the subject." John
Havard, Reasonable Foresight of Nervous Shock, 19 MOD. L. REv. 478, 478 (1956). I
prefer "mental injury" because it reflects the fact that this is indeed an injury, and
one to be taken seriously.
7. 1 will resist calling this person the "primary accident victim," as courts and
commentators are wont to do, because this leads to conceptual difficulties. Of course,
the third person is the "primary victim" in the sense that his or her injury will usu-
ally precede the mental injury chronologically. However, it is my purpose to argue
that this type of injury is best understood as caused by a breach of a duty owed
directly to the plaintiff; the popular terminology obscures this.
1996]
Law and Inequality
strictive recovery rules accordingly. For example, the law has often
privileged people who, in a situation of danger, fear only for them-
selves, over people whose primary concern is the safety of others.8
This article develops the argument that this response reflects a fun-
damentally masculine world view.
Obviously, women are not the only people who suffer mental
injury as a result of witnessing the death or injury of another per-
son, but mental injury appears to affect women more often than
men. A brief survey of the cases in this area reveals that the vast
majority of plaintiffs are women. 9 This overrepresentation can be
partly explained by the fact that women are more likely to be the
primary caretakers of children, and are therefore more likely to be
present when a child is injured or killed. However, presence at the
scene of the accident is not necessary to produce mental injury, and
so attention must be paid to a more fundamental explanation for
women's overrepresentation. My argument is that it is the cultur-
ally femininelO world view and attitude toward relationships which
provides this explanation. Quite simply, disruption to relation-
ships, and harm to loved ones, can be expected in this society1 to
affect women more deeply than men. Women are conditioned and
expected to invest more in relationships with others, and thus to
lose more when relationships are brought abruptly and violently to
an end.
! It will have become clear by now that much of the argument in
this article is based on a notion of sexual difference. This notion, it
is acknowledged, can be quite controversial both within and outside
of feminist discourse. I will therefore explain here the types of dif-
ferences on which my analysis relies, and what I think the broader
ramifications of those differences are. As noted above, it is expected
in our society that relationships with others are of greater impor-
8. See infra note 44 and accompanying text.
9. See Martha Chamallas & Linda Kerber, Women, Mothers and the Law of
Fright: A History, 88 MICH. L. REv. 814, 814, 844-49 (1990).
10. My use of the terms "masculine" and "feminine" is intended to describe at-
tributes that appear to belong predominantly to one sex or the other, rather than
any essential sexual difference. This is consistent with my refusal to make any
claims about the origins of gender differences, while still allowing that there is mas-
culine and feminine in all of us. Thus, "masculine values" are those commonly asso-
ciated with men, though any given woman may hold them, and a "feminine injury" is
one that affects a side of one's existence which is commonly identified with or en-
couraged in women, though any given man may suffer it. Thus, whenever I use the
term "masculine" or "feminine," I should be understood as referring predominantly
to cultural rather than biological attributes.
11. When I say "our society," I mean Anglo-dominated Western society. I cannot
presume to speak for other parts of Western society of which I have little experience,
but my assessment of the United Kingdom, the United States of America, and Aus-
tralia is based on long exposure to their culture and traditions.
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tance to women than to our male counterparts, and that we are
more emotionally vulnerable than men.' 2 These characteristics
form an important part of the gender script for female humans in
our society, and because of the sanctions attached to failure to fol-
low the script, the script in the vast bulk of cases becomes a self-
fulfilling prophecy-that is, the prescribed difference becomes an
observable and experienced reality.
A question people commonly raise in the context of gender dif-
ference is whether the difference is innate or learned. Feminists
generally argue that it is learned; others are inclined to insist that
it is innate and therefore it is a waste of time to resist or analyze it.
For the purposes of this paper, however, the origin of the observable
and experienced difference is beside the point. A lawsuit is no place
to be attempting to distinguish nature from nurture. The people
(mainly women) who are plaintiffs in a mental injury case simply
are who they are, and whether any (relative) predisposition they
might have had was a result of hormones or conditioning, they
should not be penalized for it. If this aspect of sex difference is in-
nate, such a penalty amounts to setting men up as the standard by
which others are judged. If, on the other hand, the premium that
women tend to place on relationships is learned, we are confronted
with a double standard whereby society values women for caring
and connection, teaching and encouraging us to display those quali-
ties, and abandons us when faced with the sometimes disastrous
consequences. The real point is that if women are particularly vul-
nerable to mental injury, we are that way as a group, and the traits
that identify the group should not be treated as individual idiosyn-
cracies that are in the control of each person.
The law has now been responding to compensation claims for
mental injury for some time. Discussion by courts and commenta-
tors has at times revealed a deep distrust of such injuries. Argu-
ments have been advanced about the danger of a flood of fraudulent
and/or trivial claims, or simply a flood of claims, and of liability that
would exceed culpability. Courts have developed, and commenta-
tors have proposed, a number of mechanical rules in an attempt to
address these concerns. I will argue that none of these rules is sat-
isfactory, for both doctrinal reasons and reasons of principle. Part I
of this article provides a brief overview of the various rules which
have been, and in some cases continue to be, applied in mental in-
jury cases. Part II explains some inconsistencies between general
12. See generally CAROL Gnuo-AN, IN A DuYEREzN Vo1cyn PS-ChOLOGmIcL Tvm-
ORY AND WOMEN's DEVELOPMENT (1982). The work of Gilligan and other feminist
theorists will be discussed in greater length at Part V.
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principles of tort law and the various approaches taken to mental
injury.
Finally, Parts III and IV argue that the lack of any real coher-
ence in the law relating to mental injury belies a deeper and possi-
bly unconscious bias against the female and the feminine. The
mental injury rules developed by courts perpetuate culturally mas-
culine values in relation to what is essentially a feminine injury.13
Some of the rules are redolent of the Cartesian mind-body split, a
notion which has always had a tendency to treat women as second-
class human beings.14 Some of the rules are predicated on the no-
tion that people identify themselves, or should identify themselves,
primarily as individuals, in the mold of classical liberal atomism.15
This once again is a notion that tends to describe men's experience
more accurately than women's, and so treats women as in some
sense abnormal. And some of the rules perpetuate implicit male
norms, in one or more of three ways: by tending to value "economic"
losses over losses sounding in the emotions or in relationships, by
defining "reasonableness" in such a way as to describe a world view
that can be identified as masculine, or by rewarding masculine ac-
tivities like heroism while marginalizing characteristics that are
more culturally feminine, such as caring and connection with
others.16 All of this amounts, I argue, to a double standard, where
society values women for being caring and concerned with connec-
tion, and treats women who suffer injury as a result of that concern
as somehow abnormal and undeserving.17 In this way, I develop in
this article a picture of the law relating to mental injury as firmly
entrenched in the values and culture of patriarchy.
I. The Historical Development of the Law of Mental
Injury
It is impossible to understand the law's present response to
mental injury occasioned by the death of or by injury to a third per-
son without surveying the historical treatment of non-physical in-
13. An example of the sense in which mental injury is "feminine" according to
our everyday understandings is in the House of Lords decision of Page v. Smith,
where Lord Jauncey of Tullichettle uses "a woman prone to hysteria" as his example
of a person particularly susceptible to mental injury. [1995] 2 All E.R. 736, 749 (ap-
peal taken from Eng. CA.). The introduction of a gendered image was quite unnec-
essary here, and in my view illustrates the tendency of judges and commentators
consciously or unconsciously to treat the injury as one belonging to women as a
gender.
14. See infa part IV.A.
15. See infra part WV.B.
16. See infra part IV.C.
17. See infra part IV.D.
[Vol. 14:391
A FEMINIST CRITIQUE
jury. There are a number of ways such injury may arise. Many of
the older cases involved shock or fright to a plaintiff who was placed
in physical danger but not actually touched by the defendant. Such
cases form the pedigree for present legal doctrine.
The law has treated these injuries in a number of ways. The
general trend has been towards liberalization of recovery rules, but
there remain serious restrictions. In the earliest cases, mental in-
jury was simply not recognized as sounding in damages.18 Even
once mental injury was recognized, around the turn of the century,
as legally cognizable, two rules (each of which is still applied in
some United States jurisdictions) have perpetuated the burden on
plaintiffs to prove the breach of a duty in respect of physical integ-
rity. The first, again from around the turn of the century, requires
plaintiffs to have suffered some kind of physical impact in the
course of events leading up to their mental injury. This is com-
monly known as the "impact rule."19 The second rule, again devel-
oped as early as the turn of the century, but mainly since the early
1960s, requires that the defendant's actions should have physically
endangered the plaintiff. This rule is commonly referred to as the
"zone of danger rule."20 Finally, since 1968, some United States ju-
risdictions have recognized a duty towards people who were not
touched or endangered in the accident, provided that certain other
criteria were met. This approach is commonly named after the Cal-
ifornia case that originated it, Dillon v. Legg.21 Apart from an ex-
ception for "direct victim[s] of the assertedly negligent act,"2 2 the
Dillon approach appears to be the "state of the art" in recovery for
mental injury in the United States. The approach introduced in the
1984 Australian case of Jaensch v. Coffey28 represents an even
greater liberality in recognizing mental injury claims than the Dil-
lon approach, but still contains limitations as compared with the
approach to other kinds of injury.
It appears that there have been significant advances in the
law-informed and inspired, no doubt, by advances in medical sci-
ence-in the willingness to recognize mental injury as serious and
debilitating and worthy of the tort system's attention. However,
there remain fairly substantial limitations on recovery throughout
the United States, Australia, and the United Kingdom. In most ju-
18. See discussion infra part I.A
19. See discussion infra part I.B.
20. See discussion infra part I.C.
21. 441 P.2d 911 (Cal. 1968). See discussion infra part I.D.
22. Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 616 P.2d 813, 816 (Cal. 1980). See infra text
accompanying notes 69-78.
23. 155 C.L.R. 549 (Austl. 1984). See infra text accompanying notes 86-103.
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risdictions, mental injury plaintiffs are required to show that their
injury is a psychiatrically diagnosable disease; in some, they are
required to show that their injury is one of a particular severity. 24
Some jurisdictions allow only plaintiffs who were within a certain
distance of the accident to recover; some allow only plaintiffs who
learned of the accident within a certain time of its occurrence to
recover.2 5 Some require plaintiffs to have physically witnessed the
accident; others extend recovery to plaintiffs who witnessed the af-
termath of the accident, for example at the hospital. 26 Plaintiffs
who are injured by the strain of caring for the physically injured
person after the accident cannot recover. 27 Many jurisdictions im-
pose a requirement that the defendant must be liable also to the
physically injured person,28 which can pose significant problems in
cases of contributory negligence by the physically injured person.
And finally, there are indications that mental injury arising out of
what in many courts' opinions amounts to "irrational guilt feel-
ings"-that is, where a plaintiff blames herself for the physical in-
jury to the other person, even though it is not her fault-is not
recoverable.2A All of these restrictions indicate that we are still a
long way from the situation where mental injury is treated as on a
par with physical injury.
A Damage Not Recognized
Initially, mental harm was simply non-harm. 30 It was re-
garded as transient or trivial, and simply not something on which
courts should waste time. This attitude can partly be explained by
the state of medical knowledge in the nineteenth century and ear-
lier, when lack of understanding about the workings of the human
mind consigned depression, anxiety, and neurosis to the same cate-
gory as "mere" grief, sorrow, or upset. Since "the low is not con-
cerned with trifles,"31 such injury could not form the basis for an
action. Another argument advanced was that such damages were
24. See infra part I.E.1.
25. See infra part I.E.2.
26. See infra part I.E.3.
27. See infra part I.E.4.
28. See infra part I.E.5.
29. See infra part I.E.6.
30. "Historically, the purpose of the tort law has been to compensate innocent
persons for their economic losses inflicted by the carelessness of others." Ballinger v.
Palm Springs Aerial Tramway, 269 Cal. Rptr. 583,590 (Ct. App. 1990) (McDaniel, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis added). See also Monteleone v. Coop. Transit Co., 36 S.E.2d
475,480 (W. Va. 1945); Harold F. McNiece, Psychic Injury and Tort Liability in New
York, 24 ST. JomN's L. REV. 1, 9 (1949).
31. From the maxim "de minimus non curat lex." There were also concerns
about the difficulty of proving the existence of such injury.
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essentially vindictive or punitive-an attitude which could perhaps
be seen as a precursor to present concerns about disproportionality
between liability and culpability.32 However, damages for mental
suffering have always been available where the plaintiff was also
physically injured. Under the doctrine of "parasitic damages," com-
pensation for pain and suffering, no matter how great, has always
been able to ride on the back of damages for physical injury.3 3 The
"parasitic damages" rule was a way of recognizing mental injury
without increasing the pool of potential plaintiffs.34 A plaintiff who
suffered both physical and mental injury could sue, no matter how
trivial the physical injury. However, a plaintiff who suffered only
shock or fright could not sue, no matter how severe the mental
injury.
B. The Impact Rule
The view that damages for non-physical injury were mere tri-
fles, and hence not the concern of the law, was challenged by cases
where a plaintiff suffered some physical consequences of his or her
fright; a common example is the case of a pregnant woman suffer-
ing a miscarriage. 3 5 It is difficult to regard such an injury as triv-
ial, so courts found other justifications for denying recovery, such as
the danger of a flood of fabricated claims and the difficulty of prov-
ing factual causation.
The courts developed a rule, commonly referred to as the "im-
pact rule," which was thought to have the capacity to avoid the two
main difficulties:36 the plaintiff could recover so long as he or she
32. See Blackwell v. Oser, 436 So. 2d 1293, 1295 (La. Ct. App. 1983). The court
later noted that it has been held that such damages are not "vindictive." Id. at 1297.
However, similar arguments have surfaced in the literature relatively recently.
Richard Pearson argued in 1982 that plaintiffs should not be compensated for the
"intangible harm" arising out of the loss of relatives because it is impossible to re-
store such plaintiffs to their pre-accident condition: "it is because the mother's claim
to our sympathy is so strong that money damages seem so inappropriate." Richard
N. Pearson, Liability to Bystanders for Negligently Inflicted Emotional Harm: A
Comment on the Nature of Arbitrary Rules, 34 U. FiA. L. REv. 477, 502 (1982). Dis-
proportionality between culpability and liability is discussed further in Part II.C.
33. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 54, at 362-65 (5th ed. 1984); JOHN A. FLEMING, THE LAW OF TORTS 145 (7th ed.
1987); Pearson, supra note 32, at 486.
34. It has been said that the "parasitic damages" rule also worked to discourage
fraudulent claims. See Ethan Finneran, The Death of the Ensuing Physical Injury
Rule: Validating Claims for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Harm, 10 HOFSTRA L.
REv. 213, 218-19 n.28 (1981).
35. See, e.g., Bourhill v. Young, 1943 App. Cas. 92 (appeal taken from Scot.);
Reed v. Moore, 319 P.2d 80 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957); Pankropf v. Hinkley, 123 N.W. 625
(Wis. 1909).
36. See, e.g., Lejeune v. Rayne Branch Hosp., 556 So. 2d 559, 563 (La. 1990); see
also Alvan Brody, Negligently Inflicted Psychic Injuries: A Return to Reason, 7 VmL.
1996]
Law and Inequality
had been touched in some way in the course of the events that pro-
duced the shock. Thus, in a case where the plaintiff was frightened
by the defendant's charging horses, which came so close to her that
she was standing between their heads when they stopped, recovery
was denied.37 In other cases, successful plaintiffs based their
claims on smoke inhalation3S or dust in the eye.3 9 Thus, "some
courts stretched the concepts of physical injury and physical im-
pact" where "justice seemed to call for compensation."40
C. The Zone of Danger Rule
By the end of the first half of this century, most courts were
willing, probably as a result of advances in medical science, to ac-
cept that extreme fright could have physical consequences. 41 How-
ever, this recognition led to another problem: was mental integrity
L. REv. 232, 233-35 (1961-62); Jonathan IK Golden, The Development of Recovery for
Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress Arising from Peril or Injury to Another: An
Analysis of the American and Australian Approaches, 26 EMORY L.J. 647, 649 (1977);
Comment, Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress: The Case for an Independent Tort,
59 GEo. L.J. 1237, 1239-40 (1971) [hereinafter Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress].
For general rejections of this type of reasoning, see Niederman v. Brodsky, 261 A.2d
84, 86-89 (Pa. 1970); Brody, supra, at 243 (stating that "as a problem of causation...
the mental anguish of the onlooker does not depend upon whether he is physically
injured by the same force which imperils or harms the victim").
Some have interpreted the impact rule as the corollary of the proposition that
there can be no recovery for mere fright. So, the argument goes, there cannot be
recovery for the consequences of fright. See McNiece, supra note 30, at 25-27 ("Actu-
ally, of course, the fright is proved merely in an effort to show the chain of causa-
tion." (citing Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 45 N.E. 354, 355 (N.Y. 1896))).
37. Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 45 N.E. 354 (N.Y. 1896).
38. Morton v. Stack, 170 N.E. 869 (Ohio 1930), discussed in KEETON ET AL.,
supra note 33, at 364.
39. Porter v. Delaware Lackawanna Western R.R., 63 A. 860 (N.J. 1906), dis-
cussed in KEETON ET AL., supra note 33, at 364.
The Supreme Court of Illinois noted in Rickey v. Chicago Transit Auth., 457
N.E.2d 1 (Ill. 1983), that recovery in this type of case was a major reason for the
rule's "loss of adherents." Id. at 4. See also McNiece, supra note 30, at 28 (pointing
out that such cases make a mockery of the argument from proximate cause which
supposedly supports the impact rule); Pearson, supra note 32, at 487-88 (arguing
that the problem with the impact rule is that it confuses liability and damages, "[tihe
discontinuity between the damages rule recognising fright as an appropriate ele-
ment of harm and the liability rule limiting recovery to cases involving impact would
inevitably doom the rule").
40. Bowen v. Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co., 517 N.W.2d 432, 437 (Wis. 1994).
41. As one court recently explained:
The abandonment of the impact rule resulted from the appropriate rec-
ognition by courts of two related concepts: First that a negligent actor
can produce mental trauma in another without physical impacts, and
second, that advances in medical science permit the diagnosis of mental
trauma with accuracy akin to that available for the diagnosis of physi-
cal trauma.
Asaro v. Cardinal Glennon Memorial Hosp., 799 S.W.2d 595, 598 (Mo. 1990). See
generally Paul V. Calandrella, Safe Haven for a Troubled Tort: A Return to the Zone
[Vol. 14:391
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now an independently protected interest? The United States
courts' answer, by and large, was no; the rule encapsulating this
response is generally known as the "zone of danger rule."42 Only
plaintiffs who were themselves physically endangered (as well as
frightened) by the defendant's negligence can recover.
Jurisdictions differ as to the exact operation of the zone of dan-
ger rule. In some, as long as the plaintiff was in fact in the zone of
danger, he or she can recover, irrespective of whether he or she
feared for him- or herself or for another person;43 in others it seems
that the plaintiff must testify that he or she was afraid for him- or
herself. 44 We might call the former the "weak" version of the zone
of Danger for the Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress, 26 SUFFOLK U. L. REV.
79 (1992).
42. See, e.g., Rickey, 457 N.E.2d 1; Purcell v. St. Paul Ry., 50 N.W. 1034 (Minn.
1892); Bass v. Nooney Co., 646 S.W.2d 765 (Mo. 1983); Jelley v. LaFlame, 238 A.2d
728 (N.H. 1968); Bovsun v. Sanperi, 461 N.E.2d 843 (N.Y. 1984); Niederman v. Brod-
sky, 261 A.2d 84 (Pa. 1970); Johnson v. Rogers, 763 P.2d 771, 785 (Utah 1988); Sa-
yard v. Cody Chevrolet, Inc., 234 A.2d 656 (Vt. 1967). Although the zone of danger
rule is commonly regarded as a uniquely American invention, a recent House of
Lords decision adopts something similar in that it distinguishes between "bystand-
ers" (who need to show that injury by nervous shock was foreseeable) and "partici-
pants" (who can rely on the foreseeability of physical injury to form the basis of a
duty of care). See Page v. Smith, [199512 All E.R. 736 (appeal taken from Eng. C.A.).
43. See, e.g., Orlo v. Connecticut Co., 21 A.2d 402 (Conn. 1941); Asaro, 799
S.W.2d at 598; Reed v. Cioffi, Seftel & Soni, P.C., 548 N.Y.S.2d 73 (App. Div. 1989);
Trombetta v. Conkling, 593 N.Y.S.2d 670, 671 (App. Div. 1993). However, the court
in Asaro later asserted that liability under the zone of danger rule is predicated on
"reasonable fear of personal, physical injury," which would suggest that the test is
both subjective and objective. 799 S.W.2d at 599. In Bowman v. Williams, 165 A.2d
182 (Md. 1933), the Court of Appeals of Maryland pointed out that fear is the same,
whether it is "objective" or "subjective" and so "there is neither logic nor reason" in
the distinction. 165 A.2d at 183. See also Stanley W. West, Torts-Recovery for
Physically Manifested Mental Distress-Towards a More Liberal Negligence Ap-
proach, 10 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 187, 188 (1974) (calling this version of the zone of
danger rule a "misnomer in that the damages awarded do not result from the plain-
tiff's presence in the 'zone of danger,' but rather are awarded for mental suffering
which would have resulted irrespective of the exact position of the plaintiff").
In D'Ambra v. United States, 338 A.2d 524 (R.I. 1975), the zone of danger rule
was defended on the basis that it "does reflect the core notion of some reasonable
relation or nexus between the negligent conduct and the injury sued upon." Id. at
530. The court did not appear to see any significant difference between the zone of
danger rule and the more permissive rules laid down in Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912
(Cal. 1968). See infra notes 60-62 and accompanying text; see also Chamallas &
Kerber, supra note 9. at 821-22. Havard suggests that even if a plaintiff thinks that
he or she feared for another person, the fear was probably in fact for him- or herself.
Havard, supra note 6, at 482-83.
44. In Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 379 P.2d 513 (Cal. 1963), for ex-
ample, the plaintiff had actually refused the opportunity to amend her statement of
claim to say that she had feared for herself rather than for her son. Her claim was
denied, and it appeared that the court assumed that the requirement was fear for
oneself. Id. at 517-20. See also Reed v. Moore, 319 P.2d 80 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957)
(holding that miscarriage which resulted from fright for one's own safety is compen-
sable); Strazza v. McKittrick, 136 A.2d 149 (Conn. 1959) (allowing recovery to plain-
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of danger rule and the latter the "strong" version.45 The difficulties
of the strong version were noted in the English case of Hambrook v.
Stokes Bros.46 The plaintiff's wife saw the defendant's runaway
lorry careening towards a place where she knew her children were
walking to school; upon hearing the news that a little girl had been
hurt, the woman suffered nervous shock and a severe hemorrhage,
as a result of which the fetus she was carrying was stillborn, and
the woman herself died.47 The plaintiff sued for his wife's wrongful
death. The reason the facts of this case present a difficulty from the
tiff who feared for her own safety); Williams v. Baker, 572 A.2d 1062, 1064 (D.C.
1990) (barring recovery to mother for emotional distress caused by witnessing physi-
cian's negligent treatment of her child); Rickey v. Chicago Transit Auth., 457 N.E.2d
1, 5 (Ill. 1983) (holding that a bystander in the zone of danger who had reasonable
fear for her own safety has right of action for emotional distress); Stadler v. Cross,
295 N.W.2d 552, 553 (Minn. 1980) (denying recovery for bystanders not reasonably
positioned to fear for their own safety); Asaro, 799 S.W.2d at 599 (Mo. 1990) (requir-
ing fear for oneself which was both actual and reasonable); Lancellotti v. Howard,
547 N.Y.S.2d 654 (App. Div. 1989) (denying recovery to plaintiff whose erroneous
pregnancy diagnosis did not result in fear for her own safety); Waube v. Warrington,
258 N.W. 497, 499 (Wis. 1935) (denying recovery to husband for wife's death which
resulted from her witnessing the death of their child on the grounds that had she
lived she would not have been allowed to recover damages); AKL. Goodhart, Emo-
tional Shock and the Unimaginative Taxicab Driver, 69 L.Q. REV. 347, 348-49 (1953)
(discussing the opinion of Hodson, L.J., in King v. Phillips, [1953] 2 W.L.R. 526);
Pearson, supra note 32, at 490 (defending this version of the zone of danger rule on
the basis that it maintains continuity between the damage recognized-fear for one-
self-and the rule of liability); Golden, supra note 36, at 650 (discussing mental dis-
tress arising from peril or harm to self); Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress, supra
note 36, at 1240-41, 1243 (discussing the requirement of fear for self in recoveries for
mental distress). The Wisconsin Supreme Court explicitly rejected this aspect of the
rule in Bowen v. Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co., 517 N.W.2d 432 (Wis. 1994).
Brody noted in 1962 that the zone of danger rule appeared to mean that, where
the plaintiff feared both for him- or herself and for another person, damages would
be apportioned between those attributable to the first and the second fear, and that
the award would cover only the former. Brody, supra note 36, at 241-42. Somewhat
paradoxically, the plaintiff would have full recovery under the impact rule, provided
its other requirements were met. Id. Apportionment between injury arising from
fear for self and fear for others was required in the English case of Richard and Wife
v. Plymouth Coop. Soc'y (1903). See Havard, supra note 6, at 485-86.
45. For example, in Klassa v. Milwaukee Gas Light Co., 77 N.W.2d 397 (Wis.
1956), the plaintiff and her children were in the basement of their home when em-
ployees of the defendant caused a fire there, but the plaintiff was in the laundry
room and therefore separated from her children at the time of the fire. Id. at 400.
The defendant argued that the plaintiff's shock and fright did not stem from the
original fire but rather from learning that the children were in the basement. Id. at
402. Recovery was excluded unless the plaintiff could prove that she had feared for
her own safety. Id. at 404. In Strazza v. McKittrick, the plaintiff heard a truck
crash into the porch where she thought her child was waiting. 156 A.2d at 151. The
Connecticut Supreme Court held that the plaintiff could recover for injuries stem-
ming from fear for herself, but not for injuries stemming from fear for her child. Id.
at 152. In both these cases, the plaintiff was in the zone of danger, but recovery was
limited according to the state of the plaintiff's mind at the time of the accident.




point of view of the strong version of the zone of danger rule is that
the woman was arguably in the zone of danger herself, so the weak
version of the zone of danger rule would not preclude her (or anyone
claiming through her) from recovering. Under the strong version of
the zone of danger rule, however, she would have to prove that her
fear was actually for herself and not for her children.
It is entirely likely that the involvement of the mother-child
relationship in the case was a significant factor in convincing the
court of appeal to allow her husband's wrongful death claim, in
spite of the fact that the woman did not necessarily fear for her own
physical safety. Lord Justice Bankes, in a now rather famous state-
ment, compared the "natural" feelings of a "courageous" mother,
who is "devoted to her child" and fears only for the child, with the
"non-natural" feelings of a woman who "is timid and lacking in the
motherly instinct" and thinks only of herself.48 Not surprisingly,
Justice Bankes saw the former mother as more deserving and re-
fused to fashion a rule which would deny her claim.49 Thus, in es-
sence, Bankes applied the weak version of the zone of danger rule.
Bankes was willing to give legal recognition to the fear of a mother
for the safety of her children, and thus to the kind of selflessness
that makes the strong version seem harsh and unrealistic in a
world where connections between people are important.
A later case supports this interpretation. In Bourhill v.
Young5O the House of Lords denied recovery to a woman who suf-
fered a miscarriage as a result of witnessing the immediate after-
math of a fatal motorcycle accident. Because there was a tram
between her and the motorcyclist at the time of the collision, she
only heard the impact and later saw a pool of blood on the road.51
48. Id. at 151.
49. Id. at 151-52. As a feminist, one must feel ambivalent about this statement,
though it is clear that the more acceptable result is reached. The simple fact is that
most women do have special connections with their children, whose safety is likely to
be at least as important to them as their own, and possibly more so. Lord Justice
Bankes' statement recognises this significant reality, and yet passes judgment on
women who do not conform to this standard. On the one hand, it is refreshing that
Justice Bankes does not see the "maternal instinct" as an inevitable phenomenon,
and on the other hand, it is discomforting that its absence is a reason for (albeit
mild) censure. However, the important fact is that the censure is mild, and his Lord-
ship does not hint that he would exclude the claim of the "timid" mother.
Havard comments on this passage in Bankes' judgment: "It would, in any case,
be impossible to attribute the 'courageous' mother's damage to fear for her child,
unless it was assumed that she was entirely lacking in the normal instinctive and
automatic emotional reaction to an immediate threat to her own life: a proposition
which is medically unsound and based largely on sentiment." Havard, supra note 6,
at 489.
50. 1943 App. Cas. 92 (1942) (appeal taken from Scot.).
51. Id. at 101.
1996] 403
Law and Inequality
Unless the mother-child relationship was an exception to the zone
of danger rule in England, it must be concluded that the weak ver-
sion of the zone of danger rule remained in force: the tram between
the plaintiff and the cyclist put the former out of the zone of danger.
The witness simply could not reasonably have feared for herself.52
The zone of danger rule was finally expressly rejected in Eng-
land in 1982.53 The rule is still in force in many jurisdictions of the
United States, however, and courts have been much stricter in ap-
plying the rule.54 Proponents of the rule believe that it guards
against unlimited liability: a defendant can cause fear in many
more people than he or she can physically endanger. 55
A comparison of the zone of danger rule and the impact rule
shows that the essential difference between the two is that the zone
of danger rule was a step towards recognizing a duty of care in re-
spect of mental injury. The impact rule tied duty very closely to
physical injury, and therefore individuals had a duty of care to
avoid physical injury. Mental integrity was not a protected inter-
est. The zone of danger rule, on the other hand, recognized that
injury could arise out of fright without impact, and so moved away
from insistence on physical injury.56 In this sense, it is best under-
stood as a precursor to a duty of care to avoid actions that would
52. Goodhart suggests that the foundation of the Bourhill decision was distrust
of the plaintiff's assertion that her miscarriage was caused by the defendant's negli-
gence, rather than any point of doctrine or principle. '[Tihe distinction between fore-
sight of physical injury and foresight of emotional shock was probably not in the
minds of their Lordships as it was clear that the emotional shock could not reason-
ably be attributed to the motor-cyclist's negligence." Goodhart, supra note 44, at
348. Goodhart also suggests that Hambrook itself could be seen as abandoning the
zone of danger rule, since it was not clear that the plaintiff there was in any danger
herself. A.L. Goodhart, The Shock Cases and Area of Risk, 16 Mop. L. REv. 14, 18-19
(1953). This would appear to support Goodhart's theory about the basis of the deci-
sion in Bourhill. See id. at 20.
53. See McLoughlin v. O'Brian [1982] 2 W.L.R. 982, 983 (appeal taken from Eng.
C.A.).
54. See, e.g., Williams v. Baker, 572 A.2d 1062 (D.C. 1990) (holding that mother
could not recover for emotional distress caused by witnessing physician's negligent
treatment of her child); Stadler v. Cross, 295 N.W.2d 552 (Minn. 1980) (denying re-
covery to parents who saw their child hit by a truck); Asaro v. Cardinal Glennon
Memorial Hosp., 799 S.W.2d 595 (Mo. 1990) (denying relief for mother's emotional
distress caused by medical malpractice on her son); Reed v. Cioffi, Seftel & Soni,
P.C., 548 N.Y.S.2d 73 (App. Div. 1989); Oresky v. Scharf, 510 N.Y.S.2d 897 (App.
Div. 1987) (denying recovery for emotional distress to daughters of a nursing home
resident who disappeared from the home).
55. See Tobin v. Grossman, 249 N.E.2d 419, 423 (N.Y. 1969); Pearson, supra
note 32, at 507; Comment, Negligence and the Infliction of Emotional Harm: A Reap-
praisal of the Nervous Shock Cases, 35 U. Cm. L. 1Ev. 512, 512 n.2 (1968) [hereinaf-
ter Negligence and Emotional Harml. However, even this understanding can be
challenged. See infra text accompanying notes 186-89, 209-12.
56. It is on this basis that Pearson prefers the zone of danger rule to the impact
rule: "the zone of danger rule neatly dovetails liability and damages" in the sense
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inflict mental injury. Yet, as will be shown below, analysis of the
zone of danger rule in relation to fundamental legal principles
shows that the rule did not in fact recognize a duty of care in re-
spect of mental injury.57 Rather, recovery seems to be based on a
theory somewhat akin to parasitic damages: a duty is owed in cer-
tain circumstances, depending mainly on the foreseeability of a cer-
tain type of damage (physical), but then damages are available for
other kinds of injury arising from the same negligent act. Looking
at it from a defendant's point of view, there is only a duty to avoid
certain kinds of behaviour, and (theoretically) any behaviour that
raises a risk only of mental injury is permissible, as long as there is
no duty relating to that kind of injury. Of course, most negligence
raises a risk of both types of injury, so in most cases the difference
is academic, but this analysis highlights the extent to which physi-
cal injury remains the paradigm in the minds of courts applying the
zone of danger rule.58 What in essence has happened is that courts
have extended liability without extending duty59 because the de-
fendant was in breach of a well-recognized duty owed to the plain-
tiff in respect of physical safety. There was no behaviour that
previously had been permissible that became negligent as a result
of the adoption of the rule.
D. A General Duty of Care in Respect of Mental Injury?
The first major break with the heavily restrictive rules de-
scribed above in the United States came in 1968, when the
Supreme Court of California decided Dillon v. Legg. 60 The facts of
the case exposed the arbitrariness of the zone of danger rule. The
that it predicates liability on invasion of the protected interest, which is the interest
in freedom from fear for oneself. Pearson, supra note 32, at 490.
57. See discussion infra part III.A.1.
58. As we shall see later, further liberalizations have left untouched the para-
digm status of physical injury.
59. As much was explicitly recognized in Asaro v. Cardinal Glennon Memorial
Hosp., 799 S.W.2d 595, 599 (Mo. 1990) (stating that the zone of danger rule "permits
recovery according to the defendant's already existing duty of care to the plaintiff");
see also Williams v. Baker, 572 A.2d 1062, 1065, 1072-73 (D.C. App. 1990) (adopting
the zone of danger rule to impose liability for mental distress but refusing to recog-
nize a duty of care to avoid causing such distress); Tobin v. Grossman, 249 N.E.2d
419, 421 (N.Y. 1969) (discussing the courts' expansion of tort concepts to include
mental harm rather than the creation of an entirely new cause of action); Waube v.
Warrington, 258 N.W. 497, 500-01 (Wis. 1935). It was on this basis that the rule
commended itself to the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in Dziokonski v.
Babineau, 380 N.E.2d 1295 (Mass. 1978), but the court ultimately extended liability
in that case, noting that the rule "is an inadequate measure of the reasonable fore-
seeability of the possibility of physical injury resulting from a parent's anxiety aris-
ing from harm to his child." Id. at 1300.
60. 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968).
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plaintiff was outside the zone of danger because she was sitting on
the porch of her home when her daughter was struck and killed by
a negligent driver, yet the woman's other daughter was in the zone
of danger because she was in the street with her sister at the time
of the accident. The majority recognized this aspect of the case and
commented:
[We can hardly justify relief to the sister for trauma which she
suffered upon apprehension of the child's death and yet deny it
to the mother merely because of a happenstance that the sister
was some few yards closer to the accident. The instant case ex-
poses the hopeless artificiality of the zone-of-danger rule.6 1
Rather than creating an exception to the zone of danger rule
for Mrs. Dillon's mental injury arising from the death of her daugh-
ter, the majority approached the case on the basis that the central
question was one of duty. Recognizing that mental injury is not so
simple a problem as physical, the majority propounded the follow-
ing guidelines to aid in resolving the duty question: (1) the plain-
tiff's proximity to the scene of the accident, (2) the plaintiff's
sensory observation of the accident, and (3) the closeness of the re-
lationship between the plaintiff and the third person. 62 These three
guidelines, all relating to what might loosely be termed proximity,
61. Id. at 915. See also Sinn v. Burd, 404 A.2d 672, 677 (Pa. 1979); John L.
Diamond, Dillon v. Legg Revisited: Toward a Unified Theory of Compensating By-
standers and Relatives for Intangible Injuries, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 477, 481-83 (1984);
Negligence and Emotional Harm, supra note 55, at 522-23; Anthony E. Create, One
Step Beyond the Zone of Danger Limitation Upon Recovery for the Negligent Inflic-
tion of Mental Distress, 43 TEMP. L.Q. 59, 59-60 (1969). The majority in Dillon went
on to disapprove of all the previous rules, commenting that their "successive aban-
donment... exposes the weakness of artificial abstractions which bar recovery con-
trary to the general rules." 441 P.2d at 925. See also Barnhill v. Davis, 300 N.W.2d
104, 107 (Iowa 1981) (rejecting "the harshness and artificiality of the zone of physical
danger test"). The zone of danger rule was, however, defended in Asaro on the
ground that "[i]t is the nature of the common law process... for courts to establish
rules. Criticism of a rule as being arbitrary is often no more than a rhetorical device
employed by courts to justify rejection of that rule." Asaro, 799 S.W.2d at 599.
62. Dillon, 441 P.2d at 920-921. Other courts have adopted similar approaches.
See, e.g., Mattingly v. Sheldon Jackson College, 743 P.2d 356 (Alaska 1987); Barn-
hill, 300 N.W.2d 104; Lejeune v. Rayne Branch Hosp., 556 So. 2d 559 (La. 1990);
Culbert v. Sampson's Supermarkets, 444 A.2d 433 (Me. 1982); Dziokonski, 380
N.E.2d 1295; James v. Lieb, 375 N.W.2d 109 (Neb. 1985); State v. Eaton, 710 P.2d
1370 (Nev. 1985); Corso v. Merrill, 406 A.2d 300 (N.H. 1979); Portee v. Jaffee, 417
A.2d 521 (N.J. 1980); Ramirez v. Armstrong, 673 P.2d 822 (N.M. 1983); Bovsun v.
Sanperi, 461 N.E.2d 843 (N.Y. 1984) (allowing recovery for mental distress only if
the physically injured person is a close relative of the plaintiff); Paugh v. Hanks, 451
N.E.2d 759 (Ohio 1983); Sinn, 404 A.2d 672; D'Ambra v. United States, 338 A.2d
524 (R.I. 1975); Kinard v. Augusta Sash & Door Co., 336 S.E.2d 465 (S.C. 1985);
Landreth v. Reed, 570 S.W.2d 486 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978); Hunsley v. Giard, 553 P.2d
1096 (Wash. 1976); Heldreth v. Marrs, 425 S.E.2d 157 (W. Va. 1992); Bowen v. Lum-
bermens Mut. Casualty Co., 517 N.W.2d 432 (Wis. 1994).
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were thought to have the capacity to assist future courts in deter-
mining the foreseeability of this type of injury in any given case.
Justice Traynor, dissenting, criticized the guidelines on the
basis that they did not clearly indicate the correct resolution of a
case, being all matters of degree: "Upon analysis ... their seeming
certainty evaporates into arbitrariness, an [sic] inexplicable distinc-
tions appear."63 Other commentators, by contrast, have criticized
later California courts for treating the Dillon criteria as hard and
fast rules, rather than the flexible guidelines they were intended to
be.64
The real breakthrough of Dillon was its recognition of the fore-
seeability of mental injury occasioned by harm to another: that
others will be shocked upon witnessing injury to a third person is
within the foresight of the reasonable man.6 5 The majority saw as
foreseeable not only the injury, but also the plaintiff: "Surely the
negligent driver who causes the death of a young child may reason-
ably expect that the mother will be not far distant."66 Thus, this
statement of what the reasonable man will foresee in a mental in-
63. Dillon, 441 P.2d at 926. On the reaction of the House of Lords to the Dillon
approach, see Harvey Teff, Liability for Negligently Inflicted Nervous Shock, 99 L.Q.
REV. 101, 108-11 (1983) (discussing McLoughlin v. O'Brian [1982] 2 W.L.R. 982).
Henderson criticizes the majority's decision on the principle that the rule was not
stated in sufficiently formal terms to provide an adequate "basis upon which to adju-
dicate future cases." James A. Henderson, Jr., Expanding the Negligence Concept:
Retreat from the Rule of Law, 51 IND. L.J. 467, 518 (1976).
64. See Diamond, supra note 61, at 477-78 (suggesting that foreseeability, rather
than proximity, was the basis for the decision in Dillon and arguing that the "result
is feast or famine for the plaintiff depending on the fortuities of time, location, or
characterization of the plaintiff as 'direct' or 'indirect' "); Richard S. Miller, The Scope
of Liability for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: Making "The Punishment
Fit the Crime," 1 U. HAw. L. REV. 1, 5 (1979); West, supra note 43, at 190. In Paugh
v. Hanks, the Supreme Court of Ohio was at pains to stress that the similar criteria
it was adopting were "by no means exclusive, and the mere failure of the plaintiff to
satisfy all of them should not preclude an aggrieved party from recovery." 451
N.E.2d at 766. In another case, observations about subsequent treatment of the Dil-
lon guidelines were used to support continued adherence to the zone of danger rule.
See Williams v. Baker, 572 A.2d 1062, 1072 (D.C. 1990).
It has also been suggested that Dillon has been applied in an inconsistent way.
See, e.g., Asaro v. Cardinal Glennon Memorial Hosp., 799 S.W.2d 595, 598 (Mo.
1990); Pearson, supra note 32, at 491-92 (criticizing the Dillon approach on the basis
that it is difficult to ascertain the content of the rule); Diamond, supra note 61, at
481-83 (discussing the inconsistencies in subsequent courts' interpretations of
Dillon).
65. See West, supra note 43, at 187.
66. Dillon, 441 P.2d. at 921. Chamallas and Kerber note the importance to the
outcome in Dillon of Justice Tobriner's deployment of "the gender of the plaintiff
both to guarantee the genuineness of the injury suffered and to argue for the foresee-
ability of the injury." Chamallas & Kerber, supra note 9, at 857. Pearson comments,
however, that the Dillon approach, insofar as it hinges on foreseeability, is just as
arbitrary as the zone of danger rule. Pearson, supra note 32, at 478.
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jury case brings the case in line with the classic statement in Pal-
sgraf v. Long Island Railroad67 that the test for a duty of care is
foreseeability of injury. Dillon expanded the notion of what is
foreseeable.
One should not be too quick to conclude, however, that in ex-
panding the content of foreseeability, Dillon achieved its goal of
bringing the law of mental injury into step with general tort princi-
ples. In fact, there are strong grounds for suggesting that even
under the Dillon rule, mental injury occasioned by harm to another
is still somewhat marginalized, and that "bystanders" are subjected
to a burden considerably heavier than plaintiffs whose injury came
about in other ways.
The test to determine whether Dillon in fact brought mental
injury occasioned by harm to another into line with the general
principles of tort law is whether it recognized a general duty in rela-
tion to that type of injury. The potential difference between Dil-
lon's three "proximity" criteria and "normal tort principles" lies in
the degree of flexibility in the manner in which they are applied. To
the extent that the criteria are intended to be flexible guidelines for
foreseeability, the case will have recognized a general duty in rela-
tion to mental injury and thus brought the area into line with other
areas of tort law. One can imagine the criteria withering away as a
body of case law was built up, expressing a collective judgment
about the plaintiffs and the injuries that are foreseeable. Once that
process was complete, there would no longer be any superadded cri-
teria beyond foreseeability.68 On the other hand, if the "proximity"
67. 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928). This was a case where a woman standing on a train
platform was injured by a scale that fell from a wall as a result of an explosion pre-
cipitated by the negligence of railroad employees in pushing some other passengers
onto a train and dislodging a package which one of the passengers was carrying. Id.
Recovery was denied on the basis that, although the employees were clearly negli-
gent, no impact on the plaintiff was foreseeable and therefore no duty owed to her.
Id. at 100-01. On the relationship between the zone of danger rule and the Palsgraf
doctrine, see KEETON ET AL., supra note 33, at 365-66. A similar approach, albeit
with a different result, was taken by one member of the English Court of Appeal in
King v. Phillips [1953] 2 W.L.R. 526. There recovery was denied a plaintiff who had
seen her child run over by a taxi from a window in a nearby building; Lord Justice
Singleton held that her presence, and thus her witnessing of the accident, were sim-
ply unforeseeable. Id. at 531. See Goodhart, supra note 44, at 350.
On the other hand, it has been suggested that Dillon "altered the conventional
Palsgraf doctrine .... [Tihe Palsgraf requirement that plaintiff sue only for wrongs
personal to that plaintiff [was] no longer found determinative of the duty issue and
was relegated to a secondary role." Golden, supra note 36, at 656-57 (footnote
omitted).
68. It is well-known, of course, that foreseeability is not the only criterion of duty
in negligence; additional limitations may be added for policy reasons. But see Bowen
v. Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co., 517 N.W.2d 432, 439 (Wis. 1994) (equating policy
with legal cause rather than duty). Perhaps that is what the Dillon criteria really
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criteria are hard and fast rules, one will still not be able to say that
a duty is owed with respect to mental injury occasioned by harm to
another. On this understanding, there is a duty only in relation to
physical injury, but that duty, as the result of an exception and sub-
ject to special criteria, also may form the basis for recovery for
mental injury. There is no general duty towards the loved ones of
those a person puts at physical risk with one's negligence. This
would mean that recovery for mental injury is exceptional and
anomalous.
Thus, there are at least two possible interpretations of the af-
termath of Dillon: the first is that mental injury occasioned by
harm to another is now a fully accepted, legally recognized injury
which, as a general principle, the reasonable man should foresee as
a possible consequence of negligent behaviour. In other words,
there is a duty owed with respect to it. The second interpretation is
that recovery for mental injury is an anomalous and heavily cir-
cumscribed extension to recovery for physical injury. On this inter-
pretation, there is no duty with respect to mental injury occasioned
by harm to another.
Alternatively, it might be suggested that Dillon created a sep-
arate tort-something other than ordinary negligence-and subject
to its own rules and limitations. A later decision suggests that this
latter interpretation might be the correct one. In Molien v. Kaiser
Foundation Hospitals69 the plaintiff sued a doctor for negligently
misdiagnosing his wife as suffering from syphilis.70 The doctor, un-
derstandably, advised the wife to inform the plaintiff of her sup-
posed disease because he too would need to be tested and possibly
treated.V1 The news led to suspicion and discord within the mar-
riage, and its eventual breakup, leading the plaintiff to suffer from
severe emotional distress, 72
The defendants attempted unsuccessfully to have the claim
dismissed on the basis of the Dillon criteria, pointing to the fact
that the plaintiff was not present at the scene of the misdiagnosis.73
represent: a proposal for a way to limit claims in order to satisfy policy concerns.
However, if policy concerns remain, it is difficult to understand why a court would
undertake to bring the area of law into line with normal tort principles. One would
expect that no court would make such an undertaking without first considering and
rejecting, as a matter of law, policy reasons for disallowing claims. Therefore, the
Dillon criteria must be based not on policy but on an attempt to preempt future
inquiries as to what is foreseeable.
69. 616 P.2d 813 (Cal. 1980).
70. Id. at 814.
71. Id.
72. The misdiagnosis led the wife to suspect that her husband had been having
an affair. Id. at 814-15.
73. Molien, 616 P.2d at 815-16.
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The Supreme Court of California, however, allowed the plaintiff to
recover damages for this emotional distress, and also for loss of con-
sortium. 74 The Court held Dillon to be "apposite but not control-
ling,"75 distinguishing it, except insofar as it required the
application of a test of foreseeability, as opposed to mechanical
tests, such as impact or the plaintiff's presence in the zone of
danger.76
Thus was born the theory of the "direct victim," which is some-
thing separate from the theory of "bystander recovery" on which
Dillon was based. Unlike "bystanders," "direct victims" do have a
duty owed to them in relation to mental injury-that is, mental in-
jury is a "direct" consequence of the negligence, and the nature of
the negligence was such that it was bound or highly likely to cause
that sort of injury. Justice Mosk, with whom Chief Justice Bird and
Justices Tobriner, Newman, Manuel and Richardson concurred,
reasoned as follows:
It is easily predictable that an erroneous diagnosis of syphilis
and its probable source would produce marital discord and re-
sultant emotional distress to a married patient's spouse; Dr.
Kilbridge's advice to Mrs. Molien to have her husband ex-
amined for the disease confirms that plaintiff was a foreseeable
victim of the negligent diagnosis.... We thus agree with plain-
tiff that the alleged tortious conduct of defendant was directed
to him as well as to his wife. 7 7
It is difficult to find fault with these observations; the connec-
tion between the patient and the plaintiff was certainly such that
an erroneous diagnosis of a sexually transmitted disease would
have a profound effect upon the latter.78 However, it appears that
74. Id. at 821-23.
75. Id. at 815.
16. The court explained that"the significance of Dillon for the present attion lies
not in its delineation of guidelines ... ; rather, we apply its general principle of fore-
seeability to the facts at hand...." Id. at 816.
77. Id. at 817.
78. Other courts have allowed recovery using a similar analysis. See, e.g., Mar-
lene F. v. Affiliated Psychiatric Medical Clinic, 770 P.2d 278 (Cal. 1989) (allowing
mother to assert claim for ernotional distress against family therapist who, while
treating both mother and son, molested the child); Newton v. Kaiser Hosp., 228 Cal.
Rptr. 890 (Ct. App. 1986) (allowing recovery where plaintiffs' child was injured dur-
ing childbirth by negligent obstetrician); L.P. v. Oubre, 547 So. 2d 1320 (La. Ct. App.
1989) (molestation of plaintiffs' sons by scoutmaster); Skorlich v. East Jefferson Gen-
eral Hosp., 478 So. 2d 916 (La. Ct. App. 1985) (obstetric malpractice); Blackwell v.
Oser, 436 So. 2d 1293 (La. Ct. App. 1983); Holland v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 135
So. 2d 145 (La. Ct. App. 1961) (allowing recovery to parents for mental anguish after
their son ate rat poison left by defendant's insured and insured was unable to pro-
vide information as to the type of poison); Johnson v. Jamaica Hosp., 467 N.Y.S.2d
634 (App. Div. 1983) (plaintiff's baby disappeared from hospital nursery). For an
example of a refusal to apply the direct victim analysis, see Marchand v. Superior
Court, 246 Cal. Rptr. 531 (Ct. App. 1988). In Marchand, the plaintiff claimed that
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since this case there have been two categories of "mental distress"
cases in California: "direct victim" cases and "bystander recovery"
cases. 79 We are left wondering what would have happened if, say,
Mrs. Molien had been injured rather than misdiagnosed, and Mr.
Molien had heard of it and suffered the same injury.S0 Would he be
considered a "direct victim" under those circumstances?
It appears not; otherwise, we would have the anomalous situa-
tion where a person who was present at the scene of a third person's
harm would still have to satisfy the Dillon criteria-which, as we
have seen, are not applied as flexibly as their authors appear to
have wished8l-and one who was some distance away would not
have to satisfy the Dillon criteria. The position of the plaintiff who
was some distance away certainly would be contrary to the spirit of
Dillon, and one cannot imagine the courts allowing a plaintiff that
kind of freedom for that reason.8 2 Thus, "direct victim" cases must
be identified by the nature of the negligence and/or the existence of
a very close, perhaps contractual, relationship between the third
person and the defendant, such as that of doctor and patient.8 3
Returning to normal tort principles-that is, to the idea of
foreseeability-Molien invites us to conclude that the mental injury
arising out of a person's mistaken belief that his or her spouse has
not been faithful is plainly forseeable, whereas the foreseeability of
mental injury arising out of a mother's learning of her child's death
or serious injury depends on whether she was present at the scene
of the injury-causing event. Alternatively, one could conclude that
the mental injury of a bystander as a result of witnessing a horrific
accident to another person may or may not be foreseeable, depend-
the defendant's medical malpractice on her daughter caused her serious emotional
distress; the court distinguished this from other direct victim cases on the ground
that the plaintiff's reproductive interests were not implicated. Id. at 537. But see
id. at 551 (Carr, A.J., dissenting) (arguing that the plaintiff could be treated as a
direct victim on the basis of a contractual relationship between herself and the de-
fendant). See also Allen v. Toten, 218 Cal. Rptr. 725 (Ct. App. 1986) (holding that
defendant police could not foresee emotional injury to wife when they brought her to
a scene where her armed and suicidal husband was involved in a standoff with other
police).
79. A similar distinction between "participants" and "bystanders" has also been
recently observed in Great Britain. See supra note 42 (discussing Page v. Smith,
[1995] 2 All E.R. 736).
80. See, e.g., Maloney v. Conroy, 438 A.2d 6 (Conn. 1980) (allowing no recovery to
bystander in case of medical malpractice).
81. See supra text accompanying notes 62-64.
82. Pearson comments that "the [Molien] court's distinction between the facts of
Molien and those of Dillon is analytically unsound." Pearson, supra note 32, at 515.
83. See, e.g., the medical malpractice cases cited supra notes 54 and 59. It has
been suggested that another rationale behind the direct victim cases is that the ob-
ject of the plaintiff's concern "is one commonly regarded as worthy of emotional at-
tachment." Finneran, supra note 34, at 231.
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ing on what the relationship between the two people was. These
examples make it clear that "direct victims" are treated as more or
less on par with victims of physical injury, whereas "bystanders"
are in a special category, are not subject to the normal principles of
tort law, and are not owed a duty in relation to the injury they suf-
fered. Once again, the conclusion is that there is no general duty
towards the loved ones of the people one endangers physically
through his or her negligent acts.
We can only conclude that, if Dillon ever had the potential for
bringing the law relating to mental injury occasioned by harm to
another in line with other tort law, Molien put any such hopes to
rest.8 4 In the eyes of the law, only certain types of negligence (like
misdiagnosis of a sexually transmitted disease) by their nature cre-
ate a risk of mental injury. Other types of negligence will be sub-
jected to the added scrutiny of the Dillon criteria. A preferable
approach would recognize that any negligence that creates a risk of
physical injury to one person also creates a risk of mental injury to
that person's loved ones. Under such an approach, everyone would
be a "direct victim2'S5
To illustrate the restrictions remaining after Dillon, it is inter-
esting to compare the Australian case of Jaensch v. Coffey8 6 in an
attempt to develop a theory to solve duty problems in all difficult
areas, including occupiers' liability, omissions, the liability of public
authorities, pure economic loss, and negligent misstatement.8 7 The
typical approach of United States courts to mental injury has by
and large been the introduction of special rules. 88 In Jaensch, on
84. In Marchand v. Superior Court, 246 Cal. Rptr. 531 (Ct. App. 1988), the court
explicitly stated, relying on Molien, that the plaintiff's cause of action derived from
that of the person who was physically injured, id. at 534, and on that basis denied
recovery to parents as bystanders to medical malpractice on their child. Id. at 546.
Thus, it has been commented that "even after Dillon it cannot be said that emotional
tranquility is a truly protected interest." Finneran, supra note 34, at 221-22.
85. One reason that has been suggested for limiting recovery in the way just
described is that it avoids double recovery-by the person suffering physical injury
and the person suffering mental injury. Diamond, supra note 61, at 501. It has been
suggested that it would be economically inefficient to allow this kind of recovery.
See, e.g., Miller, supra note 64, at 21-23.
86. 155 C.L.R. 549 (Austl. 1984).
87. These areas are listed as "difficult" because courts have seen the need for
special rules or special attention. The reasons for this vary: occupiers' liability has
historically been quite complicated; liability of public authorities raises significant
policy issues from a constitutional viewpoint; pure economic loss has traditionally
been seen as raising a significant risk of floods of claims; and unlimited liability and
negligent misstatement and omissions have not traditionally been recognized as ac-
tionable at law.
88. It will be argued later that all these rules either distort the concept of fore-
seeability or ignore its relevance. See discussion infra part IIIA,
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the other hand, Justice William Deane89 of the High Court of Aus-
tralia attempted to find a solution which could cover all of these
problem areas, without falling back on mechanical rules.9 0
In Jaensch, the plaintiff's husband was seriously injured in a
motorcycle accident, shortly after which she saw him at the hospi-
tal.9 1 She had apparently had an unhappy childhood and only
found contentment and stability through her relationship with
him.92 Although the husband ultimately survived, the plaintiff en-
tertained for some weeks the belief that he was going to die and
suffered severe anxiety and depression, which in turn developed
into gynaecological problems necessitating a hysterectomy. 93 She
brought a successful "nervous shock" action against the driver who
negligently injured her husband.
In Jaensch, Justice Deane postulated that the duty of care in
negligence is not, and never has been, dependent only upon foresee-
ability. By this Deane did not mean simply that policy considera-
tions may be taken into account to avoid a duty even once
foreseeability is established.9 4 The basis of his analysis was prox-
imity, which is "a broad and flexible touchstone of circumstances in
which the common law would admit the existence of a relevant duty
of care to avoid reasonably foreseeable injury to another,"95 and
which, as Deane explained:
involves the notion of nearness or closeness and embraces phys-
ical proximity (in the sense of space [and] time) between the
person or property of the plaintiff and the person or property of
89. It should be noted that Jaensch was decided by a five-judge panel, and that
each of the other judges delivered a separate opinion allowing recovery on slightly
different grounds. See Jaensch, 155 C.L.R. at 549. Justice Deane's decision is dis-
cussed here because the approach in that judgment was two years later adopted by
all but one of the other judges on the court as applicable to all negligence cases. See
San Sebastian Proprietary Ltd. v. Ministey Xdministering Envd. PlAning & Aasess-
ment Act 1979, 162 C.L.R. 340 (Austl. 1986).
90. For an example of the application of Justice Deane's analysis in the area of
occupiers' liability, see Australian Safeway Stores v. Zaluzna, 162 C.L.R. 479 (Austl.
1987); in the area of omissions by statutory authorities, see Council of the Shire of
Sutherland v. Heyman, 157 C.L.R. 424 (Austl. 1985); and in the area of negligent
misstatement occasioning economic loss, see San Sebastian Proprietary Ltd v. Min-
ister Administering Envtl. Planning & Assessment Act 1979, 162 C.L.R. 340 (Austl.
1986).
91. 155 C.L.R. at 550.
92. Id. at 556.
93. Id. at 559.
94. Justice Deane did, however, suggest that "policy considerations••• may well
be relevant to [the] overriding proximity requirement." 155 C.L.R. at 590. Thus the
proposition that the duty inquiry involves a second stage of considering policy rea-
sons for excluding or limiting the scope of duty, based on Arms v. Merton London
Borough Council, 1978 App. Cao. 728 (1977) (appeal taken from Eng. CA.), was not
rejected in the course of Justice Deane's opinion.
95. 155 C.L.R. at 584.
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the defendant, circumstantial proximity such as an overriding
relationship of employer and employee or of a professional man
[sic] and his [sic] client and causal proximity in the sense of the
closeness or directness of the relationship between the particu-
lar act or cause of action and the injury sustained.... The iden-
tity and relative importance of the considerations relevant to an
issue of proximity will obviously vary in different classes of
cases .... 96
Justice Deane rejected the zone of danger rule9 7 and the 1939
holding in the Australian case Chester v. Waverley Corp. 98 where
the High Court, in an opinion that could be described as insensitive
to say the least, rejected on unforeseeability grounds the claim of a
plaintiff who had suffered "nervous shock" on seeing her drowned
son dragged from a ditch.99 On this, Justice Deane commented:
It is simply out of accord with medical knowledge and human
experience to deny that it is reasonably foreseeable that the
shock suffered by a mother on seeing the body of her infant
child, whom she was seeking, raised from the bottom of a
water-filled trench might well be such as to cause psychoneuro-
sis or mental illness.' 0 0
Justice Deane likewise rejected the second of the Dillon crite-
ria, commenting that a requirement that the plaintiff witness the
actual accident does not appear to effect any consideration of fore-
seeabilitylOl and noted that the most important explanation for
mental injury is "the existence of a close, constructive and loving
relationship" between the plaintiff and the third person.' 0 2 Be-
cause of that relationship and because the plaintiff's injury was
96. Id. at 584-85.
97. He noted that it had never been part of Australian law. Id. at 606.
98. 62 C.L.R. 1 (Austl. 1939).
99. The High Court stated:
A reasonable person would not foresee that the negligence of the de-
fendants towards the child would 'so affect' a mother .... it is... not a
common experience of mankind that the spectacle, even of the sudden
and distressing death of a child, produces any consequence of more
than a temporary nature in the case of bystanders or even close rela-
tives who see the body after death has taken place.
62 C.L.R. at 10 (Latham, C.J.) (quoting language used in In re Polemis and Furness,
Withy & Co., [1921] 3 KB. 561, 574, 579, and in Donaghue v. Stevenson, 1932 App.
Cas. 562, 580 (appeal taken from Scot.)).
100. Jaensch, 155 C.L.R. at 590.
101. Id. at 591-92. The validity of claims arising out of witnessing the aftermath
of an accident was also recognized in several U.S. courts. See, e.g., Masaki v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp., 780 P.2d 566 (Haw. 1989) (allowing recovery to parents who wit-
nessed the consequences of an accident that left their son paralyzed); Landreth v.
Reed, 570 S.W.2d 486 (Tex. Ct. App. 1978) (allowing recovery to sister who witnessed
the drowning death of a sibling); Gates v. Richardson, 719 P.2d 193, 199 (Wyo. 1986)
(allowing claims brought by family members who observed immediate aftermath of
child's bike accident where child suffered severe bodily injuries).
102. Jaensch, 155 C.L.R. at 600. Justice Deane was, however, willing to counte-
nance the possibility of an action by an unrelated bystander. Id. at 606.
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caused by witnessing the immediate aftermath of her husband's ac-
cident, 03 the proximity criterion was satisfied and the plaintiff re-
covered damages for her mental injury and its physical
consequences.
One cannot help but note the marked similarities between this
decision and that in Dillon v. Legg.'0 4 Both decisions concerned
themselves with proximity considerations (though not precisely the
same proximity considerations) and effected a substantial advance
in recognition of this type of injury. Both attempted an answer to
the duty question on the basis of general tort principles, and both
recognized the importance of relationships. However, both left lin-
gering restrictions that cannot really be justified on the basis of
traditional tort principles.' 05
The difference, however, is that some of the restrictions left
behind by Dillon were unintended. Although the decision spelled
out the proximity criteria to be applied, those criteria were only in-
tended as flexible guidelines. Jaensch, on the other hand, was
rather vague about the content of proximity, leaving the law to be
developed in the usual way-that is, on a case-by-case basis and in
reaction to the fact situations that come before the courts. There
may be much that is unsatisfactory about this method of develop-
ment, from the point of view of certainty in the law and the conven-
ience of parties and litigants, but it has always been the way of the
common law. The main point for present purposes, however, is
that the traditional approach contrasts markedly with the approach
in the United States, which has been to attempt to preempt foresee-
ability issues and give resolutions in advance. The approach in
Jaensch serves to highlight the extent to which United States law,
even in the most liberal jurisdictions, has treated mental injury oc-
casioned by harm to another as marginal to the general run of neg-
ligence law.
A plaintiff who has suffered mental injury occasioned by harm
to another, in California or another state following the Dillon ap-
proach, must satisfy the court that he or she (1) was present at the
scene of the accident, or not far from it at the time; (2) heard or saw
the events killing or causing physical injury to the third person; and
(3) was in a close familial or marital relationship to the person who
was killed or physically injured. If all of these elements are satis-
fied, the injury and the plaintiff are held to be foreseeable.106 It is
103. The key was witnessing the accident, rather than simply being told of the
accident or the stress of nursing him afterwards.
104. 441 P.2d 911 (Cal. 1968).
105. See infra part III.
106. See supra text accompanying note 62.
1996]
Law and Inequality
also possible, if there is a close relationship between the defendant
and the third person, or where reproductive or very obviously rela-
tional interests are involved, for a plaintiff to show that it was
clearly foreseeable that mental injury would ensue. This is com-
monly known as the theory of the "direct victim" and is to be con-
trasted with the "bystander" theory of Dillon v. Legg, suggesting
that maybe "bystanders" suffering mental injury are not really fore-
seeable, but are nonetheless to be treated as an anomalous excep-
tion if they can satisfy all three of the criteria listed above. In
Australia, on the other hand, Jaensch v. Coffey has ruled that
mental injury occasioned by harm to another is in principle foresee-
able and that "proximity" must be established, but does not lay
down any particular guidelines as to which injuries and which
plaintiffs are proximate in the relevant sense. 1 0 7 Proximity is to be
established on a case-by-case basis, as with other types of injury.
Thus, the Australian approach comes much closer to recognizing a
general duty of care in relation to mental injury occasioned by harm
to another.
E. Lingering Limitations
As noted above, there remain restrictions on recovery for
mental injury occasioned by harm to another, even after that type
of injury has been recognized (to a greater or lesser extent) as fore-
seeable and deserving of the tort system's attention. The Dillon de-
cision, although a substantial advance on the previous approaches
of the impact rule and the zone of danger in recognizing a cause of
action for negligently inflicted mental injury, stops short of recog-
nizing a duty of care to the loved ones of the people one endangers
through negligent acts. The courts' limitations on the cause of ac-
tion purport to relate to policy considerations having to do with lim-
iting liability and methods of proof. I discuss here the limitations
on recovery, in order to set the scene for my argument in Part II
that such limitations are not really supported by these policy
considerations.
1. The Type and Extent of Injury
All the jurisdictions under consideration here (the various
states of the United States, Australia and the United Kingdom) re-
tain some kind of requirement relating to the type and/or the extent
of the injury the plaintiff must prove in order to be successful. l08
107. See supra text accompanying notes 94-102.
108. Other types of, or lesser, injuries will fall foul of what remains of the "no
damage" rule. See supra part I.A.
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These limitations show that the law in most United States juridic-
tions does not legally protect mental integrity. Even limitations re-
lating to the extent of the injury, rather than its nature, evidence a
treatment of mental injury that would be inconceivable in relation
to other legally-protected interests.
The "physical manifestation requirement," which still applies
in most United States jurisdictions,109 is a limitation relating to the
type of injury. It means that in order to recover for mental injury, a
plaintiff must prove some physical symptoms resulting from the
plaintiff's mental injury.1 10 Some states, on the other hand, impose
a requirement of "serious emotional injury" or something similar,
which clearly goes to the extent of the injury."'1
Courts in Australia and the United Kingdom, along with those
in some states in the United States, are clearly more comfortable
about recognizing an interest in mental integrity; the criterion in
those jurisdictions for actionable mental injury is simply a medi-
cally diagnosable psychiatric disorder."12 This can probably be
characterised as a requirement relating both to the type of injury
and to the extent of the injury. It does not introduce any physical
element to the injury that is recognized. The requirement makes
109. Marrs reports that as of 1992, 30 states and the District of Columbia still
adhered to the physical manifestation rule. Scott B. Marrs, Mind Over Body: Trends
Regarding the Physical Injury Requirement in Negligent Infliction of Emotional Dis-
tress and 'Fear of Disease" Cases, 28 ToRT & INS. L.J. 1, 17 (1992).
110. See, e.g., Thompson v. Sun City Community Hosp., 688 P.2d 647, 657 (Ariz.
1983); Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 911, 920 (Cal. 1968) (though the requirement was
subsequently abandoned in Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 616 P.2d 813, 816 (Cal.
1980)); Robb v. Pennsylvania R.R., 210 A.2d, 709, 711 (Del. 1965); Ob-gyn Assoc. of
Albany v. Littleton, 386 S.E.2d 146, 149 (Ga. 1989); Hatfield v. Max Rouse & Sons
Northwest, 606 P.2d 944, 955 (Idaho 1980); Clomon v. Monroe City Sch. Bd., 490 So.
2d 691, 693 (La. Ct. App. 1986); Corso v. Merrill, 406 A.2d 300, 304 (N.H. 1979);
Ramirez v. Armstrong, 673 P.2d 822, 826 (N.M. 1983); Schultz v. Barberton Glass
Co., 447 N.E.2d 109, 115 (Ohio 1983). The requirement was abandoned in Hawaii in
Leong v. Takasaki, 520 P.2d 758,763-64 (Haw. 1974).
111. See, e.g., Ballinger v. Palm Springs Aerial Tramway, 269 Cal. Rptr. 583, 586
(Ct. App. 1990); Williams v. Baker, 572 A.2d 1062, 1075 (D.C. App. 1990) (Ferren, J.,
dissenting in part); Rodrigues v. State, 472 P.2d 509, 520 (Haw. 1970); Burris v.
Pollack, 545 N.E.2d 83, 91 (Ohio 1989); Paugh v. Hanks, 451 N.E.2d 759, 765 (Ohio
1983); Tarolli v. Rossotti, 532 N.Y.S.2d 672, 673 (N.Y. 1988); Bowen v. Lumbermens
Mut. Casualty Co., 517 N.W.2d 432, 437-38 (Wis. 1994) (noting trend towards aban-
doning physical requirements). See also KEETON ET AL., supra note 33, at 365. Such
requirements were criticized and rejected by the Supreme Court of Wyoming in
Gates v. Richardson, 719 P.2d 193,200 (Wyo. 1986), where the court considered such
limitations to be necessary only where liberal liability rules are applied to mental
injury.
112. See McLoughlin v. O'Brian, 1983 App. Cas. 410 (1982) (appeal taken from
Eng. C.A.); Jaensch v. Coffey, 155 C.L.R. 549 (Austl. 1984). See also Bowman v.
Williams, 165 A.2d 182, 184 (Md. 1933) (requiring "symptoms clearly indicative of a
resultant pathological, physiological, or mental state"); Asaro v. Cardinal Glennon
Memorial Hosp., 799 S.W.2d 595 (Mo. 1990).
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sense, for as long as an interest in mental equilibrium is recognized
by the law, it is anomalous to require proof of injury to another in-
terest.113 Thus, the "diagnosability" approach, unlike the physical
manifestation requirement, takes mental injury seriously. It also
enables courts to be candid in their recognition of a new legally pro-
tected interest.
2. Geographical and Temporal Limitations
The three proximity guidelines in Dillon have been used in a
mechanical way to defeat claims by persons suffering mental injury
as a result of the physical endangerment of a third person. 1 4 The
requirement of physical proximity relates to the plaintiff's presence
at the scene of the accident killing or injuring the third person and
introduces a test of geographical and temporal proximity between
the plaintiff and the accident. Examples of the application of this
guideline include cases where a plaintiff has suffered shock on hear-
ing of the death or injury of a loved one"15 or by seeing or hearing of
it on the electronic media.116 Recovery in such cases is generally
denied.
There has been at least one case which suggests that recovery
may be considered where the plaintiff suffers injury as a result of
viewing a live telecast of events surrounding an accident involving
a loved one."1 7 Here, of course, the contemporaneous nature of the
experience satisfies the temporal proximity requirement, so al-
lowing recovery makes sense, provided that claims based on injury
arising out of viewing the immediate aftermath of an accident are
not excluded. It is difficult to justify applying strict temporal prox-
imity criteria while having very loose spatial criteria.
113. If Teff is correct, this limitation is not founded on logic or principle, but
purely on policy. See Teff, supra note 63, at 100.
114. See supra text accompanying note 62.
115. Kelley v. Kokua Sales & Supply, 532 P.2d 673 (Haw. 1975) (holding that fa-
ther, who was in California where he suffered a fatal heart attack upon learning that
his daughter and grandchildren died in a car accident in Hawaii, was not within
reasonable distance of accident to have a claim for emotional distress). On geograph-
ical limitations generally, see Miller, supra note 64, at 9-13.
116. Brownie Miller v. National Broadcasting Co., 232 Cal. Rptr. 668 (Ct. App.
1987) (denying recovery to wife and daughter who saw death of husband/father on
television documentary about paramedics); Gain v. Carroll Mill Co., 787 P.2d 553
(Wash. 1990) (denying recovery to plaintiffs who saw their relative, a state trooper,
killed on television).
117. Gain, 787 P.2d at 557. The question was not decided, however, because the
plaintiffs did not specifically plead that witnessing the telecast was the cause of their
injuries. In Alcock v. Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police, (19921 1 App. Cas.
310 (1991) (appeal taken from Eng. C.A.), many plaintiffs were denied recovery on
the basis that they learned of an event causing injury or death to another by a live
telecast or broadcast rather than from their presence at the scene.
[Vol. 14:391
A FEMINIST CRITIQUE
3. The Aftermath/Percipient Witness Rule
A third remaining limitation is the "percipient witness" rule,
encapsulated by the second of the guidelines in Dillon, which stated
that the plaintiff should have witnessed the events causing the
death of or injury to the third person. Other courts have taken this
requirement very seriously and have denied recovery where the
plaintiff arrived at the scene of an accident that killed or injured a
loved one only moments later.118
Situations have arisen that illustrate the arbitrariness that is
bound to ensue if the percipient witness rule is applied in a hard
and fast manner. In one case, the plaintiff's son was injured by
radiation during treatment for curable cancer; since the injuring
agent was invisible, recovery was denied, even though the plaintiff
witnessed the ghastly consequences to the child's health, leading to
his death. 119 Cases such as Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospi-
tals120 also point to difficulties in the very requirement of a single
"shock-producing occurrence,"'121 because not all negligence takes
that form. 122
118. See, e.g., Hathaway v. Superior Court, 169 Cal. Rptr. 435, 440 (Ct. App.
1980) (denying recovery to parents who were in hearing distance of, but did not see,
their son's fatal electrocution on the grounds that, by the time the parents arrived on
the scene less than two minutes later, the boy "was no longer ... receiving the elec-
trical charge"); Arauz v. Gerhardt, 137 Cal. Rptr. 619, 627 (Ct. App. 1977) (denying
recovery to mother who arrived on scene five minutes after her son had been struck
by a car on the grounds that she was neither present "at the time of the impact" nor
'near enough ... to have any sensory perception of the impact"). On the other hand,
the plaintiff could recover in similar circumstances in Archibald v. Braverman, 79
Cal. Rptr. 723 (Ct. App. 1969), because she could be presumed to have heard the
explosion that injured her son.
119. Golstein v. Superior Court, 273 Cal. Rptr. 270, 272 (Ct. App. 1990). Anyone
who has ever seen even a cinematographic depiction of the physical results of radia-
tion sickness must marvel at the proposition that the sight of one's child suffering
from it is not a "shock-producing occurrence." See also Cortez v. Marcias, 167 Cal.
Rptr. 905, 907 (Ct. App. 1980) (plaintiff saw her child die in hospital, but thought
that it was going to sleep: since her shock did not arise from witnessing the death,
but from being told of it moments later, recovery was denied); Mobaldi v. Regents of
Univ. of Cal., 127 Cal. Rptr. 720, 722 (Ct. App. 1977) (plaintiff saw foster-child be-
come comatose after being negligently injected with overdose of glucose solution; re-
covery denied as she did not know at the time that it was the overdose which was
causing the child's condition); Jansen v. Children's Hosp. Medical Ctr., 106 Cal.
Rptr. 883, 885 (Ct. App. 1973) (mother watched child die a long and painful death
caused by misdiagnosis; recovery denied as misdiagnosis not perceived as a sensory
observation).
120. 616 P.2d 813 (Cal. 1980). See supra notes 69-78 and accompanying text.
121. See, e.g., Alcock v. Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police, [19921 1 App.
Cas. 310 (1991) (appeal taken from Eng. C.A.); Page v. Smith [1995] 2 All E.R. 736,
739 (Lord Keith of Kinkel, dissenting), 751-52 (Lord Jauncey of Tullichettle,
dissenting).
122. Though, as has been seen, that fact was seen as sufficient reason to distin-
guish Molien from Dillon. See supra text accompanying note 76. This might mean
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Some courts, notably those in Australia and the United King-
dom, have held that the fact that a plaintiff witnessed only the af-
termath of the accident that killed or caused injury to a loved one is
not a bar to recovery.12 3 Recovery in those jurisdictions extends,
for example, to injury caused by experiences at the hospital to
which the third person was taken.124 The significance of the "after-
math" cases is that the plaintiff has not witnessed the accident it-
self so the injury is more likely to be caused by the realization of the
nature of the injury than by the shock to the senses. In Jaensch v.
Coffey, Justice Deane of the High Court of Australia reasoned:
It would, in my view, be both arbitrary and out of accord with
common sense to draw the borderline between liability and no
liability according to whether the plaintiff encountered the af-
termath of the accident at the actual scene or at the hospital to
which the injured person had been quickly taken. Indeed... in
some cases the true impact of the facts of the accident itself can
only occur subsequently at the hospital where they are
known. 12 5
This approach is preferable to the percipient witness rule be-
cause it looks directly to -what mental injury is and the fact that it is
caused by injury to a loved one; while witnessing the event causing
that injury may well be more traumatic than learning about it af-
terwards, that is not the end of the story.12 6 The Australian ap-
that Dillon does not really stand for the proposition that the plaintiff must have
witnessed a shock-producing occurrence, but for the proposition that where there
was such an occurrence, the plaintiff must have witnessed it (or should have wit-
nessed it, depending on how flexibly the criteria are applied). It might therefore be
concluded that the plaintiff's chances of recovery are dependent upon how his or her
shock was caused: if by some sudden visible occurrence, he or she is limited by Dil-
lon, and if in some other way, he or she has the chance to make out a "direct victim"
case. This would be a peculiar result, if the Dillon court's opinion was correct that
witnessing a violent occurrence is what makes mental injury foreseeable. But see
infra part l11.A.2.
123. See, e.g., Jaensch v. Coffey, 155 C.L.R. 549 (Austl. 1984); McLoughlin v.
O'Brian, 1983 App. Cas. 410 (1982) (appeal taken from Eng. CA.); Ferriter v. Daniel
O'Connell's Sons, Inc., 413 N.E.2d 690 (Mass. 1980); Bowen v. Lambermens Mut.
Casualty Co., 517 N.W.2d 432 (Wis. 1994) (but maintaining that recovery does not
extend to plaintiffs who attended the "aftermath" at the hospital or even in the am-
bulance; the plaintiff must witness an "extraordinary event").
124. Examples of such experiences might be seeing and talking to the physically
injured person, discussing the injuries with medical personnel, and being involved in
decisions about treatment. See, e.g., Jaensch v. Coffey, 155 C.L.R. 649 (Austl. 1984);
McLoughlin v. O'Brian, 1983 App. Cas. 410 (1982) (appeal taken from Eng. C.A.).
125. 155 C.L.R. at 608.
126. See Diamond, supra note 61, at 486-89. See also Ferdinand F. Stone, Louisi-
ana Tort Doctrine: Emotional Distress Occasioned by Another's Peril, 48 TUL. L. REv.
782, 794 (1974) ("[tlhere would seem to be no magic in the sense of sight alone, since
other senses can convey the phenomena which create shock"); Teff, supra note 63, at
100 (stating that the only possible justification for such a limitation is policy), 106-
107 ("There is medical support for the view that, in some circumstances, hearing of
the loss of a loved one in an accident could prompt an even stronger reaction than
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proach recognizes the importance of relationships in a way that
United States jurisdictions adhering to the percipient witness rule
have failed to do.12 7 It allows more scope for recognition that what
matters is feeling for the injured person, rather than a spectacular
sight.
4. Post-accident Care
Another way of limiting recovery on the basis of notions of
proximity is to exclude claims where the immediate cause of the
plaintiff's mental injury is the stress of caring for and/or witnessing
the effect of the harm on a negligently injured loved one. 128
5. Liability to the Third Person
A fifth lingering limitation on recovery relates to the relation-
ship between the defendant and the person whose death or physical
injury precipitated the plaintiff's mental injury. This aspect of the
Dillon decision is often overlooked by its detractors: the court in-
sisted that the defendant must be liable to the third person before
the plaintiff can recover. 129 Many other courts have held simi-
larly. 3 o Thus, if the third person contributed to his or her own in-
seeing it, given the human mind's propensity for constructing an image of an event
even more gruesome than the reality."); Golden, supra note 36, at 677 (urging that,
"[alithough the degree of shock may be more severe where a plaintiff actually wit-
nesses the accident, this matter should be a question for the jury in determining
damages, rather than for the court in determining whether a cause of action exists").
127. It must be noted, however, that even in Australia recovery has been denied
on the basis that the plaintiff's mental condition was caused by something gradual
rather than sudden. In Council of Campbelltown v. McKay, 15 N.S.W.R. 501 (1989),
the New South Wales Court of Appeal denied a "nervous shock" action to a young
couple who had witnessed the deterioration and eventual collapse of their home.
They did recover, however, in respect of their psychiatric conditions, in the form of
"parasitic" damages.
128. The suggestion of such an exclusion was expressly made by Justice Deane in
Jaensch v. Coffey. This limitation might appear to be just another version of the
percipient witness rule, or of spatial and temporal criteria, but Justice Deane ex-
pressly rejected all of these rationales, preferring to justify the limitation on the ba-
sis of "causal proximity." 155 C.L.R. at 606. See also Jensen v. L.C. Whitford Co.,
562 N.Y.S.2d 317 (1990).
129. See Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 911, 916 (Cal. 1968).
130. See, e.g., Allen v. Toten, 218 Cal. Rptr. 725, 728 (Ct. App. 1986); State v.
Eaton, 710 P.2d 1370, 1377 (Nev. 1985); Dawson v. Garcia, 666 S.W.2d 254, 259-60
(Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (holding specifically that this means a claim may be defeated by
the application of comparative negligence principles). In Jaensch v. Coffey, Justice
Deane hinted that a defendant should be liable to the third person, but did not need
to decide that issue. 155 C.L.R. at 604-05.
A related requirement is that the third person should have suffered serious in-
jury or death. See Portee v. Jaffee, 417 A.2d 521, 527-28 (N.J. 1980); Ramirez v.
Armstrong, 673 P.2d 822, 826 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983). Such requirements would pre-
sumably mean that a plaintiff who thought his or her child had been injured, when
that was not the case, would not recover. It becomes clear that courts imposing such
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jury, liability for mental injury depends on the law of contributory
negligence in the jurisdiction where the action is brought. If con-
tributory negligence is a complete bar to recovery, the plaintiff's
claim will also be barred; if it is grounds for apportionment, the
plaintiff's damages will also be apportioned, and so on.
6. The Plaintiff's "Irrational Guilt Feelings"
Finally, there appears to be an interesting exception for a rare
category of case involving what courts have deemed to be "irra-
tional" guilt. These are cases where the plaintiff blamed him- or
herself for another's injury or death and suffered mental injury as a
result. The best example is the Australian case of Rowe v. McCart-
ney, where the plaintiff had reluctantly succumbed to defendant's
persuasion and allowed him to drive her car.iS1 The defendant had
driven negligently and both he and the plaintiff were injured. The
plaintiff suffered relatively minor physical injuries (though they in-
cluded a broken pelvis), but the defendant became a quadriplegic;
the plaintiff also suffered depression as a result of blaming herself
for the defendant's severe injuries, since they would not have oc-
curred if she had not let him drive.132
By a two-to-one majority, the New South Wales Court of Ap-
peal upheld the plaintiff's recovery of damages for her physical in-
juries, but held that she was not entitled to damages for her mental
injury since it was caused by guilt which was irrational in these
circumstances, for the accident was not her fault, and therefore un-
foreseeable.133 If, by contrast, her depression had arisen out of her
own injuries, or out of her presence at or direct involvement in the
event causing the defendant's injuries, she would have been able to
recover under the parasitic damages theory or under the then-ex-
isting Australian law relating to mental injury occasioned by the
death of or injury to another.13 4 However, the plaintiff was undone
by the fact that her mental injury arose out of guilt at having al-
lowed the defendant to drive. Even though it was clear that the
defendant breached a duty to the plaintiff, the court of appeals de-
nied her the extra damages on the basis that her mental injury was
too "remote."
requirements still see the plaintiff's action as derivative of the third person's action.
For criticism of this approach, see infra text accompanying notes 229-30. Miller
comments that the requirement "is inconsistent with general principles of causa-
tion." Miller, supra note 64, at 4.
131. [19761 2 N.S.W.R. 72.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 76, 90.
134. See, e.g., Mount Isa Mines Ltd. v. Pusey, 125 C.L.R. 383 (Austl. 1970).
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Only one United States case deals with the problem of the
plaintiff's guilt. In Clomon v. Monroe City School Board135 the
plaintiff had accidentally run down and killed a child at a school
crossing; she sued the school board in negligence for not having suf-
ficient safety procedures to protect the child.136 The Louisiana
Court of Appeals held that the board's duty extended to motorists
who might injure the children, in respect of mental injury they
might suffer as a result of being "precipitated by the fault of the
defendant into the position of the actor whose conduct causes injury
to another."137 Clomon may perhaps be distinguished from Rowe
on the basis that the plaintiff was partly at fault, or partly "respon-
sible" in a legal sense, and thus one can imagine the Rowe court
finding her guilt "rational" and foreseeable. But this is an unsatis-
factory result, where the plaintiff's own tort enables her to recover,
whereas an innocent plaintiff is excluded. 138
Still, Rowe stands as an example, if a marginal one, of the
proposition that plaintiffs claiming damages for mental injury need
to prove that their injury was rational, and that only rational inju-
ries are foreseeable in the eyes of the law.
Although the common law has progressed significantly in the
last century in recognizing a cause of action for mental injury occa-
sioned by negligently-inflicted harm to a person other than the
plaintiff, it is clear that such claims are still looked on with disfa-
vour. Some United States jurisdictions still adhere to the anti-
quated and largely discredited impact and zone of danger rules, and
135. 490 So. 2d 691 (La. Ct. App. 1986).
136. 557 So. 2d 1100 (La. Ct. App. 1990).
137. 490 So. 2d at 692-93. In a later appeal, the plaintiff having been found to be
30% at fault at trial, the issue was raised as to whether her post-traumatic stress
disorder wa caused by aimmina t s pending agamst her o by avm.g ,-it.oe-e.
the accident. See Clomon v. Monroe City Sch. Bd., 557 So. 2d 1100, 1102 (La. Ct.
App. 1990). The court of appeals refused to disturb a jury finding in her favour. It is
submitted that whatever the cause of her injury, she should have recovered, because
the criminal charges and any resultant stress were still foreseeable consequences of
the situation into which she was "precipitated." The issue is admittedly a difficult
one, raising as it does complicated questions about the relationship between the civil
and criminal law. However, one must bear in mind that it was likely that she would
be acquitted of the criminal charges, in spite of her 30% responsibility in the eyes of
the civil law, and the worry and anxiety of having charges pending would be able to
be considered 70% the result of the defendant's negligence. Given the presumption
of innocence, this is the better approach to take.
138. Another distinction may be that in Clomon three parties were involved (the
plaintiff, the defendant and the child), whereas in Rowe there were only two. Many
people seem to find it peculiar, at first blush, that the plaintiff in Rowe seemed to be
suing the defendant for injuring himself. (I make this observation on the basis of the
reactions of my students when I have been teaching the case, and others with whom
I have discussed it). Perhaps this was what really troubled the majority in that case,
but it must be noted that no such observation was made in the opinions.
19961
Law and Inequality
even those that have abandoned those rules still impose significant
limitations on recovery. In Part II, I consider the purported justifi-
cations for these limitations, both from the point of view of policy
and from the point of view of doctrine.
II. The Policy (Non-)Justifications for the Rules
In this Part, I will consider the rules described in Part I in
relation to the avowed policy concerns of the courts and the com-
mentators that are put forward to justify restrictive liability
rules.139 My analysis shows that policy does not support the re-
strictive approaches courts have taken. The policy reasons either
are generally suspect, or apply equally to other types of injury and
so do not justify special rules relating to mental injury, or are used
to justify rules that do not and cannot have the effect of addressing
the named concerns.
The main policy reasons traditionally offered for the apparent
privileging of physical over mental injury are: (1) mental injury is
usually transient or trivial; (2) mental injury is easily feigned, so
allowing a cause of action will encourage fraudulent claims; (3)
mental injury is something that may happen to many people as a
result of one accident, giving rise to liability which is disproportion-
ate to the defendant's fault; and (4) courts cannot cope with the ad-
ministrative burden likely to be imposed if the cause of action is
recognized (the "floodgates" argument).140 In this section I argue
that not all of these considerations are the proper concern of the law
and that, in any event, the rules which have been applied to mental
injury do not necessarily effectively address the purported policy
considerations. If this is true, we need to wonder what the true
basis of the rules is.
139. See Bowen v. Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co., 517 N.W.2d 432, 443-45 (Wis.
1994).
140. The "floodgates" argument is often paired up with the fraud argument: the
stated concern is that there will be a flood of fraudulent claims. Certainly if fraudu-
lent claims are a good reason to exclude liability, a flood of them is an even better
reason, but pairing the two arguments up in this way appears to be simply an at-
tempt to compensate for the weaknesses in either one standing alone. See Brody,
supra note 36, at 259 (asserting that the fraud argument is "little more than make-
weight"). For this reason, they will be dealt with separately here.
Another argument is that such damage is difficult to measure in money terms.
See, e.g., Black v. Carrollton R.R., 10 La. Ann. 33 (1855) discussed in Lejeune v.
Rayne Branch Hosp., 556 So, 2d 559, 561-62 (La. 1990). This argument is easily
disposed of by pointing out that it poses no greater difficulty than pain and suffering
when awarded as "parasitic" damages. See Schultz v. Barberton Glass Co., 447
N.E.2d 109, 112 (Ohio 1983); KEETON ET AL., supra note 33, at 360; Brody, supra




One significant theme in the development of mental injury law
is the notion that mental injury is inherently insignificant or triv-
ial. 14 1 However, triviality as an argument is not advanced very
often these days, probably because of widespread medical accept-
ance of the seriousness of mental disability. "Law, marching with
medicine but in the rear and limping a little,"142 has in some juris-
dictions come to recognize that mental injury is not necessarily triv-
ial. However, the idea seems to linger in most jurisdictions that
mental injury is simply something to be borne stoically, without re-
course to the legal system. 14 3 If this is true, it could explain courts'
continuing discomfort with allowing redress for the injury and
many of the law's restrictive recovery rules, particularly the linger-
ing limitations discussed above. 144
Since courts have limited time and resources, there is some-
thing to be said for excluding trivial claims. One might wonder,
however, why the law's traditional methods for keeping trivial
claims out of the courts have not been deemed sufficient in the area
of mental injury, and why the law has not imposed limitations in
physical injury cases which are aimed to exclude trivial claims.
Traditionally, courts have trusted plaintiffs and their attorneys to
exercise judgment and economic rationality when deciding whether
to bring a claim in the first place. If an injury is not sufficiently
serious, it is simply uneconomical to bring a suit. It must be asked
why the victims of mental injury (and their lawyers) are to be
trusted any less than those of physical injury.
If the physical manifestation requirement145 were to be justi-
fied on the basis of concerns about triviality, it would have to be
because courts automatically regard physical injuries as serious,
which would be unsound logic. 1 4 6 The requirement does not ad-
dress triviality concerns because it does not exclude all but the most
serious injuries. For one thing, mental injury may be very severe
without physical manifestations or illness. More fundamentally,
the very distinction between mental and physical injuries is on
shaky ground.147 There is certainly no ground in logic or legal prin-
141. See generally Calandrella, supra note 41.
142. Mount Isa Mines Ltd. v, Pusey, 125 C.L.R. 383, 395 (Austl. 1970).
143. KEETON ET AL., supra note 33, at 360; Miller, supra note 64, at 34; Pearson,
supra note 32, at 508; Teff, supra note 63, at 105.
144. See supra part I.E.
145. See supra part I.E.1.
146. See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
147. The Wisconsin Supreme Court recently suggested that the physical manifes-
tation requirement "[hlas encouraged... meaningless distinctions between physical
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ciple for suggesting that physical injuries are necessarily more seri-
ous than mental injuries. Indeed, many commentators have
observed that mental injury is in fact more devastating than physi-
cal because a physically disabled person can still enjoy life and
make a positive contribution to society, whereas a mentally injured
person is unlikely to have any such ability. Either physical or
mental injury may be serious or trivial, and so as a matter of princi-
ple the same requirements as to seriousness should be imposed on
both.148 Yet, as noted above, they are not, apparently on the basis
that mental injury plaintiffs and their lawyers cannot be trusted to
be economically rational.
A further example of the arbitrary distinctions between
mental and physical injury is the post-accident care limitation, dis-
cussed above.149 The difference between mental injury occasioned
by involvement in the aftermath and mental injury occasioned by
post-accident care is that one manifests itself later than the other.
Statutes of limitations aside, no such limitation exists with respect
to physical injury.150 If the physical injury resulting from the de-
fendant's negligence manifests itself only some time after the com-
mission of the negligence, this is not seen as a reason to exclude the
physical injury claim of an otherwise deserving plaintiff. The justi-
fication for not taking the same approach to mental injury is not
immediately obvious. Ultimately, it is very difficult to see what
ground there is in logic or legal principle to differentiate between
mental and physical injury.
Requirements which go to the extent rather than the kind of
injury,151 on the other hand, clearly do have the capacity to address
concerns about triviality. However, they are in fact bound to oper-
ate as arbitrary limitations. Results will ultimately depend on the
amount of sympathy a plaintiff can inspire in the person or persons
responsible for assessing damages. Triviality is a question of de-
and emotional symptoms." Bowen v. Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co., 517 N.W.2d
432, 443 (Wis. 1994).
148. It may be objected that to exclude physical injury claims on the basis of trivi-
ality would be too great a break with the tradition of the common law and that only
the legislature could do such a thing. The only way that this could be argued con-
vincingly would be to say that only the legislature has the resources for setting the
standards with some degree of precision. However, the common law has already
introduced seriousness requirements with respect to mental injury, and there is no
reason it could not do the same with physical injury.
149. See supra part I.E.4.
150. Even under many statutes of limitations, there is allowance for latent inju-
ries of which the plaintiff could not reasonably have known within the limitation
period. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 33, at 164-66.




gree, but a requirement that the plaintiff prove, for example, "seri-
ous emotional distress" treats the matter as one involving a clear
distinction. The law needs clear distinctions, but triviality does not
provide one, so the law would do better to look to a standard that
can.
One such standard would be the time-honored common law
principle that mere grief and upset do not sound in damages. The
preferable approach is to impose a limitation on recovery that fol-
lows the distinction between "mere grief and upset" and lasting,
debilitating mental disturbance. This is what the Anglo-Australian
"diagnosibility" approach 1 52 does. It bases the restriction on the
type of injury, rather than the extent, thus providing a clear dis-
tinction that is both logically and doctrinally sound. It also, unlike
"serious emotional distress," introduces an independent party (an
expert medical witness) to certify that the correct type of injury has
indeed been suffered. In this way it provides a principled and pre-
dictable method for limiting claims.
In sum, many of the restrictive rules fail to live up to their
justification on the basis of triviality, either because they fail to
keep trivial injuries out of the courts or because, in doing so, they
operate in an arbitrary or unprincipled way.
B. Fraud
The fraud argument is that mental injury is easily feigned and
thus its recognition by the law raises a danger of fraudulent
claims.153 Some general objections may be raised against this ar-
gument. First, courts and commentators have noted that even if
the danger does exist, it is better to allow some fraudulent claims
than to exclude genuine ones.15 4 Furthermore, it can be argued
that mental injury is not appreciably easier to feign than many
types of physical injury. 15 5 Finally, the courts do have mechanisms
152. See supra text accompanying note 112.
153. See Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress, supra note 36, at 1244; Finneran,
supra note 34, at 216-17 (noting the comparative ease of observation of physical
injury).
154. See, e.g., Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 911,917-18 (Cal. 1968); Johnson v. Jamaica
Hosp., 467 N.Y.S.2d 634, 688 (1983); McNiece, supra note 30, at 31.
155. See Schultz v. Barberton Glass Co., 447 N.E.2d 109, 111-12 (Ohio 1983);
Brody, supra note 36, at 236, 245-48. It has also been noted that mental injury
raises no more difficulties of causation than physical injury. Falzone v. Busch, 214
A.2d 12, 15 (N.J. 1965); Note, Torts-Expanding the Concept of Recovery for Mental
and Emotional Injury, 76 W. VA. L. REv. 176, 186 (1973-1974) [hereinafter Ex-
panding the Concept of Recovery]. But see Hubert Winston Smith, Problems of Proof
in Psychic Injury Cases, 14 SYRACUSE L. REV. 586, 593 (1963) (noting the
'[ambiguities and dangers of interpretation... inherent in subjective symptoms, as
contrasted with objective signs").
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for assuring themselves of the genuineness of claims, notably by ex-
pert medical evidence.1 56 Provided the defence has the opportunity
to present its own expert evidence about the plaintiff's injury, there
is a substantial barrier to fraudulent claims already built into the
system. Furthermore, scrutiny of the various rules developed by
the courts shows that they have been for the most part unable to
solve the perceived problem.
First, the impact rule, although supposedly designed to guard
against fraudulent claims, was15 7 unable to do so because it al-
lowed claims to stand on even thO slightest touching.158 Courts
adopting this logic must have believed that physical impact was the
only way that mental injury could come about, but such a position
would appear to be contrary to both common sense and medical
knowledge.X5 9 It is difficult to see how dust in the eye or inhalation
of smoke is more likely to cause serious fright and injury than the
threat of a horrific accident. 160
156. As one court explained, "[d]ue to advances in medical research and improved
diagnostic techniques, the presence of emotions such as grief, anxiety, and anger is
frequently accompanied by physical indicia that are capable of objective proof." Wil-
liams v. Baker, 572 A.2d 1062, 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1990). See also Negligently Inflicted
Mental Distress, supra note 36, at 1261 (noting that even if reliance on medical evi-
dence can lead to a "battle of the experts," this problem "is not unique to mental
distress cases").
It has also been suggested that "[t]he responsibility of weeding out fraudulent
claims rests on courts, juries and the adversary system." Barnhill v. Davis, 300
N.W.2d 104, 106 (Iowa 1981). See also Dziokonski v. Babineau, 380 N.E.2d 1295,
1299 (Mass. 1978); Falzone v. Busch, 214 A.2d 12, 16 (N.J. 1965); Battalla v. State,
176 N.E.2d 729, 731 (N.Y. 1961); Sinn v. Burd, 404 A.2d 672, 678-80 (Pa. 1975);
Niederman v. Brodsky, 261 A.2d 84, 88-89 (Pa. 1970); Brody, supra note 36, at 250;
Stone, supra note 126, at 791 (arguing that the concern with fraud is "an insult to
the whole judicial process dedicated as it is to the winnowing of true claims from
false ones").
157. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text. See also KEETON ET AL., supra
note 33, at 363. Although I use the past tense when speaking of the impact rule, it
should be noted that the rule is still in use in some United States jurisdictions. See,
e.g., Ob-gyn Assoc. of Albany v. Littleton, 386 S.E.2d 146 (Ga. 1989). In Williams v.
Baker, 572 A.2d 1062 (D.C. Cir. 1990), the following jurisdictions were listed as still
adhering to the impact rule: Arkansas, Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Oklahoma and
Oregon. Id. at 1066 n.11. Since then, Florida has abandoned the rule, see Zell v.
Meek, 20 Fla. Law. W. S. 515 (Oct. 5, 1995), and Indiana has modified it, see
Shuamber v. Henderson, 579 N.E.2d 452 (Ind. 1991).
158. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
159. Though perhaps it would not appear contrary to the medical knowledge of
the time when the rule was formulated.
160. This type of observation has been instrumental in leading courts to reject the
impact rule. See Falzone v. Busch, 214 A.2d 12, 16 (N.J. 1965); Williams v. Baker,
572 A.2d 1062 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Battalla v. State, 176 N.E.2d 729, 731 (N.Y. 1961).
See also Miller, supra note 64, at 34. The Supreme Court of California in Dillon v.
Legg noted that the zone of danger rule did not guard against fraudulent claims
either. 441 P.2d 911, 918 (Cal. 1968).
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If, on the other hand, the connection between the impact rule
and the prevention of fraud went to the plaintiff's credibility, it
might be noted that a plaintiff who has been physically touched is
no less likely to fabricate a claim than one who has not.161 Thus,
the courts' logic must have been that it was simply easier to believe
physical impact could lead to physical injury than to believe mental
or emotional impact could result in physical injury. However, this
analysis is more a question of factual causation than of the plain-
tiff's credibility. It must therefore be further noted that the causal
connection is not necessarily easier to find between touching and
injury than between fright and injury. Moreover, the impact rule
did not require the plaintiff to show that the ultimate injury was
caused by the touching.162 In fact, his or her injury may have been
a direct result of fear, and the touching may have been a minor or
even insignificant link in the chain of events which led to the
injury.163
Thus, although the rule appeared to be but a minor step away
from the "parasitic damages" position,' 64 it in fact led the law on
something of a tangent. The courts, contrary to their assertions,
were happy to find a causal connection between fright and physical
injury. The rule, as a tool for alleviating proof of causation difficul-
ties, was worse than imprecise: it was completely arbitrary.165
Second, the "strong version" of the zone of danger rule, 16 6 if
justified on the basis of the fraud argument, would mean that
161. Indeed, it has been suggested that the impact rule in fact encourages perjury.
Battalla v. State, 176 N.E.2d 729, 731 (N.Y. 1961); McNiece, supra note 30, at 31,
80-81. It is easy to see how this could happen. Many of the situations to which it
will be applied will have been fraught with confusion, and it will be easy for a plain-
tiff to assert that she was touched when in fact she was not, since other people pres-
ent at the scene are likely to have been in fear themselves and not closely watching
what is touching whom. It has been further pointed out that it is also easy to fabri-
cate a claim relating to physical injury. See Brody, supra note 36, at 236.
162. Chamallas and Kerber note that the "common justification for the impact
rule [that] treated it as a corollary of the more general legal principle that limited
recovery to material, as opposed to emotional, harms... was completely undercut by
cases where the physical impact was slight and it was clear that it was fright which
produced the plaintiff's injuries." Chamallas & Kerber, supra note 9, at 819-20. See
also Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress, supra note 36, at 1239-40.
163. See, e.g., Homans v. Boston Elevated Ry., 62 N.E. 737 (Mass. 1902), dis-
cussed in Chamallas & Kerber, supra note 9, at 829-30.
164. See supra text accompanying notes 33-34. It has been pointed out that even
"parasitic" damages for mental pain and suffering may be causally linked to the
physical injury in only a tenuous way. Dziokonski v. Babineau, 380 N.E.2d 1295,
1301 (Mass. 1978).
165. Courts rejecting the impact rule have considered that it is better to deal with
proof problems as they arise, rather than imposing a blanket exclusion on account of
the possibility of such problems. See, e.g., Battalla v. State, 176 N.E.2d 729, 731
(N.Y. 1961).
166. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
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mental injury can be caused (or is at least easier to believe) only if it
arises out of fear for one's own safety.167 This, too, would appear to
ignore the observable fact that people care about each other, and
that this tendency is considered in many quarters to be a positive
human trait, though the notion that there is something unnatural
about being concerned about the safety of others appears to have
some support in medical quarters.168 The "weak version" of the
zone of danger rule 169 is even more difficult to justify on the basis of
concerns about fraud, because it predicates liability on a physical
threat which was not necessarily perceived by the plaintiff. Since
the injury is a product of the plaintiff's own apprehensions, there is
no connection whatsoever between the liability rule and the injury,
or its genuineness. The fact that we may say later that a plaintiff
was physically endangered by the defendant's negligence does not.
lead to the conclusion that he or she is any more or less likely to be
fabricating a claim.
Finally, the Dillon criteria 170 are not supported by the fraud
argument Admittedly, the criteria do purport to address the prob-
lem of foreseeability, rather than the fraud problem. However,
there is a close logical connection between foreseeability and genu-
ineness: an injury's unforeseeability makes it easy to be suspicious
of its reality.171 Thus, to the extent that the Dillon criteria are ade-
quate guidelines for foreseeability, they are also safeguards against
fraud. Their capacity to prevent fraud is limited by their concern
with generalities rather than the particular plaintiff and fact situa-
tion. The connection between foreseeability and genuineness is not
so close that it is safe to assume that any injury is genuine just
because it is foreseeable, or vice-versa, and so the fraud problem is
still better addressed by strict scrutiny of the evidence in each indi-
vidual case.
167. This would be different than saying that only abnormal people suffer such
injury in this way.
168. See generally Hubert Winston Smith, Relation of Emotions to Injury and Dis-
ease: Legal Liability for Psychic Stimuli, 30 VA. L. REv.193 (1944), discussed in
Chamallas & Kerber, supra note 9, at 846-51.
169. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
170. The Dillon criteria are spatial proximity, sensory perception and close rela-
tionship to the third person. Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 920-21 (Cal. 1968). See
supra text accompanying note 62.
171. See Finneran, supra note 34, at 229 (noting that the only difference between
the foreseeability of injury approach and the genuineness of injury approach is that
the former is determined by the jury and the latter by the judge). The court in John-
son v. Jamaica Hosp. justified the "direct victim" exception to New York's restrictive
liability rules on the basis that "an especial likelihood of genuine and serious mental
distress... serves as a guarantee that the claim is not spurious." 467 N.Y.S.2d 634,
636 (App. Div. 1983) (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAw OF TORTS § 54, at 330 (4th ed.)).
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It has been suggested that the physical manifestation require-
ment addresses fraud concerns; some courts believe that mental in-
jury is objectively verifiable only when it results in some physical
manifestation. 172 This argument would appear to overlook the
availability of expert medical testimony about psychiatric diagno-
sis, and moreover the possibility that the very fact of what a plain-
tiff has endured might be sufficient evidence that he or she has
suffered a mental disturbance. That is, there will be situations
where one would think only a very strange person indeed would not
suffer such a disturbance.
Nor are requirements relating to the seriousness of the injury
tuned to the detection of fraudulent claims-that is, they may well
exclude some or even many fraudulent claims, but if they do, it will
be by coincidence.
Ultimately, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that the law's
traditional methods for identifying fraudulent claims are as ade-
quate in mental injury cases as in any other type of case, and there-
fore any additional restrictions on recovery in the areas of mental
injury are not justified by the fraud argument.
C. Disproportionality
It is often suggested that one of the main problems with
mental injury is that, while one can endanger only so many people
physically with a negligent act, the number of persons potentially
emotionally affected by that act is much greater, if not limitless. 173
Thus, if liability is allowed for mental injury, one small act of negli-
gence can lead to unlimited liability. This, in a nutshell, is the ar-
gument based on disproportionality between culpability and
liability. The argument is deeply flawed, and is moreover inconsis-
tently applied, which suggests that it is really only a conveement
excuse for limitations which in fact address other concerns. 174
172. See generally Calandrella, supra note 41. The requirement could be under-
stood as a way of limiting recovery to the most serious injuries, but the practical
effect of the requirement is to limit recovery to plaintiffs who suffer a particular kind
of injury. It appears that even the slightest physical manifestation will suffice to
enable the plaintiff to recover; at least, extensive research has failed to produce a
case where a plaintiff failed for having a "physical manifestation" which was too
trivial.
173. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
174. The disproportionality argument is particularly strange in the context of
mental injury occasioned by harm to another person, for, as the Supreme Court of
Rhode Island has observed, "where a mother actually witnessed the death of her
child, the resulting mental distress can hardly be deemed so fantastic or freakish as
to make the imposition of liability a moral outrage." D'Ambra v. United States, 338
A.2d 524, 529 (R.I. 1975). Furthermore, it has been observed that "there is plenty of
moral blame flowing from a tortfeasor who negligently injures or kills another to
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It can be argued at the outset that proportionality is simply an
inappropriate basis for limiting recovery in any category of tort
case. It has traditionally been thought that the main purposes of
the tort system are compensation and deterrence.175 The latter ob-
jective is concerned less with punishment than with the imposition
of a sanction to make people think twice about being negligent (or
committing some other tort).176 An exception to this, of course, is
the imposition of punitive or exemplary damages in cases where the
defendant's conduct is sufficiently egregious to justify the use of the
tort system for punishment. 1 77 Otherwise, punishment is generally
thought to be the province of the criminal law, where sanctions are
set according to, inter alia, the degree of wrongfulness of the con-
duct in question. 178
Generally speaking, negligence law does not concern itself
with degrees of wrongfulness. Even in the area of punitive dam-
ages, it draws a line that differentiates situations calling for such
damages from those that do not. Certainly in the area of compensa-
tory damages, the general rule is that once conduct is declared neg-
ligent, the plaintiff recovers for all losses caused by that
negligence. 179
In short, the business of tort law is one of line-drawing, not
one of moral fine-tuning. This kind of system should not even at-
tempt to concern itself with balancing culpability and liability, be-
cause it simply does not possess the analytical tools to do so
effectively, nor is such an exercise part of its "official" mission.
justify recovery by a family member who witnesses the event in horror." Gates v.
Richardson, 719 P.2d 193, 197 (Wyo. 1986).
175. RESTATEMENT (SEcoNDw) OF ToRTs § 901 (1979). Another worthy goal sought
by the tort system is the vindication of plaintiffs-the formal recognition that they
have suffered an injury and formal condemnation of the person who caused that in-
jury. Id. Hepler argues that this goal is particularly important in mental injury
cases. Hepler, supra note 2, at 73.
176. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 901 cmt. c (1979) (explaining that
tort law, "which was once scarcely separable from the criminal law, has within it
elements of punishment or deterrence").
177. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 908 (1979). See also KEETON ET AL.,
supra note 33, at 9-12; FLEMING, supra note 33, at 206.
178. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 6.06 (providing range of prison sentences) and Art.
7 (setting out criteria for application of different types of sentence) (1985). See also
ROLLIN M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRnumNAL LAw 15-20 (3d ed. 1982) (explain-
ing that the felony-misdemeanor distinction depends partly on "moral turpitude").
179. The "eggshell skull" rule, which holds that a defendant is liable even for in-
jury which is caused by some pre-existing susceptibility in the plaintiff, is best un-
derstood as a way of putting into practice the principle that there are no degrees of
negligence. See infra text accompanying notes 255-59. Miller uses the eggshell
skull (or, as he calls it, the "thin-skull") rule as an example of the inconsistency of




Rather, tort law is a system of compensation, and therefore it
should concentrate on the need for compensation, rather than on
the effects of compensation. This is not to say that negligence law
should or could (or is likely to) concentrate solely on the needs of
plaintiffs, for the fault requirement is as deeply ingrained as the
compensation principle. The point is that fault has always been (of-
ficially, at least) a black-and-white concept, even though in reality
there may be shades of grey on either side of the negligence line.
That being the case, concerns about disproportionate liability have
no place in tort law, and indeed sound quite hollow, especially if
they lead to the conclusion that a deserving plaintiff is denied re-
covery against a tortfeasor.1 8 0
Of course, it is conceivable that courts could develop the ana-
lytical tools for balancing liability and culpability. They could
abandon either the principle that compensation must restore the
plaintiff to his or her former position, or the principle that money
damages are the only available remedy. Standards would have to
be found for measuring culpability; such standards would have to
be somewhat vague, but need not be any vaguer than those already
applied to establish breach of duty or to assess damages for pain
and suffering. However, unless and until the law is willing to take
such steps, disproportionate liability is no reason to exclude a whole
class of claims, nor even to place limitations on recovery. Unless
the limitations are closely tied to the balance between liability and
culpability, are designed for the express purpose of achieving that
balance, and are in fact effective in achieving the balance, they will
be completely arbitrarylSi and unjust.182
There is also something of a paradox to disproportionality ar-
guments, which can be illustrated with the post-accident care limi-
tation discussed above.1s That limitation states that a plaintiff
cannot recover for mental injury occasioned by the stress of caring
for a physically injured person, and purports to be based on consid-
erations of causal proximity. If such injury is not causally proxi-
180. Miller suggests that the real problem is that mental injury claims compound
an already existing disproportiorality problem that is created by the eggshell skull
rule. Id. at 35.
181. Richard N. Pearson defines "arbitrary" in the following way: "A rule of law
may be arbitrary with respect to policy either because it is unsupported by any pol-
icy, or because it goes farther than, or not as far as, its underlying policy would
suggest." Pearson, supra note 32, at 478. A rule of the kind discussed in the text
would fall into the latter category.
182. This observation can be supported by considerations of changes in social or-
ganization. As the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania said in 1975: "The more complex
and interwoven societal relations become the greater the responsibility one must
accept for his or her conduct." Sinn v. Burd, 404 A.2d 672, 681 (Pa. 1975).
183. See supra part I.E.4.
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mate, what this means is that it is likely to be rare. Thus, the
restriction does not solve the problem of limitless or disproportion-
ate liability, as the number of claims eliminated must be relatively
small. Here is the paradox: the unlikelihood of mental injury
caused by caring for a physically injured person (which is not to say
its unforeseeability) makes it easier to exclude liability in such
cases, but exclusion will have only a minimal effect in achieving the
intended purpose of limiting the number of claims. That minimal
effect makes it seem unfair to those individuals who do suffer injury
in this way. Their legitimate interests should not be sacrificed for
so small a gain.
Neither the impact rule nor the zone of danger rule effectively
addresses the proportionality concern. The impact rule was unable
to do so, as it did not tie recovery to the degree of tortiousness in the
defendant's act, nor to the extent of harm suffered.184 Lest it be
suggested that the impact rule did address proportionality con-
cerns, to the extent that it applied only to negligently-caused harm,
and recovery was considerably easier for intentionally-caused
harm-that is, where the defendant's act was more morally culpa-
blel-'5 -one should note that a sharp distinction between negli-
gence and intentional torts is hardly a finely-tuned instrument for
balancing culpability and liability. Thus, it becomes clear that the
impact rule was not really a tool for excluding non-deserving
claims. Rather, it was simply a knee-jerk reaction, equating physi-
cal touching with physical harm and failing to see the subtleties
and complexities of the relationship between the mind and the
body.
If the impact rule failed to address proportionality concerns,
does the zone of danger rule succeed? Consideration of this ques-
tion returns us to the shakiness of the foundation for distinguishing
between mental and physical injury. If the zone of danger rule is
justified on the basis of proportionality, the argument must be that
one can easily place a large number of people at risk of mental in-
jury with a single act of negligence, but the number of people placed
at physical risk will always be smaller. Modern technology, how-
ever, allows some defendants to place huge numbers of people in
physical danger with one single act of negligence. We need only
184. It is perhaps not so surprising that this is the case, since concerns about
disproportionate liability appear to be a more modern phenomenon.
185. Intentionally caused harm is subject to a separate set of rules, which are
beyond the scope of this article.
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consider mass tort cases such as Agent Orange,186 the Dalkon
Shield,187 and DESiss to see that this is true. Mass injury situa-
tions contrast sharply to a quiet suburban street where a person
witnesses another individual run down by a negligent driver. If
courts were really concerned about limiting liability on the basis of
a proportionality principle, they would introduce special rules limit-
ing recovery in mass injury, on the basis that many people are in a
position to suffer an injury from a single act of negligence. Thus,
mass tort claims would be disfavoured simply by reason of the vast
numbers of people affected, or potentially affected. On the same
analysis, the plaintiff who suffered mental injury as a result of wit-
nessing an accident on a busy city street would be disfavoured com-
pared to one who saw an identical accident on a quiet country road.
The outlandishness of these suggestions should suffice to show that
unlimited liability is not the real problem. Rather, the attitude un-
derlying restrictive recovery rules such as the zone of danger rule is
simply one that privileges physical injury over mental injury.189
We do not see special restrictive liability rules for situations of
mass physical peril, based on the large numbers of people poten-
tially affected. We would expect to see such rules if disproportional-
ity were a general concern of the law, so it begins to look as if it is
really an after-the-fact justification for restrictions on recovery for
mental injury which are in fact based on some other consideration.
In Part III, I give some suggestions as to what those considerations
might be.
186. Agent Orange was a defoliant which was proven to cause cancer in Vietnam
veterans. See generally Robert L. Rabin, Tort System on Trial: The Burden of Mass
Toxics Litigation, 98 YALE L.J. 813 (1989).
187. The Dalkon Shield was an unsafe contraceptive device which caused pelvic
inflammatory disease and other complications in women who used it, See generally
Judge Miles Lord, The Dalkon Shield Litigation: Revised and Annotated Reprimand
by Chief Justice Miles W. Lord, 9 HAMLINE L. REv. 7 (1986).
188. DES was a drug marketed to pregnant women from the late 1940s to the
early 1970s. It caused cancer of the reproductive tract and other complications in
the daughters of the women who took it. See generally David A. Fischer, Products
Liability-An Analysis of Market Share Liability, 34 VAND. L. REv. 1623 (1981);
Glen 0. Robinson, Multiple Causation in Tort Law: Reflections on the DES Cases, 68
VA. L. REv. 713 (1982).
189. See Goodhart, supra note 52, at 22 ("It has been difficult for the courts to rid
themselves of the idea that in some way or other the shock which the person has
suffered must be connected with some pre-existing physical injury or danger....");
Finneran, supra note 34, at 220 (noting a 'theoretically untenable" gap between rec-
ognition of mental integrity as a legally protected interest and (non-) recognition of




The "floodgates" argument, well known to all lawyers,190 is
generally suspect and should not be applied to exclude liability in
this or any other context.191 Professor A.L. Goodhart likened the
argument to the principle "that you should not act justly now for
fear of raising expectations that you may act still more justly in the
future-expectations which you are afraid you will not have the
courage to satisfy."192 Goodhart comments:
[L]awyers are inclined to speak of "opening a wide field," which
they tend to regard with some alarm. It is difficult to see why,
if the field should prove to be a fertile one, this process should
be considered with such disfavour. On the other hand, if it
should prove, as is generally the case, only of limited extent,
then the exaggerated fears have been unnecessary.193
In other words, there is something rather peculiar about deny-
ing compensation to a plaintiff on the basis that many other people
suffer, or are likely to suffer, the same injury. 194 To mix metaphors
for a moment, there cannot be a flood of litigation without an in-
ferno of negligence-yet it seems that when the floodgates argu-
ment prevails, the idea is that a defendant who injures many
people, or who is in a class that injures many people, should be ex-
cused for that very reason.'9 5
This aspect of the floodgates argument is rarely, if ever, recog-
nized by the courts. They tend to concentrate more on the adminis-
trative aspects of the situation; their apprehension appears to be
190. See Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress, supra note 36, at 1244.
191. See generally Calandrella, supra note 41.
192. Goodhart, supra note 52, at 14 (citing CoRNsRORD, MIcROCOSMOGRAPHIA 15
(4th ed. 1949)).
193. Id. The "field" was expressly admitted to be "fertile" by Judge Van Voorhis,
dissenting, in Battalla v. State, 176 N.E.2d 729, 732 (N.Y. 1961); this was, in Van
Voorhis' opinion, a reason not to abandon the impact rule. For instances of courts
generally disapproving of the floodgates argument, see Williams v. Baker, 572 A.2d
1062, 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Blackwell v. Oser, 436 So. 2d 1293, 1297 (La. Ct. App.
1983); Sinn v. Burd, 404 A.2d 672, 680-81 (Pa. 1975); Gain v. Carroll Mill Co., 787
P.2d 553, 559 (Wash. 1990) (Brachtenbach, J., concurring only in the result and
otherwise dissenting); Gates v. Richardson, 719 P.2d 193, 197 (Wyo. 1986).
194. In D'Ambra v. United States, 338 A.2d 524 (R.I. 1975), the Supreme Court of
Rhode Island reasoned in just the opposite way:
The modern trend of urbanization and overall increase in density of
population make serious invasion of our psychological security more
and more likely. Where there is a widespread need for redress, the judi-
cial system should consider very carefully before it undertakes to reject,
as a matter of law, an entire class of claims.
Id. at 529.
195. See Goodhart, supra note 52, at 23. This same observation could be applied
to proportionality arguments, insofar as they are based on the apprehension that
many people may be affected by an act of negligence.
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that there will be more claims than they can deal with. 196 Courts
that experience this apprehension do not appear to realize that un-
just rules which are out of step with social standards are more
likely to give rise to litigation, because the legal profession and soci-
ety at large will feel such dissatisfaction with them that attempts
will be made time and time again to have them overturned. A clear
rejection of restrictive liability rules, on the other hand, may in fact
reduce the volume of litigation before the courts, because defend-
ants will not take the trouble to litigate and will be more inclined to
settle.197
In any event, it has been rightly argued that the business of
courts is to entertain litigation, and it is an abdication of the judi-
cial function to turn deserving plaintiffs away on the basis that they
may belong to a large class. 198 Another argument is that even if
the courts may be swamped by litigation, it is still better to place
the burden on the defendant (or, in most cases, its insurer) than on
an innocent plaintiff.199
As to Goodhart's second point-that "if [the field] should prove
... only of limited extent, then the exaggerated fears have been
unnecessary"-although courts rejecting the Dillon approach have
196. See William L. Crowe, Sr., The Anatomy of a Tort-Greenian, as Interpreted
by Crowe Who Has Been Influenced by Malone-A Primer, 22 Loy. L. REv. 903, 907
(1976).
197. Harvey Teff, for example, notes that the strain of reliving the experience over
and over again in the course of litigation would discourage many people, that poten-
tial claimants may get medical advice against pursuing a claim, and furthermore
that:
the "secondary" nature of the nervous shock in question suggests that
this is an area where claims-consciousness and social expectations of
redress are unusually weak. Nor is it far-fetched to speculate that
where the relationship with the accident victim is very close some peo-
ple would perceive litigation on their own behalf as inappropriate and
distasteful-in extreme cases as a kind of betrayal or negation of their
feelings for the primary victim.
Teff, supra note 63, at 111-12.
198. See Barnhill v. Davis, 300 N.W.2d 104, 106 (Iowa 1981); Falzone v. Busch,
214 A.2d 12, 16 (N.J. 1965) ("the proper remedy is an expansion of judicial machin-
ery, not a decrease in the availability of justice"); Schultz v. Barberton Glass Co., 447
N.E.2d 109, 111 (Ohio 1983); Robb v. Pennsylvania R.R., 210 A.2d 709, 714 (Del.
1965). See also Pearson, supra note 32, at 506 (noting that the California court
"reacts to any argument not going to the substantive merits as an attack on its
judgehood,' as an accusation that, were it to accept the process argument, to that
extent it could not dispense justice"); KEETON ET AL., supra note 33, at 360; Teff,
supra note 63, at 111 (noting that the reactions of the Law Lords to the floodgates
argument in McLoughlin v. O'Brian, 1983 App. Cas. 410 (1982) (appeal taken from
Eng. CA.), ranged from "fairly scathing" to "skeptical" to "equivocal").
199. Marchand v. Superior Court, 246 Cal. Rptr. 531, 552 (Ct. App. 1988);
D'Ambra v. United States, 338 A.2d 524, 530 (R.I. 1975). See also KEETON ET AL.,
supra note 33, at 360.
1996]
Law and Inequality
expressed concerns about the floodgates,200 the California experi-
ence appears to show that such concerns are misplaced.201 There
are probably several reasons for this, including the fact that mental
injury claims are often settled rather than litigated, limitations
built into the Dillon approach2O2 (especially the physical manifesta-
tion requirement, which means that such injury is relatively rare),
and subsequent restrictive application of Dillon in California.203
These general problems with the "floodgates" argument must lead
us to ask, even if a rule does stem the tide of litigation-as, for
example, the impact rule has the capacity to do, by excluding large
numbers of claims204-what is the price to logic and principle of
achieving that end?
Another variation on the "floodgates" argument is that al-
lowing recovery for mental injury will leave the courts with no logi-
cal stopping place.2 05 The immediate reaction to such an argument
must be that if there is no logical stopping place then there should
be no stopping place. In other words, we should not take it for
granted that there must be a stopping place at all, if there are peo-
ple in need of compensation and people who have negligently in-
200. See Stadler v. Cross, 295 N.W.2d 552, 555 (Minn. 1980); Tobin v. Grossman,
249 N.E.2d 419, 424 (N.Y. 1969).
201. Corso v. Merrill, 406 A.2d 300, 306 (N.H. 1979); Ramirez v. Armstrong, 673
P.2d 822, 826 (N.H. 1983). See also KEETON ET AL., supra note 33, at 360; Golden,
supra note 36, at 658. If Goodhart is correct, even the evidence of the Californian
experience is unnecessary to reach the conclusion that the zone of danger rule does
not stem any tide. See Goodhart, supra note 52, at 23.
202. See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
203. See supra text accompanying notes 69-80.
204. But see McNiece, supra note 30, at 30-31 (claiming that the impact rule is
unable to stem the tide of litigation).
205. See, e.g., Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 379 P.2d 513, 522-24 (Cal.
1963); Williams v. Baker, 572 A.2d 1062, 1070-71 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Rickey v. Chicago
Transit Auth., 457 N.E.2d 1, 4 (111. 1983); Stadler v. Cross, 295 N.W.2d 552, 554
(Minn. 1980); Corso v. Merrill, 406 A.2d 300, 309 (N.H. 1979) (Grimes, J., dissent-
ing); Tobin v. Grossman, 249 N.E.2d 419, 422-23 (N.Y. 1969); Jelley v. LaFlame, 238
A.2d 728, 730 (N.H. 1968); Lafferty v. Manhasset Medical Ctr. Hosp., 429 N.E.2d 789
(N.Y. 1981); Battalla v. State, 176 N.E.2d 729, 733 (N.Y. 1961) (Van Voorhis, J.,
dissenting); Niederman v. Brodsky, 261 A.2d 84, 90 (Pa. 1970) (Bell, C.J., dissent-
ing); Waube v. Warrington, 258 N.W. 497, 501 (Wis. 1935). See generally Leon
Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, 28 COLUM. L. REv. 1014, 1035 (1928)
(explaining why courts are concerned with the workability of a principle); Hender-
son, supra note 63, at 517 ("both the impact and the zone-of-danger rules serve...
the process function of accomplishing... limitations in a sufficiently formal manner
to render the negligence concept adjudicable"). Such arguments have been rejected
on numerous occasions. See, e.g., Marchand v. Superior Court, 246 Cal. Rptr. 531,
545 (Ct. App. 1988); Barnhill v. Davis, 300 N.W.2d 104, 106 (Iowa 1981) (citing Dil-
lon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 920 (Cal. 1968) (stating that the "case-by-case approach of
the common law is best suited to refine the rules"); Dziokonski v. Babineau, 380
N.E.2d 1295, 1302 (Mass. 1978); Sinn v. Burd, 404 A.2d 672, 683 (Pa. 1979) ("We find




jured them. At the same time, the use of such an argument invites
us to examine restrictive recovery rules to see whether they provide
a logical stopping place themselves. Thus, we might consider
whether any of the rules applied to mental injury really do repre-
sent a bright line, or whether they leave significant leeway to
judges and juries.
The impact rule, while appearing to be mechanical and easy to
apply, is in fact anything but. Although the word "impact" has a
ring of the black and white about it, cases involving smoke inhala-
tion or dust in the eye206 show that the rule in practice allowed
recovery in situations we would not normally think of as "im-
pact."2 07 It is clear that courts have applied the rule in a very per-
missive way; the more permissive the application, however, the
further the courts were from effectuating the stated purpose of the
rule.20 8
Similar observations can be made about the zone of danger
rule. Once again, an apparently mechanical, easy to apply rule
based on physical realities is in fact one of rather indeterminate
application. Consider the following example, taken from one of the
most famous cases in this area: a mother sitting on the front porch
of her house sees a negligent driver run down her daughter, who is
crossing the street.20 9 The mother is assumed to be outside the
zone of danger, by virtue of the fact that she was not on the street.
However, it is not unknown for negligent drivers to run off the
street and into houses or buildings.210 Thus, it is easy to see how a
plaintiff in such a position could fear for herself even though, in
hindsight, she was never really in danger.
More to the point, reasonable minds might disagree on the
question of just how far the zone of danger extends. A good illustra-
tion of this problem is the case of Portee v. Jaffee, 211 where the
plaintiff watched her son suffer and die while trapped in an elevator
206. See supra text accompanying notes 38-39.
207. One situation which I have not been able to find in a reported case applying
the impact rule, but which would pose an interesting challenge to that rule, is where
the plaintiff was splashed by the blood of a person physically injured in an accident
caused by the defendant's negligence. Certainly, being splashed with blood would be
a more horrific experience than simply witnessing the accident, and to that extent
injury becomes more easily foreseeable, but would the courts deny recovery on the
basis that the blood was not the defendant's property?
208. See infra text accompanying notes 36, 40.
209. Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 911 (Cal. 1968).
210. See, e.g., Strazza v. McKittrick, 156 A.2d 149 (Conn. 1959); Bowman v. Wil-
liams, 165 A. 182 (Md. 1933); Paugh v. Hanks, 451 N.E.2d 759 (Ohio 1983); Dulieu v.
White & Sons, 2 KB. 669 (1901) (horse and cart, rather than automobile); Hunsley
v. Giard, 553 P.2d 1096 (Wash. 1976).
211. 417 A.2d 521 (N.J. 1980).
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shaft in the building in which they lived. Where the danger created
by the defendant consists of some sort of trap, any given person's
presence in the "zone of danger" depends on his or her actions, not
on those of the defendant. Thus, the "zone of danger" is infinite in
one sense, and in another sense responsibility can be shifted to the
plaintiff for placing him- or herself in it.212
The foregoing discussion shows that the law relating to mental
injury occasioned by physical harm to another rarely if ever lives up
to the policy considerations which supposedly underlie it. The re-
strictive recovery rules imposed have not necessarily excluded triv-
ial claims, averted fraud, ensured that liability is proportionate to
moral culpability, or stemmed the tide of litigation. To the extent
that they have achieved one of these latter two aims, there are
strong grounds to argue that it is not the business of tort law to be
seeking to do so in the first place. One must conclude that the law
relating to mental injury occasioned by harm to another is in a
rather sorry state from the point of view of policy. Before offering
my own explanation for how courts allowed this to happen, I turn to
consider the law from the point of view of general tort doctrine.
M. The Inconsistency of the Rules with General Tort
Doctrine
In this part, I consider the relationship between the rules that
restrict recovery for mental injury occasioned by physical harm to
another and the general principles of tort law. First, I demonstrate
how the formation of restrictive liability rules has distorted the con-
cept of a duty of care without a convincing reason for the distortion.
I then discuss considerations of causal proximity and remoteness
that have been used to justify restrictive liability rules, and suggest
that the tension between these concerns and the principle that a
tortfeasor is liable for all injury suffered as a result of his or her
negligence should instead be resolved in favour of the plaintiff. My
conclusion is that the law of mental injury occasioned by physical
harm to another is at best a major exception to general tort princi-
ples, and at worst incoherent and inconsistent with established
doctrine.
A. Duty and Foreseeability
Application of a duty analysis is the most common way courts
resolve issues arising out of mental injury occasioned by the death
212. See Havard, supra note 6, at 492-93.
440 [Vol. 14:391
A FEMINIST CRITIQUE
of or by injury to a loved one of the plaintiff.213 If recovery is to be
denied, it is generally on the basis that the defendant owed the
plaintiff no duty of care. 21 4 Thus, most restrictions on recovery are,
formally at least, an answer to the question: was the relationship
between the parties such that the law imposes a duty on the de-
fendant to avoid injuring the plaintiff?2 15 This, of course, is a ques-
tion that must be answered in all negligence cases. However,
something other than the usual analysis is applied in the area of
mental injury. The core concept of foreseeability has been distorted
or ignored in a way that suggests that courts' concerns about
mental injury go deeper than is commonly intimated. Duty is a
question of law,2 16 which means that if the plaintiff fails to estab-
lish the defendant's duty, he or she will not have the opportunity to
present a case to a jury. Treating mental injury as a question of
duty, therefore, enables judges to keep control over the cause of ac-
tion, and to pursue any policy aims which they might consider
important.
Of course, it is clear that considerations other than foresee-
ability have always been taken into account in establishing or deny-
ing a duty, in this and many other contexts. 2 17 The reasons for
recognizing and applying policy limitations in the course of the duty
inquiry vary depending on the context, but the policies involved
here are probably the same as those that were formerly used to jus-
tify failure to recognize this type of injury, and are subject to the
same counter-arguments. 2 18 Close consideration of the rules that
have purported to recognize a duty in respect of mental injury
shows that something different from a traditional doctrinal ap-
proach has been taken to duty.
213. But cf Bowen v. Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co., 517 N.W.2d 432, 439 (Wis.
1994). For the Bowen court, the inquiry was overtly about public policy rather than
duty.
214. An alternative basis for refusing recovery is that the plaintiff has not suf-
fered the requisite type or extent of injury. Most of these rules are discussed from
the point of view of policy above. See supra part II.
215. See Henderson, supra note 63, at 516.
216. See FLEMING, supra note 33, at 126 (explaining that the court handles the
preliminary determination of whether a duty exists, a decision that carries preceden-
tial weight). See also Jaensch v. Coffey, 155 C.L.R. 549, 581 (Austl. 1984).
217. See, e.g., Anns v. Merton London Borough Council, 1978 App. Cas. 728 (1977)
(appeal taken from Eng. CA.) (liability of statutory authorities); Rondel v. Worsley,
11969) 1 App. Cas. 141 (1967) (appeal taken from Eng. C.A.) (barristerial immunity).
See also supra note 90 and accompanying text.
218. See supra parts IA and II.
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1. The Zone of Danger Rule
The zone of danger rule distorts the duty inquiry because it
ignores the nature of the injury, delineating a duty in respect of
mental injury that is coextensive with the duty in respect of physi-
cal injury.21 9 A defendant who physically endangers a plaintiff is
clearly in breach of a well-established duty, and the only remaining
element of the tort of negligence to be established is injury flowing
from the breach. Thus, the advance the zone of danger rule made
over the impact rule related to recognition of the injury and to the
way it came about, not to duty as such. It is easy to see how the
zone of danger rule relates to foreseeability in a near-miss case,
where the plaintiff was concerned only for his or her physical
safety. In such a case, endangerment is indeed the gist of the ac-
tion.22 0 However, neither the strong nor the weak version of the
rule establishes anything at all about the foreseeability of injury in
the case of mental injury resulting from fear of harm to a third
person.
Under the strong version, the plaintiff must have feared for
him- or herself; therefore, claims relating to fear for another person
are automatically excluded even if they were foreseeable. It may, of
course, be said that medical knowledge establishes that mental in-
jury arising out of fear for oneself is more normal, hence more
likely, hence more foreseeable. 22 i However, it is important to bear
in mind that the foresight with which we are concerned is that of
the reasonable man, who is not a doctor. 22 2 Medical evidence is
only useful insofar as it can establish the genuineness or otherwise
of the injury (either generally or in any particular case) or throw
light on the factual causation issue. If the reasonable person recog-
nizes that injury may arise out of fear for another, it is obvious that
such recognition cannot be based on the plaintiff's own physical
endangerment.
If the weak version of the zone of danger rule is applied, such
that recovery is allowed wherever the plaintiff might reasonably
have feared for him- or herself, even if the plaintiff's fear was in
fact for another person, the rule in effect denies the foreseeability of
that which it uses to ground the duty. On the one hand, the rule
says that mental injury is only foreseeable if it arises out of danger
219. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
220. See Brody, supra note 36, at 239.
221. See generally Smith, supra note 155; Havard, supra note 6.
222. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 33, at 182-85 (discussing the fact that the
reasonable man is only required to have the usual amount of knowledge). But see id.
at 185-93 (discussing higher standards imposed in some cases, e.g., medical mal-
practice); FLEMING, supra note 33, at 98-99.
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to oneself, and on the other hand, it allows claims based on injury
arising out of fear for another. Given the absurdity of this logic, one
must conclude that the weak version of the zone of danger rule is
not about foreseeability at all.
Thus, neither version of the zone of danger rule is consistent
with the notion that a duty of care in negligence is based on the
foreseeability of harm to another, if by "harm" we mean that harm
that is actually being compensated.
2. The Dillon Approach
The Dillon case was the first attempt in the United States to
apply a traditional duty analysis to mental injury, but the ultimate
effect of that case has been to keep mental injury in a class of its
own and subject to additional rules compared to other types of in-
jury.2 23 Plaintiffs whose mental injury is occasioned by harm to an-
other are treated as "bystanders" whereas plaintiffs whose mental
injury has come about in another way are "direct victims" and have
a considerably easier time in establishing their entitlement to re-
covery. In particular, "direct victims" are not required to satisfy the
three "proximity" criteria laid down in Dillon .224 In this sense, Dil-
lon stopped short of recognizing a duty of care in respect of mental
injury and recovery is still the exception rather than the rule.225
The case did bring the law one step closer to recognizing a general
duty in relation to mental injury in that it admitted that mental
injury occasioned by fear for another person is foreseeable under
certain circumstances. On the other hand, and in addition to the
conclusions to be drawn from a comparison with the direct victim
cases, it can be argued that the criteria laid down in Dillon cannot
be justified on the basis of any help they provide in establishing the
foreseeability of the injury.
The Dillon approach is, on the whole, far better than the zone
of danger approach in ensuring that mental injury victims are not
treated differently from those who suffer other kinds of injury. It
evidences a conviction in favour of taking mental injury seriously in
that it applies legal concepts in a manner consistent with that in
which those concepts are applied in other contexts. Leaving aside
problems relating to the strictness with which the Dillon criteria
have been applied,226 it can generally be said that the Dillon ap-
proach successfully resolves the duty question in mental injury
223. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
224. See supra text accompanying notes 69-79.
225. See supra text accompanying notes 84-85.
226. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
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cases by treating the injury as foreseeable. It does not, however, go
all the way towards squaring the law relating to mental injury occa-
sioned by harm to another with general tort law.
As discussed above, one aspect of the Dillon approach is to re-
quire plaintiffs to show that the defendant is also liable to the phys-
ically injured person. Thus, where the defendant has a defence, or
perhaps even a partial defence, against the physically injured per-
son, the mentally injured person cannot recover. 22 7 This rule rep-
resents yet another example of how a general duty of care in
relation to mental injury has not been recognized. If there were
such a duty, we would not expect to see liability depending on
things that have nothing to do with the relationship between the
plaintiff and the defendant.2 28 Thus, we see once again that courts
following the Dillon approach do not necessarily recognize an in-
dependent duty to the relatives of the people one's negligence physi-
cally endangers.229 If such a duty were recognized, it would have to
be admitted that a person suffering mental injury does not simply
"tack" his or her cause of action onto the cause of action of the per-
son who was killed or physically injured.230 The mental injury vic-
tim's action would stand or fall on its own merits. The duties owed
to the two people are interdependent, certainly; but the most ana-
lytically sound approach to this interdependence is to say that by
endangering one person, a defendant is being negligent towards that
person's relatives. This gives rise to a duty which is independent in
its own right.
If a case arises, then, where the physically injured person is
guilty of some contributory negligence, the best way of dealing with
it would be to treat the defendant and the physically injured person
as joint tortfeasors. There would then remain scope for adjusting
rights and liabilities between those two people in whatever way is
provided for by the law of the jurisdiction. Matters should be set-
tled as in any joint tortfeasor case, and the plaintiff should not be
disadvantaged because he or she has been injured by the combined
negligence of two people or singled out because one of those people
was also being negligent towards him- or herself. The injury is the
same and the need for compensation is the same; relative culpabil-
227. See supra part I.E.5.
228. Teff comments that "underlying the unease with which courts have both
made and withheld awards, can sometimes be detected a certain ambivalence about
compensating people who, however deserving, are in one sense 'secondary' victims of
tortious conduct." Teff, supra note 63, at 104.
229. See Creato, supra note 61, at 67 (suggesting that this limitation is concep-
tually inconsistent with the rest of the court's analysis).
230. See Stone, supra note 126, at 789-90.
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ity and liability should be fought out between those who have been
negligent.231 For example, the defendant might be liable for the
whole of the plaintiff's damages and retain the right to sue the
third person for a contribution.232
3. The Australian Proximity Approach
The approach introduced in Jaensch v. Coffey2 3 3 is also a via-
ble alternative to mechanical rules, and maximizes flexibility,
which is the greatest strength of the common law. Perhaps, how-
ever, this approach's capacity to maintain flexibility is best ex-
plained by the fact that it does nothing different from that which
the application of traditional tort principles would do. There is,
however, scope for criticizing the whole concept of proximity as a
superadded criterion beyond foreseeability.
It is easy to see how a concept like "proximity" sounds ger-
mane to the question of mental injury occasioned by injury to a
third person. The closeness of the relationship between the plain-
tiff and the third person is obviously a key consideration, but what
Justice Deane did not appear to recognize, at least in his general
discussion of the meaning of proximity, 2 34 is that proximity is a key
consideration for foreseeability. A concept like "proximity" cannot
provide any answers to difficult duty questions because it raises a
question itself: how proximate? The answer, of course, is, "proxi-
mate enough to be foreseeable." This answer brings us back to the
beginning if we, like Justice Deane, are determined not to regard
foreseeability as a "panacea."235 Unless the proximity inquiry
reduces to one of foreseeability, it is difficult to see how a thing like
231. See generally KEETON ET AL., supra note 33, ch. 8.
232. This, however, depends on whether the third person is liable to the plaintiff.
Do I owe a duty to my friends and relatives not to injure myself? In Jaensch v.
Coffey, Justice Deane suggested in dicta that a defendant who causes mental injury
to another by inflicting injury upon herself is not liable. Unfortunately, Justice De-
ane made only a passing reference to this issue, and so we are left to wonder about
the basis for such a position. Jaensch v. Coffey, 155 C.L.R. 549, 604 (Austl. 1984). It
can certainly be argued that, if there is such a thing as a duty to avoid causing
mental injury without impact or physical endangerment, recovery should not be au-
tomatically excluded in such a situation. A similar sentiment, though not expressed,
might go some way to explaining the decision in the Australian case of Rowe v. Mc-
Cartney, [1976] 2 N.S.W.R. 72. See supra part I.E.6.
233. 155 C.L.R. 549 (Austl. 1984). See supra text accompanying notes 86-103.
234. See supra text accompanying notes 95-96. It must also be noted, of course,
that the idea of a relationship between the plaintiff and a third person did not come
into his explanation of the meaning of "proximity."
235. Jaensch, 155 C.L.R. at 581. Julius Stone, in a scathing attack on "this fur-
ther new-fangled bifurcation," argued that it "would submerge this whole area of the
law in an ocean of raging chaos." JuLius SToNE, PRECEDENT AND LAw: DYNAMICS OF
CoMMoN LAw GRowTH 264-65 (1985).
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proximity can be measured.236 "Proximity" begins to sound like
nothing more than a convenient label for the result of some process
in the judge's mind, which may involve nothing more than random
ruminations on justice and equity.
This is not to say that ruminations on what appears just are
simply out of place in this context; indeed, they may be the only
possible way of arriving at a satisfactory conclusion. Whatever the
content of the proximity principle, its application in Jaensch did
lead to a satisfactory result.237 However, the proximity approach,
much as it has the ability to lead to satisfactory results, gives no
real assistance in understanding the problem of mental injury occa-
sioned by the death of or by injury to another person. It does not
give voice to courts' real concerns about this type of injury: that the
injury is trivial, that there is a danger of fraudulent claims, that
liability will be disproportionate to fault, and that there is a danger
of a flood of claims. The proximity approach appears to incorporate
those concerns, but subsuming them under the banner of proximity
gives practitioners and commentators no opening for analysis or ar-
gument. In short, proximity is a conclusion, not a test. It would be
preferable for the courts to award damages on the basis of sympa-
thy for the plaintiff or their assessment of his or her "deserving-
ness"; it is entirely likely that this is what they do in any event.
Thus, the proximity test does not and cannot solve the prob-
lem of mental injury occasioned by harm to another person. It
shows, like the Dillon approach, that even when courts purport to
apply general legal principles to mental injury, that injury is still
treated as an exceptional category of damage. It has at its base an
assumption that mental injury should be disfavoured. Therefore,
while Justice Deane's approach is preferable to the application of
mechanical rules, the judgment is yet another example of the need
that common law judges seem to feel to find ways to justify a re-
strictive approach to mental injury. We have not, as yet, discovered
a convincing rationale for that need.
One restriction remaining after Jaensch v. Coffey is the propo-
sition that there can be no recovery for mental injury occasioned by
the defendant's self-inflicted harm.238 This translates, analytically,
236. It is on this ground that Justice Gerard Brennan continues to reject the
"proximity" approach. See San Sebastian Proprietary Ltd. v. Minister Administer-
ing Envtl. Planning & Assessment Act 1979, 162 C.L.R. 340, 367-68 (Austl. 1986).
237. That is, the injured woman recovered and there was a general opening-up of
the area based on a recognition that mental injury is likely to be a product of a close
relationship. It may be questioned whether the results to which it leads are any
different from those which would be reached by a straight foreseeability test.
238. See supra text accompanying note 232.
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into something very similar to Dillon's requirement that the de-
fendant be liable to the third party. 23 9 One of the biggest risks for a
plaintiff under the Dillon approach is that it will be found that the
third party was contributorily negligent. Self-inflicted injury is a
case of one hundred percent contributory negligence. Therefore,
under either the Jaensch approach or the Dillon approach, mental
injury occasioned by the defendant's self-inflicted injury is not re-
coverable. For this reason, the same criticisms may be directed
against the Australian rule as against the Californian: there is no
analytical distinction between endangering another person and en-
dangering oneself, once one recognizes the deservingness of a plain-
tiff who has suffered mental injury occasioned by harm to another.
If, as argued above,240 a contributorily negligent third party can be
treated as a joint tortfeasor in relation to the mental injury plain-
tiff, there should be no reason why one should not have a self-injur-
ing defendant. The Australian reservation in relation to self-
inflicted injury, therefore, shows that the High Court has still not
fully recognized the foreseeability of mental injury occasioned by
physical harm to another.
B. Remoteness, Proximate Cause and the Eggshell Skull
Rule
Another stage of the negligence inquiry where litigants in
mental injury cases may encounter difficulties is that of "remote-
ness of damage" or "proximate cause." Although most courts and
commentators consider the issue of mental injury as one to be
solved at the duty stage, it is necessary to consider how remoteness
and proximate cause apply to mental injury. This is because of lin-
gering concerns about the abnormality of any plaintiff who suffers
serious mental injury as a result of harm to another person: remote-
ness and proximate cause speak directly to these concerns.
The United States, England and Australia all have rules
about the connection between the negligence and the injury which
go beyond a simple inquiry as to factual causation. The United
States "proximate cause" formulation requires that the conse-
quences of the defendant's negligence must be within the risk it cre-
ated,241 a direct consequence of the risk,242 or "foreseeable" before
239. See supra parts I.E.5 and III.A.2.
240. See supra part I.E.5.
241. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 33, at 281-82.
242. See id. at 293-96.
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recovery will be allowed.243 The term is also used to cover situa-
tions involving an intervening cause.244
In England and Australia, on the other hand, intervening
causes are generally thought of as a question of "legal causation,"
whereas "remoteness of damage" is a separate question.245 The
general rule in these jurisdiction is that that the damage com-
plained of is of the saxme kind as that which could be foreseen,
rather than paying attention to the chain of events which led to the
damage. The case laying down this rule was Overseas Tankship
(UK) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Engineering Co. ,246 commonly referred
to as The Wagon Mound (No. 1), whose facts give a good illustration
of the approach.
In The Wagon Mound, the defendant negligently caused an oil
spill on Sydney Harbour, which spread to the plaintiff's dock where
welding operations were being carried out. An employee of the
plaintiff made inquiries to the defendant about the safety of contin-
uing welding, and was assured that the flash point of the oil was
sufficiently high that it could not be set alight by the sparks that
would be given off. No one knew exactly how the fire started, but it
was assumed that a spark must have set alight a piece of cotton or
some similar material, which fell on the water and acted as a wick,
igniting the oil. The dock was destroyed. The Privy Council held
that the only foreseeable damage from the oil slick was soiling or
fouling from contact between the oil and the dock, not damage by
fire. Burning and fouling being two different types of damage, the
plaintiff could not recover.
The Wagon Mound rule, like American proximate cause rules,
is supported by the apprehension that liability may exceed culpabil-
ity.2 4 7 However, once again we find that on examination neither
type of rule necessarily addresses this concern effectively, 24s Rules
relating to directness or the foreseeability of a certain type of dam-
age do not necessarily tie liability to culpability. An act of minor
negligence may foreseeably or directly cause widespread damage,
and an act of gross negligence may foreseeably or directly cause
only minor damage. The outbreak of fire at Morts Dock did not sud-
243. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text. See also Leong v. Takasaki,
520 P.2d 758 (Haw. 1974) (applying a "proximate cause" approach to the entire issue
of mental injury).
244. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 33, at 301-19.
245. But see Medlin v. State Gov't Ins. Comm'n, 182 C.L.R. 1 (1995) (Austl.); Na-
der v. Urban Transit Auth., 2 N.S.W.L.R. 501, 530-31 (Austl. 1985) (suggesting that
"legal causatioan is simply part of the remoteness inquiry).
246. 1961 App. Cas. 388 (PC.) (appeal taken from N.S.W.).
247. Id. at 422-23. See generally KEETON ET AL., supra note 33, at 287.
248. See supra part II.C.
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denly make the defendant's oil spill less negligent. Nor does the
onset of a mental illness in the wake of a family tragedy make the
behaviour of the person who caused the tragedy any less blamewor-
thy. It is therefore clear that such rules are ultimately arbitrary.249
There is also the argument that such rules give effect to some
people's feeling that liability must stop somewhere.250 If that is the
case, it must be asked what they do that cannot be done in the
course of the duty inquiry.2 5 1 If the remoteness question were put
to a jury and the duty question were decided by a judge, there is
much to be said for the proposition that decisions should be based
on the instinctive feelings of the former rather than the latter.2 52
However, remoteness or proximate cause is usually treated as a
legal question253 and, as such, simply amounts to yet another hole
through which an otherwise deserving claim might fall.
Moreover, The Wagon Mound (No. 1) leaves open a serious
question which becomes very relevant in the context of emotional
injury cases: how narrowly is the damage to be categorized?
Clearly "damage to property" was a broader category than the Privy
Council was willing to recognize, but what of, say, "personal in-
jury"? Would this be parceled up into injuries to different parts of
the body? It appears not; cases since The Wagon Mound (No. 1)
have taken a broad approach to personal injury, with the result
that the foreseeability of any personal injury makes a defendant
249. See supra note 181.
250. See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
251. The duty approach was preferred in D'Ambra v. United States, 338 A.2d 524,
527 (R.I. 1975) and in Waube v. Warrington, 258 N.W. 497, 497-98 (Wis. 1935). For
a discussion of the relationship between "proximate cause" rules and the Palsgraf
doctrine of the unforeseeable plaintiff (which decides the issue at the duty stage), see
KEETON ET AL., supra note 33, at 284-90. See also West, supra note 43, at 189 (argu-
ing that the real question in mental injury cases is one of proximate cause).
252. See Masaki v. General Motors Corp., 780 P.2d 566, 576 (Haw. 1989). See
also Brody, supra note 36, at 236. It might also be argued that one of the purposes of
the tort system is to discourage self-help, and that in order to fulfill this function
plaintiffs must be allowed their "day in court' wherever possible. It may or may not
be true that plaintiffs who are unsuccessful at the duty stage are likely to go out and,
say, vandalize the defendant's property in an effort to seek revenge, but it is submit-
ted that an important factor in recovery from accidents is the opportunity to have
one's case against any (perceived) wrongdoer heard by a third person. Resolving the
issue at the duty stage denies the plaintiff this opportunity. See Miller, supra note
64, at 28. On the other hand, problems with the approach of leaving such questions
to juries have been noted. See D'Ambra, 338 A.2d at 527-28; Miller, supra note 64,
at 30-32; Nathan Sidley, Proximate Cause and Traumatic Neurosis, 11 BuLL. Am.
AcAD. PsycmATRy L. 197, 200 (1983); Negligence and Emotional Harm, supra note
55, at 528. But see Smith, supra note 155, at 625.
253. See FLEMING, supra note 33, at 281-82.
1996]
Law and Inequality
liable for all personal injury.2 54 Indeed, it is difficult to see how the
"eggshell skull" rule could survive under any other approach.
However, one cannot help but notice that there is a substan-
tial tension between the eggshell skull rule and the Wagon Mound
rule when applied to mental injury.2 55 Consider a situation where
the plaintiff has been physically endangered but not struck, and be-
cause of a particular sensitivity to fright suffers organic depression,
either as a result of fear for him- or herself or as a result of witness-
ing an injury to another person. If the eggshell skull rule means
that damages must be allowed for mental injury irrespective of the
plaintiff's pre-existing vulnerability,256 it will be difficult to justify
a declaration, in the application of the Wagon Mound rule, that
only physical injury was foreseeable.257 The eggshell skull rule re-
quires courts to disregard foreseeability, and the Wagon Mound
rule requires courts to rely on it. Such difficulties do not appear to
arise in practice, since it has been held for some time that mental
injury is a foreseeable result of fright.258 However, remoteness
rules remain a vulnerable link in the chain of liability.2 59
One good example of this vulnerability is the case of Rowe v.
McCartney, discussed above.2 60 The plaintiff in that case failed be-
254. See, e.g., Smith v. Leech Brain & Co., 2 Q.B. 405 (1962); Beavis v. Apthorpe,
80 N.S.W.W.N. 852 (1962). The one exception would seem to be Rowe v. McCartney,
[1976] 2 N.S.W.R. 72. See supra text accompanying notes 131-134.
255. See Brody, supra note 36, at 255 ("those courts which deny recovery where
fright has induced physical consequences on the ground that the fright is an inter-
vening cause between the negligence and the consequences are on even surer ground
when the victim is susceptible to emotional distress").
256. That is, assuming the "transformation difficulty" has been overcome. See in-
fra text accompanying notes 283-86.
257. See, e.g., Hevican v. Ruane, [1991] 3 All E.R. 65 (Q.B.) (finding that plaintiff
was entitled to damages for "nervous shock" even though it was not foreseeable that
the plaintiff '.mild suffer a citnix 1us~
258. See, e.g., Dulieu v. White, 2 K.B. 669, 672-75 (1901) ("We must, therefore,
take it as proved that the negligent driving of the defendant's servant reasonably
and naturally caused a nervots or mental shock to the plaintiff by her reasonable
appreciation of immediate bodily hurt."); Mount Isa Mines Ltd. v. Pusey, 125 C.L.R.
383, 389 (Austl. 1970) ("[I]t could be held that such an employer could and ought to
foresee that the sight of a buroing or recently burnt human might mentally disturb
an employee whose proximity to the injured fellow employee ought to be foreseen.").
259. It has already been seen that at least one court has categorized mental injury
in a narrow way, according to the way it came about, and excluded liability on the
basis of a remoteness analysis. See supra text accompanying notes 128-33 (discuss-
ing Rowe v. McCartney, [1976] 2 N.S.W.R. 72). That case is all the more striking for
its refusal of even parasitic damages, considering that the plaintiff was physically
injured. However, this is certainly a more honest approach than that taken in some
of the impact rule cases where the causal connection between physical impact and
mental injury was tenuous, to say the least. See supra notes 36-40 and accompany-
ing text. On the "flimsiness" of applying a "proximate cause" analysis to exclude
recovery under the impact rule, see McNiece, supra note 30, at 28.
260. See supra text accompanying notes 128-33.
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cause her mental injury was caused by irrational guilt and was
therefore unforeseeable. The result was based on remoteness,
which must mean that mental injury occasioned by guilt is catego-
rized as injury of a different kind from injury occasioned by depres-
sion about her own injuries or by the shock of witnessing the
defendant's injuries. The application of remoteness analysis in this
case was an extraordinary thing in itself. The Court of Appeal of
New South Wales clearly erred in categorizing the damage accord-
ing to the chain of events by which it occurred, for that is the type of
analysis from In re Polemis that was clearly rejected in The Wagon
Mound (No. 1).261 The law in Australia since that case was decided
has been that damage is considered too remote if it is of an unfore-
seeable kind, not if it was brought about by an unforeseeable chain
of events. 2 62
It is difficult to imagine how an otherwise reputable court
could have made such a fundamental error unless there was some
other force at work. Perhaps the majority judges were being uncon-
sciously influenced by the peculiarly feminine reaction of the plain-
tiff.263 It seems likely that Rowe would be overruled today, on the
basis of statements made by the High Court of Australia's reaffir-
mation of approval of The Wagon Mound (No. 1) in Jaensch v. Cof-
fey. 264 However, it still stands as testimony to the inability of some
judges to come to grips with the idea that the human mind is not a
completely rational machine. 26 5
Similar complications arise in the United States26 6 where the
"directness" approach is used.2 6 7 This approach requires a judg-
ment about the events intervening between the negligence and the
261. Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Eng'g Co., 1961 App. Cas. 388
(P.C.) (appeal taken from N.S.W.). For a fuller description of this case, see supra
text accompanying note 246.
262. See also Chapman v. Hearse, 106 C.L.R. 112 (Austl. 1961), where the High
Court of Australia rejected the proposition that duty should only be found where the
exact chain of events leading to damage was foreseeable. It was on the basis of this
case that Glass, J.A., dissented in Rowe. See Rowe, [19761 2 N.S.W.R. at 78-79.
263. The plaintiff's reaction was a classic case of the active care, concern, and
responsibility described by Carol Gilligan as part of a distinctly feminine form of
moral reasoning. See generally GILLGAN, supra note 12.
264. 155 C.L.R. 549, 581, 602-03 (Austl. 1984). It should be noted that the High
Court of Australia, unlike the United States Supreme Court, is the ultimate court of
appeal for all civil and criminal cases; its pronouncements on the common law are
binding on all state courts, irrespective of the origin of the cases in which they were
made. It is unlikely that the High Court would have dismissed an appeal by the
plaintiff in Rowe, if such an appeal had been taken.
265. For further development of this argument, see infra part IVA.
266. See Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress, supra note 36, at 1257 (observing
that in "mental distress cases Ithe plaintiff's pre-existing] susceptibility is undoubt-
edly the major policy factor to be dealt with in determining proximate cause").
267. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 33, at 297.
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injury-their foreseeability, or whether they should be regarded as
sufficient to break the chain of causation. The law here is notori-
ously vague2 6 8 and the application of any sort of standard, implicit
or explicit or, indeed, of no standard at all, can be envisaged. One
can well imagine a declaration that the plaintiff's reaction in a
mental injury case, being abnormal, was unforeseeable, or made
the causal connection too tenuous, or its results too indirect. 26 9 An-
other approach would be to treat the plaintiff's "subjective" reaction
as an intervening cause.27 0
The tension between proximate cause and the eggshell skull
rule is especially apparent in jurisdictions which adhere to the zone
of danger rule.271 If liability is predicated at least partly on fore-
seeability, the zone of danger rule must contain a judgment about
what is foreseeable, which, in turn, has been influenced by medical
opinion of the time.2 72 Dr. Hubert Winston Smith was qualified in
both medicine and law, and his apparently influential article, Rela-
tion of Emotions to Injury and Disease: Legal Liability for Psychic
Stimuli, 27 3 explained a medical view of this type of mental injury
and made proposals for a legal response. The legal response pro-
posed was to deny recovery on the basis that only abnormal persons
would suffer severe and lasting injury as a result of fright.274 Thus,
pregnancy is "a temporary idiosyncrasy" 2 75 and any psychic injury
268. See generally id. at ch. 7.
269. It has been suggested, for example, that the real cause of the injury is the
plaintiff's fright, not the defendant's negligence. See Johnson v. Jamaica Hosp., 467
N.Y.S.2d 634, 641 (App. Div. 1983) (Bracken, J., dissenting). One might also note
that there is something of a paradox in the physical manifestation requirement and
the "serious injury" requirement if the foreseeability of the injury is a concern: to be
recognized, the injury must be serious, but the more serious it is, the more unfore-
seeable it must be! See Negligence and Emotional Harm, supra note 55, at 517.
270. See Brody, supra note 36, at 244.
211. See supra part I.C.
272. It could be observed, however, that there is something peculiar about using
the knowledge of doctors or other highly qualified professionals to reach a conclusion
about what the "reasonable man" would foresee. However, such an approach seems
to be widespread in this field. See, e.g., Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress, supra
note 36, at 1255.
273. See Chamallas & Kerber, supra note 9, at 846-851 (discussing Hubert Win-
ston Smith, Relations of Emotions to Injury and Disease: Legal Liability for Psychic
Stimuli, 30 VA. L. REv. 193 (1944)). Chamallas and Kerber note that Smith's article
was relied on in Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 379 P.2d 513 (Cal. 1963), to
deny recovery to a bystander mother. See Chamallas & Kerber, supra note 9, at 846.
See also Smith, supra note 155, at 621-22.
274. Specifically, Smith stated: "The relationship of emotional stimuli to grave
physical injury and to diagnosable disease seems to involve a weak link previously
present. The mechanism of injury here usually involves aggravation of a pre-ex-
isting impairment with the factor of individual idiosyncrasy or susceptibility playing
the dominant role." Hubert Winston Smith, Relations of Emotions to Injury and Dis-
ease: Legal Liability for Psychic Stimuli, 30 VA. L. REv. 193, 225-26 (1944).
275. Id. at 296; see Chamallas & Kerber, supra note 9, at 847-48.
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caused by an emotional stimulus and resulting in some physical
disorder is to be regarded with skepticism.276
Another writer with legal and medical qualifications is John
Havard, whose article, Reasonable Foresight of Nervous Shock, ap-
peared in 1956.277 In that article, Havard explained the physiologi-
cal bases for the connection between emotions and body, or how
emotional shock can produce physical symptoms, through the auto-
nomic nervous system:
[The autonomic nervous system] is the vestige of the primitive
nervous system of lower animal life, and gives rise to apprecia-
ble subjective physical sensations in healthy persons only in
times of crisis. These sensations include frequency in passing
water, looseness of the bowels and palpitations, which we have
all experienced on certain occasions such as the period before
an examination or a football match. These symptoms are
harmless in a normal individual and are due to an emotional
discharge through the autonomic system. Where, however,
some physical predisposition to damage is present, such as ar-
teries narrowed by disease, weakness of the heart wall, or per-
haps a pregnant uterus, a moderately severe discharge may
cause incapacitating illness or even death.... The factor which
initiates a discharge through this system is predominately fear,
and fear may be of many kinds. It may be fear for one's own
personal safety, or for the safety of another; it may be the loss of
a loved object, or even an abstract ideal such as honour, reputa-
tion, or a political creed. The common denominator of fear is
always the threat of loss or damage to something which is
highly prized, dearly loved, and to which the person is deeply
attached.2 78
Havard goes on to say that extreme fear is "appropriate, i.e., is nor-
mally found," in cases of fear for one's own life,279 presumably be-
cause this is where the primeval emotions are justified. The
conclusion to be drawn from Smith and Havard's arguments is that
the strong version of the zone of danger rule28O is justified by medi-
cal science-presence in the zone of danger is an adequate guide to
the foreseeability of mental injury.2 8 '
276. It appears that Smith thought that the very fact that such injury was less
likely to occur to men than to women was reason enough to exclude recovery for it.
See Chamallas & Kerber, supra note 9, at 847-49. It hardly needs to be pointed out
that Smith was applying a masculine standard to an injury which was, on his own
admission, a feminine one.
277. Havard, supra note 6.
278. Id. at 481-82.
279. Id. at 482.
280. See supra text accompanying notes 43-45.
281. See Chamallas & Kerber, supra note 9, at 825-26. Havard does go on, how-
ever, to note that the law is concerned with 'the normal 'man in the street'" rather
than "the normal individual of medical standards." Havard, supra note 6, at 482.
See also Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress, supra note 36, at 1256 (discussing the
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Even if Smith and Havard were correct, and only the particu-
larly vulnerable suffer lasting injury as a result of shock,282 we
must ask how this fits in with legal rules applying to existing vul-
nerabilities in other contexts. The "eggshell skull" rule, as we have
seen, 283 holds that once a duty is owed and breached the defendant
is liable for all resulting injury, even if that injury is grossly out of
proportion to that which would normally be expected from the neg-
ligent act and was a result of the plaintiff's particular susceptibility
to injury. 28 4 Thus, the rule would suggest that a plaintiff's emo-
tional vulnerability is irrelevant, but the situation is complicated
here by what we might call the "transformation difficulty": the vul-
nerability serves to transform the injury from a non-actionable one
(mere shock, grief, or fright) to an actionable one (medically
diagnosable psychiatric disorder and/or physical illness). The
ramifications of vulnerability extend, therefore, beyond mere quan-
tum of damages to the whole issue of whether the plaintiff has a
case. Little attention appears to have been paid to this fact in the
cases or the literature, so it is worth going into the question in some
depth here.
If the eggshell skull rule is designed to protect the weak, then
the "transformation difficulty" should not be a problem. If some in-
jury was foreseeable and a duty was breached, the defendant
should be liable under the fundamental restoration principle: dam-
ages must be assessed in such a way as to restore the plaintiff to his
or her former position. 28 5 However, this principle is il tension with
the apprehension of courts that to impose liability in some situa-
tions will lead to a greater extent of liability than is justified in view
of the wrong the defendant committed. 28 6
difference between medical and legal conceptions of causation). Havard ultimately
recormmends the application of something akin to the medicel stardard in the law,
Havard, supra note 6, at 495-97.
282. But see Okrina v. Midwestern Corp., 165 N.W.2d 259, 263 (Minn. 1969);
McNiece, supra note 30, at 9; Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress, supra note 36, at
1257 (observing that medical science "is in general agreement that every person pos-
sesses some degree of susceptibility to traumatically induced mental distress").
283. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 33, at 290-92;'FLEMING, supra note 33, at 183-
85. On the added complications involved in applying the rule to mental injury, see
McNiece, supra note 30, at 68-72.
284. See Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress, supra note 36, at 1257-58.
285. See FLEMING, supra note 33, at 206.
286. See, e.g., Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 616 P.2d 813, 825 (Cal. 1980)
(Clark, J., dissenting); Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 379 P.2d 513, 525
(Cal. 1963) (quoting Biakanja v. Irving, 320 P.2d 16); Barnhill v. Davis, 300 N.W.2d
104, 109 (Iowa 1981) (Allbee, J., dissenting); Corso v. Merrill, 406 A.2d 300, 304
(N.H. 1979) (stating that apprehension should not be determinative but should be
weighed against plaintiff's injury); but see id. at 308 ("liability beyond culpability
should not be imposed no matter how great the injury"); Tobin v. Grossman, 249
N.E.2d 419, 423, 425 (N.Y. 1969) (Keating, J., dissenting) (noting that the concern
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Thus, it might be said that the restoration principle actually
works against plaintiffs: if the restoration principle were relaxed
and the disproportionality concern were elevated to the status of a
principle of damages assessment, courts would modify the damages
award according to the defendant's culpability. Yet courts prefer to
deny the plaintiff's claim completely if full compensation is judged
to be too great a sanction given the defendant's level of wrongdoing.
The approach of completely denying the claim is fundamentally
flawed because it obscures the fact that the defendant has commit-
ted a legal wrong and the plaintiff is innocent. This approach re-
flects something of a "blame the victim" mentality which the
eggshell skull rule was intended to prevent.
This, however, brings us to the question of whether the plain-
tiff was in fact a "victim," in the legal sense. The resolution of this
issue depends on whether there was a duty of care, which, in turn,
depends on whether injury was foreseeable.287 If the plaintiff's vul-
nerability makes any injury at all unforeseeable, then no duty will
be owed. We must then consider exactly what is meant by "injury"
in this situation; but the cases developing the concept of duty of
care cannot answer that question because they did not anticipate
the dilemma of needing to be relatively specific about the type of
injury with which one is concerned, and having to decide on the
level of generality at which injury will be categorised. One way to
resolve the dilemma is to recognize that there is nothing anomalous
about founding duty on something broader than the foreseeability
about disproportionate liability was the majority's main reason for rejecting Dillon
in that case); Waube v. Warrington, 258 N.W. 497, 501 (Wis. 1935). See also KEE-
TON ET AL., supra note 33, at 361; Brody, supra note 36, at 232-33. But see Negli-
gently Inflicted Mental Distress, supra note 36, at 1245-1246, 1262; Creato, supra
note 61, at 65 (suggesting that the apprehension is really an example of"the court's
tendency, unconscious or otherwise, to focus almost exclusively on the defendant,
with little attention given to the plaintiff's injury").
A related concern is that to allow recovery by "abnormal" plaintiffs would lead to
a "flood of trivial claims." See Negligence and Emotional Harm, supra note 55, at
518. As to the paradox introduced by this concern with the seriousness of the injury,
see supra note 140. It should be noted that the apprehension just described is just
that-an apprehension-and does not have the same status as the restoration prin-
ciple in damages. Yet it seems to carry more weight in this type of case, with the
result that the eggshell skull principle is not applied in the way just suggested.
287. It has, of course, been asserted time and time again that the duty question
turns on more than foreseeability. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. How-
ever, the important point for present purposes is that foreseeability is an essential
component of the duty question and, it is submitted, the most important. See Barnes
v. Geiger, 446 N.E.2d 78, 80 (Mass. Ct. App. 1983); Dziokonski v. Babineau, 380
N.E.2d 1295, 1302 (Mass. 1978); Burris v. Pollack, 545 N.E.2d 83, 91 (Ohio 1989);
Corso v. Merrill, 406 A.2d 300, 303 (N.H. 1979); Sinn v. Burd, 404 A.2d 672, 686 (Pa.




of legal injury.2 88 The question will still remain whether the injury
in fact suffered is legally cognizable, and those suffering "trivial" or
"transient" injuries will still be excluded.
In other words, the reasons for excluding certain types of in-
jury from recovery are different from the reasons for insisting on
the foreseeability of injury at the duty stage. The "reasonable
man," as he is driving along the street, does not distinguish be-
tween the legally cognizable harm he might cause and the "trivial"
feelings of grief for which he will not be legally liable.28 9 He avoids
all such injuries, provided he can foresee them, and if he does not,
the courts fail to recognize some of them because there are more
important things on which precious judicial time can be spent.
The foregoing analysis, trying to separate out notions of injury
for the purposes of duty, remoteness, and damages, may appear to
be so much hair-splitting, but unfortunately it is necessary in order
to get to the bottom of the zone of danger rule and show that the
rule is simply a way of preventing a duty from being owed in re-
spect of emotional or mental security.2 9 0 Courts applying the rule
are trying to have it both ways: refusing to alter their moral assess-
ment of defendants' behaviour and yet paying lip-service to medical
knowledge. The net result of the zone of danger rule is that there is
a legally cognizable damage for which no duty is owed.
Courts' perceptions of a plaintiff's non-deservingness, particu-
larly his or her oversensitivity, raise the possibility of the applica-
tion of remoteness or proximate cause rules to disadvantage mental
injury plaintiffs. Concerns about disproportionality between liabil-
ity and fault are fundamentally in tension with the eggshell skull
rule. I have suggested a principled way to resolve the tension in
favour of those who suffer mental injury as a result of harm to an-
other person, by predicating duty on the foreseeability of any in-
288. Indeed, Lord Atkin's famous dictum in Donoghue v. Stevenson posited a duty
to those who are "so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably to
have them in contemplation as being so affected . . . ." 1932 App. Cas. 562, 580
(emphasis added). At the risk of relying too heavily on Lord Atkin's famous words,
one cannot help but notice that there is no suggestion that a defendant should be
able to foresee any damage at all.
289. He may, however, fail to consider the latter injuries at all. See infra text
accompanying notes 316-17.
290. As Justice Tobriner said in Dillon v. Legg, "when we have rejected the impact
rule ... [tihe zone-of-danger concept must. . . collapse because the only reason for
the requirement of presence in that zone lies in the fact that one within it will fear
the danger of impact." 441 P.2d 911, 915 (Cal. 1968) (emphasis in the original). See
also Creato, supra note 61, at 61-62. Havard mounts a substantial defence of the
zone of danger rule as a duty rule relating to foreseeability. See Havard, supra note
6, at 484-85. If his analysis is correct, there is no need to apply anything but the
usual rules relating to the plaintiff's pre-existing vulnerability.
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jury, legally cognizable or otherwise, and then excluding plaintiffs
who have not suffered the required kind of damage. Under this ap-
proach, as long as mental injury is legally cognizable and some in-
jury (even physical injury) was foreseeable, it makes no difference
that mental injury was not necessarily foreseeable.
In sum, the three stages of the negligence inquiry at which
recovery for mental injury has been, or could be, blocked are dam-
age, duty, and remoteness or proximate cause. The policy justifica-
tions overtly applied by courts for denying or restricting recovery
under the damage question, and either overtly or covertly under the
duty question, are suspect in terms of logic and principle, and the
rules that courts have developed and applied to mental injury do
not, for the most part, effect the policies supposedly underlying
them. Even the most permissive approaches to mental injury, such
as the Australian "proximity" approach, evidence a continuing
unease with mental injury. To the extent that restrictive liability
rules are motivated by a perception that mental injury plaintiffs are
abnormal, such plaintiffs are likely to encounter problems at the
remoteness or proximate cause level, yet the eggshell skull rule dic-
tates that such abnormalities should be disregarded. If the plain-
tiff's perceived abnormality is taken into account, this is another
clear indication that the law has more problems with mental injury
than judges have acknowledged in the traditional arguments.
In this Part, I have shown that the various rules which re-
strict recovery for mental injury occasioned by harm to another are,
at the very least, an exception to the general logic of duty and fore-
seeability in negligence. I have further shown that, to the extent
that courts have grappled with issues of remoteness and proximate
cause in this area, the suggestion has been that we are facing a
general exception to the eggshell skull rule. What are we to con-
clude from this state of affairs? I would propose the conclusion that
judges over the years have felt an instinctive discomfort with this
type of claim, and that rather than naming accurately the source of
that discomfort they have resorted to spurious arguments such as
disproportionality and "floodgates," or built rules on foundations
that cannot support them, like triviality and the danger of fraud. It
is on the basis of this hypothesis, that the real cause of judicial dis-
comfort with mental injury occasioned by harm to another has not
hitherto been named, that I now proceed to suggest that that cause
is sexist and patriarchal attitudes.
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IV. Feminist Explanations for Judicial Discomfort with
Mental Injury
The law's habit of treating mental injury as an exceptional
category of damage is not motivated by concerns about fraud, flood-
gates, or disproportionality, but by patriarchal thinking. The com-
mon law has not only been developed by men, it has been influenced
by philosophical notions developed by men, which serve as general
justifications for the subordinate position of women in Western soci-
ety. Attention to the thought of key philosophers such as
Descartes, Rousseau, and Hobbes reveals a clear correspondence
between the philosophy of patriarchy and the approach of the com-
mon law to mental injury occasioned by harm to another. This cor-
respondence may provide explanations for the development of law
in this area-explanations which, as discussed in the preceding
part, are not provided by the concerns and ideas which courts have
purported to have in mind.
The Cartesian notion of the mind-body split has long sup-
ported the idea that women are inferior to men.2 9 1 Here we find
that the legal approaches whereby mental and physical injury must
be treated differently, and the former treated as inherently unrelia-
ble, also appear to be based on the notion of a radical separation
between mind and body. This is an example of the kind of consis-
tency between patriarchal thought and the law of mental injury oc-
casioned by harm to another which is to be explained in this part of
the article.
Another important idea in Western philosophy-one which
has its roots in the classical philosophies of Rousseau and Hobbes
and supports numerous institutions in industrial capitalist soci-
ety-is abstract individualism.292 Once we recognize that abstract
individualism has been a powerfully influential idea in the develop-
ment of Western civilization, we should not be surprised to find that
the legal system treats injuries which arise out of connection to
others as somehow freakish. It is also worth noting that abstract
individualism has been heavily criticized by feminist scholars as a
notion of humanity which fails to account for the distinctive experi-
ence of women. In this sense, institutions founded on abstract indi-
vidualism marginalize women; and the law, it will be argued here,
is no exception.
Feminist critiques of abstract individualism's marginalization
of women are an example of a broader thrust in feminist theory of
291. See infra part IV.A.
292. See infra part V.B.
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identifying situations where men are treated as the standard
whereby all human beings are judged and women, to the extent
that they are observably different from men, are treated as an ex-
ception or an aberration.293 These situations are often referred to
as the imposition of an "implicit male norm," and they often place
impossible burdens on women, or otherwise disadvantage them, for
example by patronizing them. Numerous other examples of im-
plicit male norms can be found in the law relating to mental injury
occasioned by harm to another. Courts at various points have intro-
duced such norms in the way they have used female stereotypes to
deny or limit liability, tended to be more generous in cases involv-
ing mental injury suffered by a rescuer, developed the standard of
the reasonable man as applied in the duty inquiry, and placed eco-
nomic considerations at a premium in the recognition and assess-
ment of damages. To the extent that any of these tendencies can
explain the apparent inconsistency and doctrinal incoherence of the
law in the area of mental injury occasioned by harm to another, we
can conclude that the law is informed more by sexist and patriar-
chal attitudes than by principle or sound analysis.
Another common tactic used in a patriarchal society to disad-
vantage women is the application of double standards. 294 It is ar-
gued that this area of law is no exception because, with a hypocrisy
that is characteristic of a patriarchal institution, it fails to value the
feminine attributes which sustain the emotional life of our society
and which are taught to and expected of women.
A Patriarchal Epistemology and the Mind-Body Split
Mental injury plaintiffs are disadvantaged by patriarchal epis-
temology-the way that knowledge is formed, or believed to be
formed, in a male-dominated society. Traditional beliefs about the
formation of knowledge and methods for distinguishing "true"
knowledge from "mere" belief or superstition are not value-neutral,
and certainly not gender-neutral. Yet the law is riddled with
loaded assumptions about knowledge, and these assumptions dis-
advantage mental injury plaintiffs.
French philosopher Rene Descartes is commonly acknowl-
edged as the father of Western rationalism.295 His famous apho-
rism, "I think, therefore I am," means that we can be sure of our
293. See infra part IV.C.
294. See infra part IV.D.
295. See Jane Flax, Political Philosophy and the Patriarchal Unconscious: A Psy-
choanalytic Perspective on Epistemology and Metaphysics, in DISCOVERING RE Lmr
245, 258 (Sandra Harding & Merrill B. Hintikka eds., 1983) (noting that Descartes'
philosophy "defined the problematics for much of modem Western philosophy").
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existence-or the existence of anything else-only through our fac-
ulties of thought and reason.2 96 Our sensation of being alive is no
help, nor is the recognition of our existence by other people.297 The
only way of knowing anything, be it the fact that one exists, or any-
thing else, is by separating oneself from that thing.2 98 Cartesian
epistemology depends upon objectivity and rationality; in order to
know a thing, we must be able to stand back and observe it. What
we feel to be true is not to be trusted, for it may be a manifestation
of our "passions" rather than of "reason."
It may come as a surprise to hear this approach to knowledge
described as patriarchal; it is commonly understood to be simply
correct. Yet Francis Bacon described the appearance of Cartesian
epistemology as "a truly masculine birth of time."29 9 "Masculine,"
according to Susan Bordo, refers to an epistemological stance whose
"key term is detachment: from the emotional life, from the particu-
larities of time and place, from personal quirks, prejudices, and in-
terests, and most centrally, from the object itselfo"30 0
One implication of this epistemological stance is a radical sep-
aration between mind and body.301 Our bodies, the loci of our
senses and animal drives, are a hindrance to rational, objective
thought.302 The ability to transcend the body characterizes a ma-
ture human being. As children we are beset by prejudices and as-
sume that our bodies and our physical experiences make up reality:
"now, as mature Cartesian doubters, we reverse that prejudice. We
assume nothing. We refuse to let our bodies mystify us .... We
begin afresh."303 Thus, the separation of the mind and body and
296. Id. at 259 (quoting Descartes' statement: "I thereby concluded that I was a
substance, of which the whole essence or nature consists in thinking, and which in
order to exist, needs no place and depends on no material thing...
297. Flax sums up Descartes' view of the "self" as follows:
This self needs "no place and depends on no material thing" including
.. other human beings. It is thus completely self-constituting and self-
sustaining. The self is created and maintained by thought. This view
of the self entails a denial of the body and any interaction between body
and self .... Social relations are not necessary for the development of
the self. The self is a static substance.
Id.
298. Jane Flax characterizes Descartes' stance as narcissistic, "in which the
outside world is seen purely as a creation of and an object for the self." Id. at 260.
299. Susan Bordo, The Cartesian Masculinization of Thought, in SEX AND SCIEN-
Tiic INQUIRY, 247, 258-59 (Susan Harding & Jean F. O'Barr eds., 1987) (quoting
FRANcis BACON, THE PILOsoPfY OF FRANCIS BACON).
300. Bordo, supra note 299, at 259.
301. See supra note 297 (discussing the Cartesian view of the "self").
302. See Bordo, supra note 299, at 256-58.
303. Id. at 258. A similar theme can be seen in Plato. See Flax, supra note 295,




the superiority of the mind over the body are basic tenets of Carte-
sian epistemology.
One of the many implications for feminism of the idea of tran-
scending the body3 04 is the effect of such an epistemology on the
ability of courts to recognize mental injury. It might seem ironic
that a culture that emphasizes the importance of the mind does not
consider mental injury far more serious than injury to the body.
However, the "mind" affected by mental injury does not correspond
with Descartes' rational, thinking, understanding mind; it is what
Descartes would think of as the emotions, or the senses, which are
irrational, prerational, or arational, and hence associated with the
body.305 It would be unthinkable, under the Cartesian mind-body
split, that injury to the emotions could lead to injury to the mind, or
if it does, the person suffering the injury would be perceived as not
a fully mature human being because of his inability to transcend
the body.
It is easy to see how this approach can lead to the belief that a
mental injury plaintiff is in fact the author of his or her own injury,
or at least to serious confusion about the nature of the injury. Re-
quirements tying injury to physical phenomena, such as the impact
rule, the zone of danger rule, the Dillon criteria, and the physical
manifestation rule begin to make sense as products of an inability
to come to terms with the relationship among the mind, the body,
and the emotions.30 6 In addition, advances in the medical profes-
sion's understanding of such relationships have to a large extent
informed the progressive liberalization of recovery rules for mental
injury.30 7
304. These include the apparent association of women with things other than
what is valued and the failure to account for women's experiences. See infra notes
315-19 and accompanying text.
305. Bordo, supra note 299, at 256-59.
306. Chamallas and Kerber note that this is a clear example of the way the law
uses men as the standard for assessing the value of injuries. Chamallas & Kerber,
supra note 9, at 864.
307. See Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 616 P.2d 813, 817 (Cal. 1980); Fazone v.
Busch, 214 A.2d 12, 14 (N.J. 1965); Sinn v. Burd, 404 A.2d 672, 678-79 (Pa. 1975);
Robb v. Pennsylvania R.R., 210 A.2d 709, 712 (Del. 1965). See also Chamallas &
Kerber, supra note 9, at 847; Goodhart, supra note 52, at 15; Havard, supra note 6,
at 480 (to "confront the medical evidence with an impossible task of apportionment
[between physical and mental injury] would be discreditable to any system of juris-
prudence"); Expanding the Concept of Recovery, supra note 155, at 184-186 (sug-
gesting that it is artificial to distinguish between mental and physical damage).
It has been suggested that the state of science "in the field of traumatic neurosis
... probably always will be primitive" because reactions to trauma vary so widely,
depending on what the individual was like before being exposed to the trauma.
Sidley, supra note 252, at 198-199. See also McNiece, supra note 30, at 74. How-
ever, it must be remembered that the law is satisfied with a lower level of certainty
of causation than would satisfy a scientist.
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Indeed, the very fact of reliance on medical evidence308-for
example, to establish the genuineness of claims-is illuminated by
Cartesianism. According to Cartesian epistemology, scientific
knowledge is the only reliable knowledge309 because it is (suppos-
edly) based on objective observation.310 Medical evidence is scien-
tific and thus reliable. The focus on scientific rationality explains
the law's reliance on medicine, be it to support specific rules, to rec-
ognize mental injury as sounding in damages, or to evidence causa-
tion or satisfy requirements relating to the seriousness of the injury
in individual cases. 311
An example of reliance on medical evidence to support specific
rules is the way courts have relied on the work of medico-legal writ-
ers such as Smith and Havard to support the zone of danger
rule.3 12 One must always bear in mind that even medical science
develops from a point of view, and that point of view is by and large
male; Havard's examples of the examination and the football
match313 speak deeply of the male orientation of his thought.314
Havard's most glaring omission is that his analysis, while purport-
ing to be based on primeval emotions, apparently fails to recognize
the possibility that there is something primeval about protecting
one's young. If there is such a primeval drive, it is clearly of special
significance to women, and so the failure to acknowledge even the
possibility of its existence is very convenient from a patriarchal
point of view. This example shows the danger of treating medical
308. See, e.g., Page v. Smith, [1995] 2 All E.R. 736, 752 ( Lord Browne-Wilkinson).
But cf id. at 759 (Lord Lloyd of Berwick) (suggesting that advances in medical sci-
ence may mean that "it would not be sensible to commit the law to a distinction
between physical and psychiatric injury").
309. "Any knowledge not built on the foundations of mathematics is like the
'moral writings of the ancient pagans, the most proud and magnificent palaces, built
on nothing but sand and Inud.'" Flax, supra note 295, at 259 (quoting RENE
DESCARTES, DISCOURSE ON METHOD). It has been suggested that "emphasis on physi-
cal tests [in this area of law] is related to the nineteenth-century desire to equate the
law with the physical sciences." Goodhart, supra note 52, at 23.
310. Feminists have questioned even this. See generally FEMINIST APPROACHES TO
SCIENCE (Ruth Bleier ed., 1986).
311. See supra notes 155-56 and accompanying text.
312. See supra text accompanying notes 273-81.
313. See supra text accompanying note 278. It must be remembered that at the
time Havard was writing, education was still by and large a male preserve.
314. That orientation is also apparent in Smith's work. Charnallas and Kerber
comment: "Smith deployed Freudian-sounding arguments to discredit claims of wo-
men (and some men) who did not measure up to his conception of normality ....
Smith's medicalized notions of normality disadvantaged women." Chamallas & Ker-
ber, supra note 9, at 847.
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opinion as any more reliable and unbiased than other sources of
knowledge. 315
The influence of Cartesian epistemology is also evident in judi-
cial opinions that view the onset of mental injury after the death or
injury of a loved one as an unnatural reaction which is not a part of
common human experience. 3 16 Such observations show an obvious
insensitivity to women's reality in this society; indeed, a judge who
was fully attuned to that reality might well disbelieve any woman
who claimed not to have been severely distressed by such an event,
especially if she witnessed it.317 How would such an attitude be
formed? Not through detached, objective observation, but either
through the judge's own lived experience as a woman or, if the
judge were a man, a suspension of objectivity and a conscious effort
to empathize with women. In stark contrast to Cartesian ap-
proaches, feminism teaches that such lived experiences are the ba-
sis for knowledge and, as Catharine MacKinnon explains, the
method of transforming experience into knowledge is conscious-
ness-raising:3 18
Women are presumed able to have access to society and its
structure because they live in it and have been formed by it, not
in spite of those facts. Women can know society because con-
sciousness is part of it, not because of any capacity to stand
outside it or oneself.... Knowledge is neither a copy nor a mis-
315. The example in the text is in the same category as the central insight of
Carol GiUigan's work on moral development that the most influential researcher in
the field to date had based his work on observations of an exclusively male sample.
See generally Gu.LGMAN, supra note 12. A "science" which is developed without atten-
tion being paid to women can be expected to be hopelessly biased against women-
yet the practice has not traditionally disqualified the knowledge gained from de-
scription as "scientific."
316. See, e.g., Waube v. Warrington, 258 N.W. 497, 501 (Wis. 1935); Chester v.
Waverley Corp., 62 C.L.R. 1, 10 (AustL. 1939). See also Chamallas & Kerber, supra
note 9, at 828-29 (discussing Spade v. Lynn & Boston R.R., 47 N.E. 88 (Mass. 1897)
and commenting that "[t]he image that emerges... is one of a hypersensitive plain-
tiff whose claims pose a threat to business-as-usual"). Chamallas and Kerber go on
to suggest that the decision in Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 379 P.2d 513
(Cal. 1963) (denying recovery to a bystander mother) was informed by an assump-
tion of the plaintiff's abnormality. Chamallas & Kerber, supra note 9, at 854. See
also Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress, supra note 36, at 1257. Such observations
are also obvious instances of the application of an implicit male norm. See infra
notes 322-23 and accompanying text.
317. There are, however, examples in the cases and the literature of sensitivity to
this aspect of the position of mothers. See, e.g., Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 911, 917
(Cal. 1968); Blackwell v. Oser, 436 So. 2d 1293, 1297 (La. Ct. App. 1983); Johnson v.
Jamaica Hosp., 467 N.Y.S.2d 634,636, 638 (App. Div. 1983) (note, however, that this
was a "direct victim" case in a state that still adheres to the zone of danger rule);
Goodhart, supra note 52, at 25; Stone, supra note 126, at 788; Negligently Inflicted
Mental Distress, supra note 36, at 1258-59.




copy of reality, neither representative nor misrepresentative as
the scientific model would have it, but a response to living in it.
Truth is in a sense a collective experience of truth, in which
"knowledge" is assimilated to consciousness, a consciousness
that exists as a reality in the world, not merely in the head.3 19
Consciousness-raising is important to feminist theory because it
suggests that objectivity is not necessarily the best, and certainly
not the only, stance from which knowledge can be gleaned. It also
exposes the ways in which the "objective" stance of science perpetu-
ates its own power.3 20 In this way, it poses a challenge to the meth-
odological foundations of patriarchy.
It is no coincidence that Descartes was writing at a time which
saw a massive onslaught of the subjugation of women. It has been
noted that the Enlightenment, while commonly hailed as a golden
age in the blossoming of science and human intelligence, was also a
time when men's need to control women became even more urgent
than ever, the results including witch hunts and the male takeover
of birthing.321 This is not to say that everyone who has ever mis-
treated a woman did so on the basis that "Descartes told me to," but
that Descartes' philosophy has been very influential in shaping
modern Western thought (particularly the ascendancy of science as
"truth"). Many of the arguments used today to justify the subordi-
nation of women (particularly biological ones) derive more or less
directly from it. Moreover, because the influence of Descartes is
particularly pronounced in the area of our understanding of our-
selves and the way we know things, general attitudes that work to
the detriment of women can also be traced back to him.
It might therefore be suggested that a feminist legal system,
meaning one which took women's concerns seriously, would not
need to look to medical evidence or physical phenomena to be con-
vinced of the reality of mental injury. Simply from looking at the
facts, and understanding the position of the plaintiff, a feminist
legal system would conclude that the loss of a loved one, especially
of a son or daughter,32 2 can and does change one's life in a very
319. Id. at 98.
320. See id. at 99-101.
321. See Bordo, supra note 299, at 261 (characterizing "the years between 1550
and 1650 as a particularly gynophobic century"); Flax, supra note 295, at 260 ("The
self which is created and constituted by an act of thought is driven to master nature
[read: women], because ultimately the self cannot deny its material qualities...
The desire to know is inextricably intermeshed with the desire to dominate.").
322. There is a Chinese blessing: "I hope that your grandfather dies, I hope that
your father dies, I hope that you die, I hope that your son dies, I hope that your
grandson dies." While this might sound like anything but a blessing, it encapsulates
the idea that everyone dies, but the main thing is that it should happen in the right
order: it is hard to imagine anything more devastating than the untimely death of a
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serious way. This conclusion simply flows from a recognition of the
fundamental human323 experience of connection with other people,
one of the most important messages of feminism in the 1980s. 32 4
If, on the other hand, the legal system is influenced by the idea
that full humanity is achieved through detaching the mind from the
body, it will necessarily have difficulty recognizing injury resulting
from the interaction of the mind and the body. It is likely to regard
such injury as unforeseeable, or simply non-existent. It is also
likely to see people who suffer mental injury as feeble and worth-
less-the kind of people who do not deserve society's protection
through the legal system-and suspect them of lying. It cannot be
mere coincidence that all of these attitudes are evident in mental
injury cases that apply restrictive rules.32 5
If the legal system is further influenced by the idea that relia-
ble knowledge is gained only through detached observation, it is
bound to rely on medical evidence in assessing the reality and rea-
sonableness of the injury, rather than on common experience. Once
again, the common law has done just this, first by relying on ad-
vances in medical science to protect the interest in freedom from
mental injury and then by requiring medical testimony to prove
causation and/or the seriousness of the injury. It must therefore be
concluded that the common law has been shaped by the fundamen-
tally patriarchal thought of Descartes, which values those aspects
of human experience which are commonly identified with men (ra-
child or grandchild. Thus, the Court of Appeals of New York was fundamentally
wrong when it attempted to dismiss this kind of grief as "the risk of living and bear-
ing children." Tobin v. Grossman, 249 N.E.2d 419, 424 (N.Y. 1969).
323. Although it is often said that "connection" is an important part of the female
experience, it is described here as part of the human experience because it is my
belief that men experience it too; the difference is only that women are encouraged to
experience and cultivate it whereas men are discouraged from the same. This is not
to say that recognition of the importance of connection is not an important step in
recognizing women's concerns-simply that to do so will be liberating for men as
well. On women's connection experience, see Robin West, Women's Hedonic Lives: A
Phenomenological Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 3 Wis. WoMEN's L.J. 81 (1987).
On men's connection experience, see remarks of Carol Gilligan in DuBois et al., Fem-
inist Discourse, Moral Values, and the Law-A Conversation, 34 BuFFALO L. REV.
11, 47-49 (1985). See also GmLIwAN, supra note 12, at 17 ("men in mid-life [are now
celebrating the discovery] of the importance of intimacy, relationships, and care").
324. See, e.g., GHLiGAN, supra note 12; DuBois et al., supra note 323; Kenneth
Karst, Woman's Constitution, 1984 DUKE L.J. 447; Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in
a Different Voice: Speculations on a Women's Lawyering Process, 1 BERKELEY WO-
MEN'S L.J. 39 (1985); Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Consti-
tutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. Rv. 543 (1986); Bender, supra note 1; Paul J.
Spiegelman, Integrating Doctrine, Theory and Practice in the Law School Curricu-
lum: The Logic of Jake's Ladder in the Context of Amy's Web, 38 J. LFGAL EDUC. 243
(1988).
325. See supra part I.E.
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tional thought over emotions) and relies heavily on objectivity and
separation of the self from others.
B. Abstract Individualism
In addition to the tradition of valuing the "rational" mind over
the body and emotions, there is a very strong tradition in Western
philosophy of regarding human beings as fundamentally separate
from each other. The very idea of Cartesian "objectivity" involves
notions of separation and individuation: "The result [of becoming a
mature Cartesian doubter] is a securing of all the boundaries that,
in childhood, are so fragile: between the 'inner' and the 'outer,' be-
tween the subjective and the objective, between self and world."326
Thus, it would appear that a person for whom those boundaries re-
main indistinct is really only a child, and/or not fully human. Such
a person could certainly not be trusted truly to know or understand
the world, or, indeed, him- or herself.327
The idea of human beings as individuals before all else
reached its heyday with the emergence of liberal philosophy. In
contrast to the mediaeval view of the universe as an organic
whole,328 each person and each institution having its place and
function, the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries saw the ascen-
dancy of the idea that each person is his or her3 2 9 own universe.
Thus, in the "state of nature" made famous by Hobbes, Locke, and
Rousseau, human beings were fundamentally solitary, self-suffi-
cient, and independent3 3 O and it was only by the establishment of
326. Bordo, supra note 299, at 258 (emphasis added). Bordo suggests that the
Cartesian fear of and desire to control women (and nature) can be explained as the
result of a "drama of parturition"; the process of separation and individuation from
the mother is such a painful one that it gives rise to an ongoing anxiety about one's
separateness from others. Id. at 252. This anxiety could be assuaged by "an im-
agery of the cosmos" where we are all interconnected, with each other and with the
universe at large, but Descartes prefers a more radical break that is chosen and
"therefore experienced as autonomy rather than helplessness." Id. at 253-55, 259. It
has also been suggested that the very idea of transcendence of the body is informed
by one's relationship with one's mother, in that hers is the first body from which we
"escape." See Flax, supra note 295, at 257-58. If these suggestions are true, or even
partly true, they could go a long way towards explaining the relationship between
Cartesian philosophy and patriarchy, for women do not feel separateness from their
mothers so acutely as do men. See NANCY CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCTION OF MOTH-
ERING: PSYCHOANALYSIS AND TH SOCIOLOGY OF GENDER 167 (1978). See also GiLi-
GAN, supra note 12, at 46-47 (discussing Freud's position on mothers and sons).
327. It is therefore highly significant that one of the major insights of modern
feminist scholarship is that women are just such people. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 342-48.
328. See Bordo, supra note 299, at 251-55.
329. But probably "his." See infra text following note 354.
330. See Flax, supra note 295, at 265 ("Even childbearing gave rise only to brief,
utilitarian relations between mother and child.").
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private property, the division of labour, and the nuclear family that
the state of "civil society" was reached.331 On this view, most if not
all major trends and movements in human history-wars, revolu-
tions, industrialization, technological development-can be seen as
predominantly motivated by longing for that blissful former state of
autonomy.3 32
Thus, liberal philosophy concludes that the individual's
desires are paramount, being prior to social structures, and thus
prior to the position of the individual in society.333 "Logically if not
empirically, human individuals could exist outside a social context;
their essential characteristics, their needs and interests, their ca-
pacities and desires, are given independently of their social context
and are not created or even fundamentally altered by that con-
text."334 Moreover, the "metaphysical assumption of abstract indi-
vidualism" means that "each human individual has desires,
interests, etc., that in principle can be fulfilled quite separately
from the desires and interests of other people."33 5
This concept of atomistic individualism is not just a practical
philosophy336 but a world view-a set of assumptions about the re-
ality of human nature. It sees humanity as a series of atoms, which
may form itself into a collection of atoms, if that is perceived to be
in the interest of the individual atoms. However, if self-interest is
the only reason for the formation of social groups and the construc-
tion of connections between the atoms, 3 37 the atoms are still the
basic unit of humanity.
How might such a world view affect legal reasoning in the area
of mental injury occasioned by the death of or by injury to an-
331. Id. at 265-66.
332. Note, however, that Rousseau did not see fit to include the (patriarchal) nu-
clear family as an institution to be questioned, and this in spite of the fact that it
entails such a huge sacrifice of women's "natural" independence and autonomy. Id.
at 266. The nuclear family was necessitated by private property, as men had to be
sure that their heirs were legitimate, but no explanation is offered for the fact that
the property belonged to men rather than women. See id. at 265-68.
333. Liberal philosophy also rested on the "metaphysical dualism" of the mind-
body split. See ALISON M. JAGGAA, FEMInMST POLMCS AND HUMAN NATURE 28 (1983).
334. Id. at 29.
335. Id. at 30.
336. The instrumentality of liberal philosophy in establishing and justifying capi-
talism is clear. The only way individuals can be satisfied is by individual endeavour,
and so private enterprise becomes a good in itself.
337. Jaggar notes that not all liberal philosophers subscribe to the "thesis of uni-
versal egoism." JAGGAR, supra note 333, at 31. However, all such philosophers
would probably agree in this context on the importance of "rational self-interest" for
the establishment and perpetuation of social groupings.
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other?338 This type of injury is bound to raise conceptual difficul-
ties for one who sees human beings as fundamentally separate.
One who sees social relationships as acts of free will, rather than a
fundamental part of the human condition, would find it difficult to
understand that injury to one person can cause injury to another. If
relationships are acts of free will, it might be said that the injury
was also a result of the plaintiff's own choice.
We can see the influence of this kind of thinking in many of
the rules applied to emotional injury. The impact rule, for example,
can be understood on the basis of an assumption of egoism: if the
defendant does not hit me but someone else, that is none of my busi-
ness.3 3 9 Or consider this interpretation of the zone of danger rule:
it is only my own endangerment which creates a duty to me; the
breach of a duty to anyone else is a private matter between those
two people.S40 Even the Dillon guidelines, requiring as they do
some personal involvement in the accident causing the physical in-
jury to the third person, stop short of recognizing the importance of
the relationship itself.34 1 Even though the closeness of the rela-
tionship is one of the criteria, I cannot recover unless there has
been some impact on my senses. The simple knowledge that some-
one I love has been killed or injured is not recognized as something
that might change my life.
Thus, challenges to liberal individualism inevitably also chal-
lenge restrictive rules relating to recovery for mental injury, and
such challenges abound in feminist literature. Indeed, the funda-
mental feminist critique of liberal individualism is that it does not
account for women's experience of life as connection. First, as
Robin West points out, the biological experience of being female
generates the experience of feeling generally connected to others,
338. Again, it is not claimed that liberal philosophy has had any express, or even
any direct, impact on the development of tort law. This analysis is based on an edu-
cated guess that the world view propounded by liberalism has such a hold on the
minds of most people in the United States, Britain and Australia (especially on those
of the social class from which judges are most likely to come) that it cannot help but
filter into all institutions, including the courts. Prosser and Keeton have noted the
influence of"the highly individualistic philosophy of the older common law" in with-
holding recognition of duties of positive action. KEETON ET AL., supra note 33, at 373.
339. See supra part I.B.
340. It has already been noted that the ultimate import of the zone of danger rule
is that no duty is owed in respect to mental injury as such. See supra text accompa-
nying notes 57-58 and accompanying text. A very clear possible explanation for this
is the failure to recognize relationships and the possible consequences of their
disruption.
341. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
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especially to one's offspring.3 42 Menstruation is a monthly re-
minder of one's childbearing potential. Heterosexual intercourse is
a similar reminder, in that it can lead to pregnancy, and is further-
more an "invasive and 'connecting' experience" in itself.343 Preg-
nancy is probably the clearest example of women's connective
experience. 34 4 Lactation, or the creation inside one's own body of
food for another person, is also a clear example of a fundamental
connection between two people, and is experienced uniquely by wo-
men.34 5 However, these biological explanations do not fully explain
the common association of females with connectivity, given that
that association extends to, and indeed can be observed in, females
who have never had any of the above experiences.346
342. Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. Cm. L. REv. 1 (1988). That is,
it is the biological and reproductive aspects of femaleness that account in the great-
est part for women's feelings of connection to others. Id. at 2-3, 14.
343. It might be asked, if this is the case, whether heterosexual intercourse is also
a connective experience for men. Not being a man, I cannot answer this, but it is
suggested that differences in male and female anatomy make it less likely. The pe-
nis, being a visible presence, has a beginning and an end, but the vagina is both an
absence and a presence. It is "This Sexlual Organ] Which Is Not One-neither one
nor none, but possibly "two lips which embrace continually." Luce Irigaray, This Sex
Which Is Not One, in NEW FRENCH FEMINISMS 100 (Marks & de Courtivron eds.,
Claudia Reeder trans., 1981). (I would have chosen the words "kiss each other" over
"embrace," as this is a more accurate translation of the French "s'embrasser." The
original, Ce sexe qui n'en estpas un, was published in a volume of the same name in
1977). The fact that these lips allow of penetration make it difficult to say, in a
purely logical sense, exactly where a woman's body begins and ends.
It may further be wondered why West's analysis overlooks same-sex intercourse.
The most obvious response is that same-sex intercourse is not implicated in repro-
duction, but West does seem to suggest that penetration in itself blurs ego bounda-
ries. For completeness, then, it should be noted that not all sexual intercourse
between men and women involves penetration, and that some same-sex intercourse
(both between men and between women) does involve penetration. These observa-
tions do not, however, detract from West's central thesis, in that the vast majority of
women do experience penetration in intercourse at some point in their lives and the
vast majority of men do not.
344. Indeed, the very debate over abortion is, formally at least, a result of the
inability of our usual ways of understanding the status of people in relation to one
another to answer the question whether a fetus is part of the woman carrying it or a
separate person in its own right.
345. Again, it might be expected that the experience of being breast fed would
lead all children, male and female, to experience a connection with their mothers.
This may well be true, and further support for the notion that all human beings
experience the world in a connected way. On the other hand, accounts by psycholo-
gists of what comes after breast feeding suggest that the experience is very different
for boys and girls, in ways that would explain the subsequent apparent lack of con-
nectivity in men. See generally CHODOROW, supra note 326.
346. The fact that not all women experience any or all of these biological functions
does not, in my view, detract from the force of West's analysis; the fact remains that
the vast majority of women do experience at least one of the functions West men-
tions, and that even those who do not experience any or all of them are likely to have
at least expected, at some stage in their lives, to experience one or more of them.
This expectation in itself can give rise to a "sense of connection"; West explains how
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The most famous example of this observation is Carol Gilli-
gan's book, In a Different Voice.347 In it, she identifies an ethic of
caring and connection which seems to characterize women's moral
development from an early age. Gilligan notes that words like "re-
sponsibility" seem to have different meanings in the feminine and
masculine vocabularies. The "feminine voice" speaks of a world
where people are all fundamentally connected, and thus have re-
sponsibility for each other. Its approach to the settlement of dis-
putes is to emphasize caring and the preservation of relationships,
whereas the "masculine voice" sees people as fundamentally sepa-
rate, and attempts to resolve conflicts between them on the basis of
a hierarchy of rights.348
Carol Gilligan's work has captured a great deal of attention for
two reasons. First, in spite of the fact that it has been much criti-
cized, 349 it identifies something many women (including myself)
had always felt to be true, and thus validates the caring, connective
approach we have taken in our lives and with which we have per-
haps, as feminists, struggled. It speaks to the dissatisfaction many
of us felt about the "equality" approach to women's rights, which
appeared to mean that we had to become the same as men, leaving
behind large and, we suspected, valuable parts of ourselves.350 Sec-
such a sense of connection itself can lead to "a way of learning, a path of moral devel-
opment, an aesthetic sense, and a view of the world and of one's place within it which
sharply contrasts with men's." West, supra note 342, at 15. In other words, biologi-
cal experiences-and the expectation of those experiences-can have far-ranging
and very subtle social and psychological effects.
347. Supra note 12.
348. GILLiGAN, supra note 12, at 25-39.
349. Some of the strongest criticism of Gilligan's In a Different Voice has been on
methodological grounds. See, e.g., Cynthia F. Epstein, Faulty Framework: Conse-
quences of the Difference Model for Women in the Law, 35 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 309,
319-20 (1990) (arguing that Gilligan's generalizations about men and women were
drawn from an inadequate sample size and only three studies). See also generally
John Broughton, Women's Rationality and Men's Virtues: A Critique of Gender Dual-
ism in Gilligan's Theory of Moral Development, 50 Soc. REs. 597 (1983); Debra.
Nails, Social Scientific Sexism: Gilligan's Mismeasure of Man, 50 Soc. REs. 643
(1983); Catherine G. Greeno & Eleanor E. Maccoby, How Different is the Different
Voice?, 11 SIGNS 304 (1986); Zella Luria, A Methodological Critique, 11 SIGNS 316
(1986); CAROL TAVRIS, THE MISMEASURE OF WoMAN 79-90 (1992); Gertrude Nunner-
Winkler, Two Moralities? A Critical Discussion of an Ethic of Care and Responsibil-
ity Versus an Ethic of Rights and Justice, in ANl ETHic OF CARE: FEmNIST AND INTER.
DISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES (Mary J. Larrabee ed., 1993). For Gilligan's response to
her critics, see DuBois et al., supra note 323; Carol Gilligan, Reply by Carol Gilligan,
11 SItNs 324 (1986); Carol Gilligan, Moral Orientation and Moral Development, in
WOMEN AND MORAL THEoRY 10 (Eva F. Kittay & Diana T. Meters eds., 1987).
350. Much of the feminist literature on women and the legal profession, for exam-
ple, focuses on the unsatisfactory nature of the demands the legal profession makes
that women become more like men. See, e.g., Menkel-Meadow, supra note 324; Rand
Jack & Dana Crowley Jack, Women Lawyers: Archetype and Alternatives, 57 FORD-
HAM L. REv. 933 (1989).
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ond, Gilligan's work raises a number of important questions that
remain at the heart of feminist theory today: How can we ensure
respect for our differences in a world where difference means ine-
quality? How can we assert demands for full humanity in spite of
our differences from men without lending support to the essential-
ist claims about our differences that got us here in the first place?
How can we make people understand the complexities of the rela-
tionship between difference and equality?351
One answer is to recognize that the problem is not one of dif-
ference or equality, but one of power and domination. In other
words, the root cause of women's oppression is not inequality in
spite of sameness, or (substantive) differences in spite of (formal)
equality, but the overwhelming power men wield over us, which si-
lences us, makes us blame ourselves for our problems, and thus per-
petuates itself. It is for this reason that radical feminists such as
Catharine MacKinnon are wary of reliance on Gilligan's work, ar-
guing that the morality she identifies is not a "different voice" but
"morality in a higher register," the morality of those who have been
valued according to their ability to be caring and fulfill other tradi-
tional roles. 352 The feminist struggle, according to MacKinnon,
should focus instead on those institutions and practices which per-
petuate male power and silence women. 353
Problematic though Gilligan's work may be, it does say some-
thing about women that is probably true in some sense, and it has
clearly been clearly instrumental in formulating the fundamental
feminist insight that liberal "human" nature is not female nature-
so either women are not human, or liberalism is wrong in its as-
sumptions. A broader claim may also be made: that all people,
male and female, are fundamentally social beings, that it is our
351. One very good example of the way that insistence on differences between
women and men can backfire is the case of EEOC v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 839 F.2d
302 (7th Cir. 1988), where a large retailing company successfully argued that the
underrepresentation of women in its commission sales positions was a result not of
discrimination, but of women's different preferences. See Jacqueline D. Hall, Wo-
men's History Goes to Trial: EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck and Company, 11 SIGNS 751
(1986). Joan Scott has suggested that the way out of such a bind is to recognize that
difference and equality are not mutually exclusive, but mutually interdependent.
The very idea of equality rests on a recognition of difference-otherwise there would
be no need to talk about it. See Joan W. Scott, Deconstructing Equality-Versus-Dif
ference: Or, The Uses of Post-Structuralist Theory for Feminism, 14 FEMINIST STUD.
33, 46 (1988). See also Chamallas & Kerber, supra note 9, at 862-63.
352. CATHARuE MAcKiNNoN, FEMNISM UNMODIFIED 39 (1987). See also remarks
by MacKinnon in DuBois et al., supra note 323, at 27 (asserting that the "different
voice" is "the voice of the victim speaking without consciousness").
353. The silencing power of pornography, for example, is the core of MacKinon's
critique of that practice. See CATHARmE MAcKINNON, Francis Biddle's Sister: Por-
nography, Civil Rights and Speech, in MAcKINNON, supra note 352, at 163-97.
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ability to love and to form significant connections with others that
makes us human, and, perhaps more significantly, that connection
cannot be avoided for that very reason. Thus liberal individualism
may be wrong in relation to all people, although this is most clearly
perceived by women. A legal system determined to take women's
concerns seriously would recognize the importance of relationships
in a way that has not been done in any of the jurisdictions under
consideration in this article. It should not say, "Well, women
should not be that way because they are only perpetuating their
own misery, so we will go ahead and act as if they were not that
way." Such an approach is in fact a violation of the principle that
tortfeasors should take their victims as they find them.
A legal system that took the concerns of women seriously
would not be immediately suspicious of injury arising out of connec-
tions among the plaintiff and other people. Of course, some women
value connection more than others, and some men no doubt value
connection more than some women. However, the generalization
can be made that women, by and large, experience life as connec-
tion and are encouraged to value connection. Restrictive liability
rules relating to mental injury arising out of harm to another per-
son have been informed by a vision of human nature that does not
take the experiences and values of women into account. Both the
impact rule and the zone of danger rule treat plaintiffs who are in-
jured by fear for another person as either abnormal or unforesee-
able. The Dillon approach, while recognizing the importance of
relationships, really only differs from the older rules in that it re-
quires a lesser degree of directness in the relationship between the
defendant and the plaintiff. It recognizes mental injury only to the
extent that it is caused by some impact on the plaintiff's physical
senses, and stops short of recognizing that the disruption of a rela-
tionship may be a devastating thing.
C. Implicit Male Norms
When I was working on a early draft of this article, I was
asked, in a casual conversation, to explain its subject. When I did
so, my (male) interlocutor's reaction was to ask, "But don't you
think women are more sensitive to that kind of thing?" I could not
disagree; indeed, it is part of the purpose of this article to argue just
that. My response, however, was to ask another question: "More
sensitive than whom?" There is a difference between saying that
the fact that an injury has a disproportionate impact on women ap-
pears to lead courts to take it less seriously, and saying that they
are right in doing so. My interlocutor's question, prefaced as it was
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by "but," was really suggesting the latter. What he was in fact say-
ing was that the fact that there is a disparity between the sexes
means (or should mean) that whatever women are is excessively
[fill-in-the-blank]. (Or, if the disparity makes women less [fill-in-
the-blank] than men, we are automatically insufficiently [fill-in-the-
blank]). I could not have asked for a clearer example of an implicit
male norm.3 54
This is the fundamental problem of modem feminism: the fact
that men are consistently used as the standard and women are con-
sistently seen as a deviation from that standard. Traditional West-
ern philosophy is ridden with assumptions about humanity that are
based on its authors' experience as male, especially insofar as it
sees detachment and discontinuity between people as "the central
fact of human experience." We have already seen that this idea,
clearly present in the thought of Descartes, is a masculine one.
Hobbes also saw human beings as fundamentally separate and thus
failed to account for women's experience in childbearing and child-
rearing. The qualities required by such tasks were simply not seen
as part of the "human condition." It is clear that either a cause or
an effect (or probably both) of these positions is the devaluation of
women. In short, a third angle from which the law of mental injury
may be subjected to feminist analysis is that of the idea of an im-
plicit male norm.
1. Triviality and Economics
The use of a male standard explains the legal system's difficul-
ties with valuing injuries suffered by women, or injuries to "femi-
nine" interests. First, mental injury cases are riddled with the use
of female stereotypes to exclude recovery, especially when courts
rely on the triviality argument to support failure to recognize
mental injury355 or requirements relating to the seriousness of the
injury. Second, there is a structural bias against women built into
the system of damages assessment generally, which is put in relief
in the area of mental injury. This bias comes about as a result of
354. In fairness to my interlocutor, I should note that he took my point when I
launched into a tirade about implicit male norms. He then proceeded to argue that
women freely choose to value relationships and that disparities in power between
men and women are the result of that free choice, thus providing me with an excel-
lent illustration of another of my major points of feminist analysis: abstract individ-
ualism. See supra part IV.B. Another very good example of an implicit male norm is
the attitude that treats pregnancy as an abnormal state. For a discussion of how
this attitude has influenced the development of the law of mental injury, see
Chamallas & Kerber, supra note 9, at 834-35, 847-48.
355. See supra text accompanying notes 141-44.
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the common law's habit of concentrating on the economic aspects of
injuries.
The argument that mental injury is essentially trivial has at
its base an assumption that any seriousness the injury might hold
derives from the plaintiff's inability to control his or her emotions.
This assumption bears a striking similarity to the stereotype of wo-
men as overemotional.
There is no contradiction between the assertion that women's
overemotionality is a stereotype and the argument that women are
more attuned to the emotions than men.3 5 6 The point is not that
women are more emotional than men, but that we are, by and large,
more concerned than men with connection. Greater concern with
connection may entail a greater emphasis on the emotions. Stating
the proposition in terms of emotionality, however, automatically
raises negative connotations of irrationality. Of course, emotions
are in one sense irrational by definition,357 but if by irrational we
mean unreasonable, or incomprehensible, or not fully human, the
word certainly does not describe emotions. In any event, even as-
suming that women are more emotional than men, that "fact" does
not necessarily mean that we are too emotional, unless men are to
be the standard by which we are judged. The problem with the
stereotype, then, is not that it is descriptively false, but that it im-
ports a judgment and an implicit male norm. Once such injury is
valued and taken seriously, it is difficult to imagine courts relying
on the specious arguments described above358 for excluding or re-
stricting recovery.
The assumption that mental injury is trivial may also be at
least partly explained by the way the law privileges economic over
non-economic injury. This privileging amounts to a structural
bias359 against women for two reasons. First, the characterization
of loss as "economic" appears to be made on the basis of male val-
ues, because it disadvantages those who do not work outside the
home (mostly women). Second, the privileging of economic losses is
a structural bias against mental injury and leads to the conclusion
that such injury is trivial. This conclusion, in turn, leads to restric-
tive rules that fail to recognize the importance of the interest to be
356. See supra notes 316-21 and accompanying text.
357. That is, emotions are by definition not subject to control by the faculties of
thought and reason.
358. See supra part I.E.
359. Chamallas and Kerber define "structural bias" to mean a situation where
something which is disfavourvd (generally) is more likely to apply to a certain group.
Thus, if mental injury is disfavoured and more likely to be suffered by women, there
is a structural bias against women. Chamallas & Kerber, supra note 9, at 845.
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protected. Yet history suggests that the courts have, and are likely
to continue to have, difficulty recognizing the devastating effects
mental injury can have on an individual because the injury is not
"economic" in the sense that word is commonly understood in the
common law. The common law of negligence, having grown in re-
sponse to the massive increase in workplace accidents in the nine-
teenth century, displays a tendency to emphasize the strictly
economic aspects of accidents. Though damages for pain and suffer-
ing, and other "intangible" losses, make up a large proportion of
damages awards in most personal injury actions, the emphasis is
still on lost wages and earning capacity. Thus, the system automat-
ically favours those whose earning capacity is relatively great,3 60
which means that it automatically disfavours women.
It might be asked why this is such a bad thing, if it means that
everyone is put back in his or her former position. The system is,
after all, concerned with compensation rather than redistribution.
It is not the place of a compensation system to attempt to achieve
economic justice. The problem with such observations is that the
same injury has the same impact on a person, whether he or she is
rich or poor. The pain is the same; the sense of having been
wronged is the same. Yet damages awards for pain and suffering
appear to be a function of awards for lost earning capacity.
Moreover, even though damages are theoretically assessed ac-
cording to earning capacity, assessment of that capacity will un-
avoidably depend in large part on the plaintiff's actual earnings at
the time of the accident. Women generally are more likely than
men to be temporarily out of the workforce at any given time, and a
mother who has witnessed an injury to her son or daughter is even
more likely to have been out of the paid workforce at the time of the
injury. For such a woman, an injury will not affect her income, so
she will suffer in the lost earning capacity part of the award as well
as the pain and suffering component. Moreover, the common law
has become quite confused when faced with the issue of awarding
damages for loss of capacity to work in the home.361
More fundamentally, mental injury itself is likely to be seen as
non-economic in nature. It is common for an individual to be absent
360. See Richard Abel, Torts, in Tim PoLIrcs oF LAw: A PROGRESSrvE CRrrIQUE
189-190 (David Kairys ed., 1982).
361. The difficulty lies in conceptualizing a way of compensating domestic work-
ers for loss of their working capacity. The loss has variously been characterized as a
loss to the plaintiff's family rather than herself, or as loss of enjoyment of life rather
than loss of capacity to perform an economic function. See Lucinda Finley, A Break




from work for the duration of a physical injury or illness, but
mental or emotional states are not accorded the same status. Thus,
mental injury would be seen as non-economic by its very nature. If
economic injuries are privileged in personal injury actions, it is easy
to see how the conclusion could be reached that mental injury is
"trivial," even if there is strong evidence that the injury profoundly
affected the plaintiff's earning capacity.
An assumption that mental injury is essentially non-economic
and therefore trivial could begin to explain the lingering restric-
tions on recovery for mental injury. Insistence on physical manifes-
tation3 62 or psychiatric diagnosis clearly shows that the injury is
not regarded as "serious" unless it has economic consequences. The
physical manifestation requirement transforms the mental injury
into a physical one, which brings it back into the fold of easily recog-
nized losses. In a sense, the requirement is a built-in guarantee
that the loss will be economic, in the sense that the law under-
stands that term.
The psychiatric diagnosability requirement, while preferable
to one of a physical manifestation,363 defers to medicine a judgment
that should be made by the law. The doctor's evidence amounts to a
"medical certificate" that the plaintiff is unfit for work. Evidence of
a plaintiff's inability to work, of course, is highly relevant to the
assessment of damages, but here it is being used instead as a
threshold requirement, in the sense that without the medical certif-
icate, no cause of action is stated. This is inappropriate, because
injury may be profound and deserving of compensation even though
it is not "economic." A plaintiff should at least have the opportunity
to show that his or her injury fits the description of profound and
deserving of compensation, even if it is not economic in the usual
sense.
Much may be said for the importance of keeping trivial claims
out of the courts, but nothing suggests that the line between trivial
and non-trivial should be drawn according to whether the injury is
mental or physical. It is far too late to say now that mental injury
is automatically trivial and physical injury is automatically serious.
If the concern is triviality, the test should be triviality. The psychi-
atric diagnosability requirement is preferable to the physical mani-
festation requirement for this reason: that is, it is closely related to
the gravity of the injury. However, it is possible to imagine tests
even more finely attuned to the question of triviality.
362. See supra notes 105-07 and accompanying text.
363. See supra text accompanying notes 108-10.
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The preoccupation of most common lawyers with economic as-
pects of injuries is evident in the suggestion that damages should
be available only for out-of-pocket expenses arising out of mental
injury. Professor Richard S. Miller identifies proportionality of lia-
bility to culpability as the major concern in this area of the law364
and suggests that a limitation of damages to "tangible losses"365
would "make the punishment fit the crime."36 6 It has been sug-
gested above that the proportionality argument is rather a weak
one; 36 7 even if that analysis fails, there is no justification in apply-
ing the proportionality argument only to mental injury. If the con-
cern is proportionality, the test should be proportionality. Drawing
broad distinctions like that between mental and physical injury is
bound to work injustice in some cases, because such distinctions in-
crease the likelihood of tests unrelated to the policy they attempt to
effectuate. A preferable approach would recognize an injury's seri-
ousness on the basis of the importance of the interest with which
the tort interfered, and the degree of the interference. If an interest
in the lives and health of those we love is recognized as fundamen-
tal and worthy of protection, triviality concerns would not, indeed
could not, arise, except to the extent that they apply to all injury,
mental or physical.
2. Reasonable Foresight
Another way to exclude recovery for mental injury is by the
application of a foreseeability analysis, either at the remoteness
stage or at the duty stage of the negligence inquiry. Whenever the
idea of foreseeability is introduced, we must ask, "Whose foresee-
ability?" The answer, inevitably, is, "A man's foreseeability." Thus
a seemingly intractable male norm permeates the law of negligence.
As we have seen, the Australian case of Rowe v. McCartney
excluded recovery by a mentally injured plaintiff at the remoteness
stage on the basis that her guilt at the defendant's injuries was ir-
rational and therefore unforeseeable.368 This finding of unforesee-
ability shows the court's failure to recognize that mental injury is in
some sense by its very nature irrational, or perhaps arational. That
does not make it any less serious or any less devastating than "ra-
tional" injury. Nor does it make it any less foreseeable. The major-
364. Miller, supra note 64, at 19-20, 32, 34 (dismissing concerns over fraud and
floodgates).
365. Id. at 39.
366. This aphorism, drawn from Gilbert and Sullivan's The Mikado, appears in
the title of Miller's article.
367. See supra notes 173-80 and accompanying text.
368. [1976] 2 N.S.W.R. 72. See supra text accompanying notes 131-34.
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ity's decision in Rowe completely overlooks the fact that women are
trained to, and often do, blame themselves for injuries to others;
self-reproach is a (perhaps unfortunate) by-product of the ethic of
caring, which is part of the feminine condition in this society.3 6 9
The plaintiff in Rowe was indeed "responsible" for the defendant's
injuries, in the feminine moral sense,3 70 although not in the legal
sense, and so it may be said that her guilt was not irrational at all.
Its foreseeability, apparently, depends on who you are, and specifi-
cally on whether you look at it from a masculine or a feminine point
of view.
The problem of implicit male norms is especially apparent in
the standard of the "reasonable man," the "man on the Clapham
Omnibus," the "man who takes the magazines at home and in the
evening pushes the lawn mower in his shirtsleeves."3 7 1 As Profes-
sor Lucinda Finley comments: "These definitions refer to distinctly
male prototypes-the man who works outside the home, legally
governs the home, and participates in running the home only with
regard to physical maintenance activities using machinery."372
What exactly are the magazines that this man reads? Does he
think about the interconnectedness of all human beings as he
pushes the lawn mower? If Carol Gilligan is correct, he is less
likely to focus on connectedness than his wife, mother or sister.
Thus, this formerly explicit and now generally implicit373 male
norm could serve to exclude recovery for mental injury occasioned
by the death of or by injury to another person. The reasonable man
does not think, as he is driving down the street, about the families
of the people he might injure if he drives negligently. Since he does
not "have them in contemplation as being ... affected when [he is]
directing [his] mind to the acts or omissions which are called in
question,"3 74 no one else need do so, either.
369. See GILLIGAN, supra note 12, at 17, 30. Part of this ethic is the avoidance of
harm to others, which can extend to a responsibility to prevent others from harming
themselves. Id. at 50.
370. See GELIGAN, supra note 12, at 21-22, 37-38 (explaining that, [t]o Jake, re-
sponsibility means not doing what he wants because he is thinking of others; to Amy,
it means doing what others are counting on her to do regardless of what she herself
wants"); West, supra note 342, at 16-17.
371. Finley, supra note 361, at 58.
372. Id. See also Bender, supra note 1, at 20-25 (discussing the inherent male-
ness of the "reasonable man" standard and suggesting that an implicit male norm
remains even when the standard is changed to that of the "reasonable person").
373. Bender notes that most courts and commentators now use the term "reason-
able person." See Bender, supra note 1, at 21-22.
374. Donoghue v. Stevenson, 1932 App. Cas. 562, 580 (appeal taken from Scot.).
[Vol. 14:391
A FEMINIST CRITIQUE
On this analysis, it is easy to see why in many jurisdictions375
no duty is owed in respect of mental injury occasioned by the death
of or by injury to a third person: not only is the injury unforesee-
able, the plaintiff is as well. The use of a male norm in the context
of foreseeability raises different problems from those raised by the
use of a male norm in the context of recognition of injury. Recogni-
tion of mental injury as sounding in damages is really a question of
determining a "reasonable plaintiff," since the underlying attitude
seems to be that the unreasonableness of the injury makes its rec-
ognition inadvisable. Recognition of the injury obviates any need to
be concerned with the reasonableness of the plaintiff. Once we are
into the realm of the reasonable defendant, however, the problem
becomes much more complicated, because it can be solved only by
finding another standard.
Whatever standard is adopted must somehow recognize the
importance of connection without being too unrealistic in its expec-
tations of male defendants. It is tempting simply to say that from
now on the reasonable man is a reasonable person who recognizes
the importance of relationships-thinks about the fundamental in-
terconnectedness of all humans as he pushes the lawn mower-but
there is a flaw in that standard if it is descriptively untrue. As
much as its results would be desirable, it would amount to feminist
imperialism, or to an explicit female norm. 3 76
However, a view of human (or male) nature as recognizing the
fundamental importance of relationships is not necessarily descrip-
tively untrue. As Gilligan herself has recognized, men have signifi-
cant feelings of connection with others. 37 7 Moreover, events in this
century have led us back to something more like a pre-liberal world
view. Growing awareness of the destruction of the environment, for
example, is awareness of our connection to and dependence on the
earth, although such an awareness is in tension with classical lib-
eral values of freedom of choice and absence of responsibility for
375. These include those still applying the impact rule, see supra note 36, and
those applying the zone of danger rule, see supra note 42.
376. The idea of the "reasonable woman" was the subject of humorous treatment
in the fictitious case of Fardell v. Potts in A.P. Herbert's Uncommon Law discussed
in Bender, supra note 1. The judge in that case concluded that there is no such thing
as a "reasonable woman." Id. at 21-22 n.71 (quoting ALAN P. HERBERT, UNCOMMON
LAw 1, 5-6 (8th ed. 1969)). Christine A. Littleton has commented that "[m]uch of the
humour [of the case] apparently lies in the decision's plausibility." Christine A. Lit-
tleton, Feminist Jurisprudence: The Difference Method Makes, 41 STAN. L. REv. 751,
767 n.79 (1989). It is indeed no news that the quality of "reasonableness" has tradi-
tionally been associated with the male gender. See SUSAN MOLLER OK0N, WOMEN IN
WESTERN POLrICAL THOUGHT 99 (1979); Bender, supra note 1, at 22-25; Joan C.
Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REv. 797, 805 (1989).
377. See remarks of Carol Gilligan in DuBois et al., supra note 323.
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others, and poses a challenge to those values. Another example is
growing concern with international human rights, since atrocities
committed against Jews, homosexuals, communists, and gypsies
under the German Third Reich shocked the conscience of the world.
It is not liberal individualism that underlies that conscience. It is a
recognition that we are all part of the same human family: an atroc-
ity committed against someone I have not even met can be an atroc-
ity against me, as a fellow human being.
Thus, it can be argued that the fundamental interconnected-
ness of all human beings does occur to the reasonable person, or
even to the reasonable man, at least from time to time. If this is
true, it is not such a great step to require defendants to have in
mind the relatives of those whom they can physically endanger.
The implicit male norm contained in rules relating to a duty of care
in respect of mental injury is one of a masculine type, to which not
all or even most men conform in practice. The fact that women may
be, on the whole, more concerned than men with relationships378
does not mean that men are, on the whole, totally unconcerned with
relationships. A standard of reasonableness, then, which recog-
nized the importance of relationships, would move towards a gen-
eral human standard, without imposing unrealistic expectations on
those who have been taught to value relationships less than others.
In any event, it can be argued that tort law should have some
proscriptive function. If part of its goal is the deterrence of undesir-
able behaviour,379 there is nothing new about proscribing stan-
dards of conduct that are considered undesirable. On this view, the
standard is set by reference to an ideal; indeed, it could be said that
the reasonable man (or, more recently, person) always has been an
ideal, rather than a descriptive realitysso To hold that a duty of
care is owed in respect of mental injury, entailing as it does the
judgment that it is reasonable to recognize the importance of rela-
tionships, is permissible even if the average man or person does not
in fact share that recognition. A legal system that was determined
to take women's concerns seriously would hold defendants to the
standard described.
3. Heroism and Rescue
Another clear example of the application of a male norm in the
area of mental injury occasioned by the sight or fact of injury to a
378. See supra text accompanying notes 347-48.
379. See supra notes 175-78 and accompanying text.
380. See FLEMING, supra note 33, at 97-98; KEETON ET AL., supra note 33, at 174-
75 (observing that the reasonable man "never has existed on land or sea").
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loved one is provided by what I will call the "rescue cases." In these
cases, the plaintiff did not necessarily know the third person prior
to the accident, but suffered shock as a result of being involved in
an attempt to save or assist that person. The apparent ease with
which courts allow recovery in these cases suggests the application
of yet another male norm, one which rewards male virtues.
It is well known that the law wishes to encourage rescuers; in
fact, at times, the duty of care owed to the rescuee has been ex-
tended to the rescuer.381- Yet an analogous policy does not appear
to apply to mental injury occasioned by the death of or by injury to a
loved one. In short, the law appears to favour mental injury occa-
sioned by involvement in a rescue over that occasioned by the death
of or by injury to a loved one.3 8 2 There is something rather strange
about this contrast, especially where close limitations, relating to
the relationship between the plaintiff and the third person, are
placed on recovery for mental injury.
In Barnes v. Geiger383 the Massachusetts Appellate Court
commented: "To the degree that [Dziokonski v. Babineau38 4] estab-
lished a limitation of close familial relationship to set in motion the
psychic trauma-physical damage sequence, that limitation would
effectively be undone by acknowledging as actionable allegations of
an undefined intent to rescue."38 5 In other words, in a context
where the law has determined that family members should be
381. Beginning with California in 1959, every state in the United States has en-
acted some form of "good samaritan" statute as a means of encouraging people to
assist others in emergency situations. See generally Mitchell McInnes, Good Samar-
itan Statutes: A Summary and Analysis, 26 B.C. L. REv. 239 (1992). In general, such
statutes exempt persons who render emergency care to others from civil liability,
except in cases of gross negligence or wanton misconduct. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN.
§ 51-1-29 (1981). Although originally aimed at persons providing medical care,
many good samaritan statutes have been broadened to cover a wider range of per-
sons. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 205-b (McKinney Supp. 1995) (law enforce-
ment officials); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 225, para. 60/31 (Smith-Hurd 1993) (personnel at
free medical clinics); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2-374(b) (1981) (persons assisting someone
who is choking).
382. See Goodhart, supra note 44, at 350 (discussing Haynes v. Harwood, [1935] 1
K.B. 146); McNiece, supra note 30, at 6-7 (discussing Pugh v. London, B. & S.C. Ry.
[1896] 2 Q.B. 248).
383. 446 N.E.2d 78 (Mass. Ct. App. 1983).
384. 380 N.E.2d 1295 (Mass. 1978). This was the case where the zone of danger
rule was rejected in Massachusetts, and its place taken by something similar to the
Dillon criteria. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
385. 446 N.E.2d at 82. A similar observation was made by the Court of Appeals of
New York in Lafferty v. Manhasset Medical Ctr. Hosp., 429 N.E.2d 789 (N.Y. 1981),
where the plaintiff had witnessed the effect on her mother-in-law of a mismatched
blood transfusion, and participated in the events following the transfusion. New
York being a zone of danger state, the court rejected the argument that an exception
existed in relation to rescuers.
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favoured, it makes no immediate sense to favour unrelated
rescuers.
The Barnes court's observation related to a plaintiff's alleged
intent to rescue, but could be extended to actual involvement in a
rescue. If the rationale for relationship limitations is one of foresee-
ability,386 it is difficult to see how a rescuer's mental injury satisfies
this criterion any better than that of a bystander who witnessed the
injury but was too timid, or for some other reason unable, to become
involved in a rescue. Moreover, it is difficult to see how rescue is
any more foreseeable than the fact that the injured person is loved
by someone else.
The terms in which courts have spoken about rescuers suggest
that recognition of rescuers' injury simply arises out of an admira-
tion for heroism. One very good example is the New Jersey case of
Eyrich v. DaM,387 where two plaintiffs, a husband and wife, had
accompanied a small boy, their neighbour, to a circus. They were
both very close to the boy, Jay-Jay, having looked after him for the
first six months of his life while his father was in hospital; the hus-
band was described as Jay-Jay's "surrogate father," looking on him
as "the son he himself had never had."388 (The plaintiffs did, how-
ever, have three daughters.) When the child was severely mauled
by a leopard, the husband snatched him from the animal's mouth
and carried him, bleeding, away from the ring.389 The boy bled to
death, and the husband's injuries included cat phobia and olfactory
hallucinations.390 The court allowed recovery by Mr. Eyrich, while
rejecting recovery by Mrs. Eyrich, commenting:
[W]e are persuaded that defendant's liability to Mr. Eyrich does
not at all depend on his alleged bystander role. His role was
not that of a passive shocked witness but rather that of a res-
cuer, making a heroic effort to save the child from a negligently
created peril.... In doing so, he came poignantly close to saving
the child, whose life would have been spared if at that point
there had been a trained first-aid person in attendance at the
circus. Also in so doirig, he subjected himself to the risk of seri-
386. See, e.g., Jaensch v. Coffey, 155 C.L.R. 549, 591-592 (Austl. 1984).
387. 473 A.2d 539 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984). Another example is Mount Isa
Mines Ltd. v. Pusey, 125 C.L.R. 383 (Austl. 1970). This case, an important one for
the recognition of mental injury in Australia, involved a male plaintiff who had at-
tempted to assist two co-workers who had been fatally injured in a horrific accident.
It effectively overruled Chester v. Waverley Corp., 62 C.L.R. 1 (Austl. 1939), where
the plaintiff saw her drowned son dragged from a ditch. See supra notes 98-99 and
accompanying text. The final express overruling of Chester came in Jaensch v. Cof-
fey, 155 C.L.R. 549 (Austl. 1984). See supra text accompanying notes 97-100.
388. Eyrich, 473 A.2d at 541.
389. Id.
390. Id. at 543.
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ous physical injury even though his actual physical injury was
minor.3 9 1
This language creates a strong impression that the judge was treat-
ing the husband's injury more seriously than his wife's simply be-
cause of his heroism. For example, the word "heroic" would not
have been used before "effort" if the court had not considered that
aspect of the plaintiff's actions relevant. It was clearly not a ques-
tion of no longer being a mere bystander because of physical danger
(indeed, if the leopard was prone to mauling people, everyone in the
tent was in danger), but of voluntarily becoming more than a by-
stander. The fact that the husband recovered and the wife did not
was explained directly on the basis of the former's involvement in
the rescue.
Significantly, the Eyrich court's reasoning was not based on a
policy of encouraging rescues. Rather, it was based on the proposi-
tion that the rescue itself made the injury, and the injury's serious-
ness, more foreseeable:
While grief over the death of Jay-Jay is certainly a significant
component of his psychological problems, it is obvious that it is
not the only component and that his psychological problems
would have been very different had he not himself been in-
volved in the circumstances resulting in the boy's death. It de-
fies the most elementary understanding of the way trauma
affects the human mind to assert that Eyrich's physical contact
with the leopard, his seizing of the wounded child from its
mouth and the ultimate failure of his attempted rescue did not
constitute an integral and significant part of the entire episode
which caused his mental disturbance.3 92
It is very difficult to escape the conclusion that the court here saw
the husband's claim as simply more deserving than that of the wife,
because of his heroism and her timidity. The wife's claim, by con-
trast, was excluded on the basis of Dillon-type criteria previously
laid down by the Supreme Court of New Jersey.39 3 If she had been
related to the child, she would have recovered. The appellate divi-
sion, being an intermediate court, was unwilling to apply what it
considered to be an extension of that case. 394
391. Id. at 545. The Court also noted the "surprising disingenuousness requiring
our disapproval" of the defendants' failure to mention the rescue in their briefs. Id.
at 541 n.1.
392. Id. at 546-47. See also Lafferty v. Manhasset Medical Ctr. Hosp., 429 N.E.2d
789 (N.Y. 1981) (distinguishing actual rescue from intent to rescue, in a case where
the plaintiff's mother-in-law was administered a mismatched blood transfusion).
The proposition that a rescuer's shock is more foreseeable than that of a relative is
rejected by Teff, supra note 63, at 110.
393. See Portee v. Jaffee, 417 A.2d 521 (N.J. 1980).
394. It did suggest, however, an extension of the relationship criterion to cover
"the child's temporary caretaker or custodian" on the ground that injury to a child in
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In short, heroism takes one's injury outside the realm of Dil-
Ion-type criteria and into another category altogether. If one is
merely shocked by witnessing a horrifying injury to another person,
or on hearing of harm to a member of one's family, one remains
subject to (and, apparently, defeated by) the Dillon restrictions.
Now, this is all very well if one is trained to be a hero. The
development of courage in the face of physical danger is something
encouraged in men and generally actively discouraged in women.
The games that boys play, for example, have generally been more
physically dangerous than those played by girls. The iconography
of heroism is fundamentally masculine-war heroes, political he-
roes, religious heroes, police heroes, cartoon superheroes, cowboys,
explorers, the boy with his finger in the dike, were and are, almost
without exception, men. In situations of danger, there is a very
strong pressure on women to "leave it up to the men" to take care of
things-anything else could be seen as an insult to the latter's mas-
culinity. This makes the masculinity of heroism a self-perpetuating
phenomenon: women never learn to be heroes, because we rarely
have the opportunity. Thus, what might be called the "rescue ex-
ception" to restrictive mental injury rules is yet another structural
bias against women 395 and a clear example of the way that the law
rewards masculine but not feminine behaviour and reactions. Mas-
culine behaviour and reactions are apparently more valuable and
more worthy than feminine; they are the norm, the standard by
which all people are judged.
In sum, there are openings for the application of an implicit
male norm throughout the law of tort, and these opportunities have
been taken in the context of mental injury in several ways. First,
the failure to recognize mental injury on triviality grounds betrays
the application of masculine values. Second, the privileging of "eco-
nomic" injuries, and the way the law defines what is "economic," is
a structural bias against women. Third, the idea of the "reasonable
man," and judgments about what he or she can foresee, ensure that
women's perspectives will not be taken into account in the law. Fi-
nally, the courts' approach to mental injury occasioned by acts of
heroism demonstrates a valuation of masculine behaviour over the
feminine ethic of caring.
this situation would foreseeably impose "an excruciating and wrenching burden of
guilt." Eyrich, 473 A.2d at 547.




An additional problem with the law of mental injury, which
can be identified by feminist analysis, is the application of a double
standard. This very common patriarchal tactic, which places wo-
men in no-win situations and causes us to doubt our own worth, lies
at the foundation of the law's approach to mental injury.
There are two types of double standards: those which hold
men to a different standard from women where there would not ap-
pear to be any relevant distinction between the sexes, 396 and those
which hold women simultaneously to two mutually contradictory
standards. An example of the former is the expectation that men
need to, or at least will, "sow their wild oats" before settling down;
women, on the other hand, are to "save" ourselves for marriage.
There are many examples of double standards of the latter type.
Women are expected to be sexy and attractive, yet pure and
chaste-virgin and temptress. Another example is where the state
disfavours abortion397 and yet gives minimal and/or insufficient
support to single mothers. The most important double standard in
this context is that woman are valued for the way we can hold rela-
tionships together 398 and yet condemned for being overemotional.
If, on the one hand, our relative emotional wealth is innate, it
cannot be helped and therefore we should not be condemned for it.
Indeed, the only way we can be disfavoured simply for being who we
are is by the application of a male norm. Under a male norm, our
disadvantage is that we are not like men, and hence abnormal. If,
on the other hand, emphasizing relationships is something we learn
to do,399 it must be taught to us for a reason, and that reason must
be one which benefits men. There is, therefore, a deep hypocrisy in
396. Okin notes apparent double standards of this type in the thought of Plato
and Rousseau. The former clearly believes that upbringing is more important than
nature in forming human character, but justifies the subordinate position of women
in terms of their nature. OKIN, supra note 376, at 70. Rousseau's views on women
.are, unusually, very consciously held and adamantly justified, in spite of the fact
that they violate all the major principles of his ethics and social theory." Id. at 99.
397. See, e.g., Wilczyinski v. Goodman, 391 N.E.2d 479 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979), dis-
cussed in Barbara L. Bernier, Mothers as Plaintiffs in Prenatal Tort Cases: Recovery
for Physical and Emotional Damages, 4 HARv. WoMEN's L.J. 43, 55-56 (1981). The
plaintiff in Wilczyinski was seeking damages for an unsuccessful abortion, but her
claim was denied on the ground of public policy against abortion.
398. See supra note 349 and accompanying text. See also the observations of Lord
Justice Bankes in Hambrook v. Stokes Bros., [1925] 1 IKB. 141 (Eng. CA. 1924),
supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text. Bankes clearly valued the woman who
thought first of her child more than the one who thought only of herself.
399. It is my belief that this is most likely the dominant explanation. As Leslie
Bender says, "Ithere is too much evidence that suggests that gender is socially cre-




teaching us to value relationships and then not valuing the injuries
received when relationships are disrupted. If women are "more
sensitive to that kind of thing," we are that way because society
expects it of us. Society, then, should be willing to compensate us
when our concern with connection leads to injury.
Conclusion
The common law has a history of imposing restrictive liability
rules in the area of mental injury occasioned by the death of or by
injury to a third person. Initially, mental injury was not recognized
as sounding in damages, unless accompanied by the invasion of
some other protected interest, such as personal liberty, physical in-
tegrity, or reputation. Courts later limited liability depending on
whether the plaintiff had suffered some physical impact in the
events that caused the mental injury. The physical impact rule was
replaced in most jurisdictions by the "zone of danger" rule, which
limited recovery to individuals physically endangered by the de-
fendant's negligence. Finally, something approaching a traditional
negligence approach was applied to mental injury, first by the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court in Dillon v. Legg,40 0 and later by other juris-
dictions. Even this approach, however, contains what have turned
out to be mechanical tests that tend to decontextualize the problem
of recognizing that one person can suffer a mental injury as the re-
sult of a physical injury to another person.
The rules developed by courts purport to be prompted by con-
cerns about trivial or fraudulent claims, floods of litigation, and lia-
bility which is potentially disproportionate to fault. On closer
examination, however, it is clear that none of these arguments is
very convincing, and none of the tests really addresses the named
concerns in a principled way. Normal tort principles would seem to
favour recovery, and yet these principles appear to have been by-
passed or distorted.
I have therefore suggested that a structural bias against the
feminine may account for the arbitrariness with which the law has
approached mental injury. Mental injury can harm men as well as
women, but when it comes about as a result of injury to a third
person, it is injury to an interest defined as peculiarly feminine:
that of caring and relationships. The law has applied a masculine
epistemology to claims relating to mental injury. This masculine
epistemology has had two effects: first, it has insisted on a mind-
body split to differentiate mental from other injuries. Second, it has
400. 441 P.2d 911 (Cal. 1968).
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relied on scientific evidence to prove the reality and/or seriousness
of the injury, rather than paying attention to the common exper-
iences of women (and men) in this society. The law has also evi-
denced the influence of liberal ideas of individualism, which never
did account for women's experience of connection. It has applied
implicit male norms, including a privileging of economic losses over
others and of heroism over caring. Finally, an analysis of the law
exposes double standards, betraying a deep hypocrisy in society's
attitudes to women.
A legal system determined to take seriously the concerns of
women would correct all these mistakes by recognizing a funda-
mental interest in relationships. It would adopt a true reasonable
person test, and require this person to foresee the impact of his or
her actions on the loved ones of the people endangered by his or her
negligent acts. It would automatically take mental injury seriously,
and would not require plaintiffs to give extra evidence of its reality.
Finally, the rules dealing with any lingering concerns about expan-
sions in liability and the seriousness of the injury would apply to all
injury, rather than just to mental injury. In this way, an injury
more likely to be suffered by women than by men would not be sub-
ject to continuing discriminatory treatment.
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